Tag: CRS

U.S. Food Aid (Part 8): Nawiri in Arid Lands of Kenya

July 24, 2026    This is the eighth Hunger Notes article about Food for Peace programs to help inform the public and USDA about lessons learned during past decades about the design and evolution of US food aid, intended to inform USDA which has an outstanding request for information.

Nawiri was the most recent Food for Peace program for Kenya, with about $200 million to different NGOs, led by two groups, Catholic Relief Services and Mercy Corps, covering drought-prone arid lands with mixed pastoral and agricultural economies.  The CRS consortium included Caritas, Tufts University, IBTCI, Concern, Village Enterprise and Kenyatta University and worked in Isiola and Marsabit counties, while Mercy Corps worked in Samburu and Turkana counties, with Research Triangle Institute, AVSI, Viamo, Caritas and the African Population and Health Research Center.  Together these teams  reached some 550,000 people.

Program metrics showed that Nawiri achieved substantial positive impacts but the benefits were often uneven, context-dependent, and constrained by severe environmental shocks.   The implementing agencies found that acute (wasting) malnutrition varies significantly between neighboring wards, across different seasons, and over time, meaning that generalized regional approaches are often ineffective.  Also, screening methods like mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) and weight-for-height z-scores (WHZ) behave differently across seasons, sex, and age groups.  Relying solely on MUAC can delay the identification of malnourished children; employing both metrics is necessary to accurately capture different characteristics and stages of malnutrition.  Not surprisingly, they found that dry climate correlated with worse malnutrition.

NGO evidence generally showed that where their interventions were concentrated, malnutrition measurably fell.   During the period of study, wasting malnutrition declined by over 20% in target areas, though it increased 40% in Turkana. Furthermore, longitudinal studies noted that stunting (long-term malnutrition) increased significantly over time for the sample as a whole, particularly in Laisamis.

Increased systematic screening and referral of malnourished children to health posts were an important reason for those declines seen in wasting.  In the  Turkana, Nawiri equipped 210 community health volunteers in 4 communities with dosage carts, pneumonia beads, and malaria test kits.  Concern piloted an integrated health intervention that added malaria, pneumonia and diarrhea case management with existing integrated-management of acute malnutrition.

Some 57 water systems were rehabilitated, important in a dry lands, and Nawiri fostered 35 local “Water Use Associations” for ongoing improvements for tanks, pipes and water points.  Crops were expanded with irrigation: sorghum, maize, watermelon, green grams, fodder. A 7 km canal was desilted.

“The primary pathway between water insecurity and malnutrition in the arid lands of Kenya is women’s time burden collecting water to meet the minimum drinking and hygiene needs of the household. Water collection is performed exclusively by women and girls and remains one of the pervasively gender inequitable elements of pastoral life. Nawiri aims to address the role of water system functionality through borehole rehabilitation.”

The project found that traditional pastoralist strategic mobility and social institutions (like sharing milk, food, and childcare) are the frontline of disaster response and foundational to community resilience.  Nawiri helped establish retail shops (dukas) in remote areas to stock better varieties of nutritious foods, bringing vibrant markets to communities that previously had to travel up to 7 kilometers for basic goods.  Nawiri promoted livestock health and livestock disease surveillance.

Applying the graduation model, some 500 households in 14 villages graduated with Village Enterprise assistance.  In The Isiolo pilot (600 households) launched 204 businesses and 20 savings groups; Food Consumption Score rose from 51.3% to 83.8% in 3.5 months and children (6–23 mo) meeting minimum acceptable diet rose from 6.38% to 31.65%.

The Double-Edged Sword of Diversification: While livelihood diversification provides alternative income, it can act as a maladaptive coping mechanism if it forces women into labor-intensive, low-return activities,. The program observed that as women spent more time on business activities, time spent on childcare decreased, which in some zones led to reduced breastfeeding and higher acute malnutrition.  While the drought pushed communities to diversify away from livestock, weak local economies meant many new businesses sold the same basic goods (like sugar and flour), fast-tracking local market saturation

Under CRS, 207 teenagers graduated the “Nawiri na Ujuzi” course (tailoring, masonry, plumbing, electrical, mechanics, driving), which was jointly funded by Nawiri and the County Government of Isiolo.  CRS Deputy COP Margaret Kahiga notes all beneficiaries come from households with under-five children facing malnutrition.  In a separate area, a randomized controlled tiral conducted with the Rural Entrepreneur Access Project (REAP) in Samburu revealed a limitation to these economic benefits:  if market saturation crossed a certain tipping point (over 60% enrollment in a specific locality), the income impact for individual businesses could reduce over time as businesses competed against one another

Resilience was highly dependent on informal safety nets, asset ownership, and access to savings.   The program emphasized layered, sequenced interventions (e.g., combining water with agriculture, nutrition education, and markets) and local ownership, leading to better resilience against shocks like drought. The partner county governments agreed to sustaining gains post-closeout, including asset handovers and policy integration. The NGOs also observed a chronic deficiency in prioritizing and budgeting of government resources for nutrition, and political leaders frequently lack awareness of the importance of multisectoral nutrition approaches.

Much of Nawiri intentionally focused on formative research and theory-of-change-analysis during the first two years.  The  Feinstein International Center at Tufts University managed a longitudinal study (bimonthly surveys) in four sentinel sites.  Tufts found that few individual/household variables predict malnutrition, whereas basic structural drivers (pastoralism under pressure, climate variability, weakening customary institutions) dominate.  Mercy Corps’ review of longitudinal data found that wasting malnutrition had persistently been above 15% for three decades, without improvement.

Notably, DOGE terminated the CRS program, despite positive progress and investments, because DOGE’s simplistic word search through the fun. ding agreement found politically-offensive words, like “gender”, and “climate.”  Because Nawiri was terminated early, a full, independent endline evaluation of final impact may be incomplete.

–  Contributed by WHES board member, Steven Hansch

 

 

U.S. Food Aid (Part 7): Lessons of Exit & Sustainability

July 21, 2026   This is the seventh part of a Hunger Notes series that review of lessons of U.S. food aid.

The ultimate goal of aid agencies’ food aid projects is to solve hunger problems in a lasting way.  Rarely, however, are aid agencies able to come back and see what improvements persisted after the project was over.

Unique and powerful research conducted by Beatrice Lorge Rogers and Jennifer Coates of Tufts University’s School of Nutrition (commissioned by the USG Food for Peace program) looked in-depth at what happens after food assistance projects ended. Their key conclusion was that project success at the moment of exit does not reliably predict long term sustainability.  (see:  synthesis report.)

The study found that many interventions that looked strong around the end of implementation weakened or collapsed once external aid resources and incentives disappeared.  As a result, the researchers argued that sustainability must be designed from the beginning of a project, not added late in the final year. They emphasized that sustained outcomes require three jointly necessary factors. These are:  1) a continuing source of resources, 2) technical and managerial capacity, and 3) motivation that does not depend on project inputs. A fourth factor, linkages to institutions, is often essential for phase over. The study stated that “endline achievement is not evidence of durability” and that “hope is not a strategy.”  In a series of reports produced by Tufts University, they demonstrated that sustainability is a trajectory that unfolds over years, not a status measured at a single point in time.

The research followed twelve NGO projects funded by the US Food for Peace program in four countries: Bolivia, Honduras, India, and Kenya. These projects had been deemed to have been generally successful at the time of their completion, and had documented sustainability plans.  Included in the study were ADRA, CARE, Save the Children, World Vision, Food for the Hungry, ACDI/VoCA, Counterpart International, and local sub-awardees.  The Tufts study used mixed methods and collected data at exit and again one to three years later. It examined whether services continued, whether practices were maintained, and whether outcomes persisted or changed. The findings challenged common assumptions in development programming.

One assumption they found NGOs too often make is that once people have been trained, they will continue the activity. But the study found that training alone was not enough. People also needed motivation, resources, linkages, and opportunities to refresh knowledge. Another assumption is that establishing contact between community actors and government services will create a durable relationship. The study found that linkages were sustainable only when responsibilities were explicit, the receiving institution valued the activity, and the institution had staff, authority, budget, and supplies.

The research also showed that abrupt exits often led to collapse, while gradual exits that allowed independent operation before departure were more promising.

Across countries, sustainability requires deliberate integration of resources, capacity, motivation, and linkages. These factors need to be built into program design from the start. The study found that the first three factors were jointly necessary. No project achieved lasting sustainability without all three functioning together. Resources refer to a continuing source of financial, material, or human capital. Capacity refers to technical and managerial skills. Motivation refers to incentives that do not rely on project inputs. Linkages refer to vertical connections to institutions that can provide supervision, supplies, or market access. The study found that projects often achieved high impact at exit because they were supplying resources and incentives; but, once those supports disappeared, outcomes could remain stable, improve, erode, or change in unexpected ways. The researchers warned that focusing exclusively on maximizing impact at exit, as is common, can undermine sustainability.

“Even evidence of continued impact at one point in time post-exit may not predict long-term sustainability.”

Case examples illustrate these findings.  In Bolivia, NGOs built piped water systems and established community water committees. Households paid monthly user fees. The systems were highly sustainable because they combined resources, capacity, and motivation. The user fees provided resources. The committees had strong managerial capacity. Households valued the benefit of piped water and were motivated to pay. In contrast, water quality testing and chlorination collapsed. NGOs had managed and paid for water testing until the final day. Committees had never practiced independent operation. Beneficiaries disliked the taste of chlorine and did not perceive the need for treatment. Motivation was absent.

“Impact and sustainability are distinct achievements, and an exclusive focus on impact at exit may jeopardize sustainability. For example, providing free resources up to the time of project exit may maximize project impact, but the withdrawal of those resources poses a bigger threat to sustainability than a gradual withdrawal with the development of substitute resources.”

In agriculture, NGOs relied on model farmers to teach improved techniques. They provided free inputs to incentivize the model farmers. When the free inputs ended, almost all model farmers stopped training others. In maternal and child health, NGOs provided free food rations to mothers as incentives to attend community growth monitoring sessions. When the free food stopped, mothers abandoned the sessions. Many volunteer community health workers lost motivation and felt their roles had diminished. Mothers shifted participation to government clinics where cash transfers and supplements were available.  See:  Bolivia synthesis.

In Honduras, abrupt withdrawal of free food rations caused a sharp decline in mothers’ participation in health monitoring. Community health workers became demotivated. Interventions that established fee for service models and gradual transitions were more sustainable. Community managed piped water systems achieved high sustainability because they secured resources through user fees, built capacity, and maintained motivation. Linking farmers directly to commercial buyers was effective. Farmers continued agricultural practices and incomes because the linkage provided market access and motivation. Phase over to government programs struggled due to national resource constraints and a political crisis. Government health systems lacked resources to supervise volunteer health workers. Without supervision and supplies, the workers’ functionality declined.

In India, the government context shaped sustainability. The Indian Supreme Court ruled that food is a basic human right, and the government banned import of genetically modified corn soy blends. Food for Peace projects devoted their final phases to transitioning food aid responsibilities to government programs. CARE transitioned the food supply chain to the Integrated Child Development Service.  Many Anganwadi Centers maintained uninterrupted food supply for preschool children after exit. Take home rations were less reliable. In Orissa, distribution dropped dramatically due to irregular deliveries. In some states, beneficiaries reported that the quality of government rations had degraded so much that some fed it to animals. Mothers continued attending health days only to receive the rations. Catholic Relief Services attempted to transition school feeding programs to the Mid Day Meals program. This largely failed because the government lacked motivation to provide free food to private religious and boarding schools.

“The study findings demonstrate that it is critical to verify the validity of a project’s underlying theory of change at the project design stage and to reassess its validity throughout project implementation.”

The most sobering lesson from India was that the projects failed to reduce child malnutrition. The assumption that combining food supplementation with health education would reduce undernutrition was not supported by evidence.   See:  Synthesis of India study.

In Kenya, gradual exit was effective. CARE’s Community Savings Mobilization project organized savings groups and provided training. CARE provided no external seed capital. All loan funds came from members’ savings. CARE graduated the groups to independent operation after one year. For the remainder of the project, CARE served only as an on call technical resource. Three years after exit, the groups were thriving and multiplying. They had high motivation and solid organizational capacity. In agriculture, CARE required basmati rice farmers to assume the cost of premium seeds before exit. This resulted in independent producer associations. In contrast, abrupt exits led to collapse. NGOs managed water quality testing until the final day. Committees had never practiced budgeting or hiring services. Beneficiaries disliked chlorine. The practice was abandoned. In maternal and child health, NGOs distributed free food rations as incentives. When the free food ended, participation collapsed. Volunteer health workers lost motivation. In livestock health, community-based animal health workers charged fees from the beginning. Livestock owners valued the benefit and paid. The fees provided resources and motivation. This intervention was highly sustainable.

Across all four countries, the study found that free handouts pose severe risks to sustainability when no alternative local source is established. Free food rations, free agricultural inputs, and free services created expectations that could not be maintained. When the free resources ended, participation and service delivery collapsed. The study found that fee for service models were more sustainable when culturally appropriate and introduced early.

Charging fees established expectations and built market viability. Attempting to impose fees at the end of a previously free project almost always failed. The study also found that linkages to institutions were often necessary but not always viable. Linkages succeeded when the partner had resources, motivation, and capacity. Linkages failed when the partner lacked budget, staff, or political will. The study stated that “government will take over is not a strategy unless the government unit has both commitment and operational capacity.”

The research also emphasized the importance of designing for context and resilience. Projects operate within environments shaped by political, economic, and environmental shocks. In Kenya, droughts devastated yields and livestock herds shortly after exit. Farmers continued applying improved techniques, but the shock wiped out yields. They lacked resources to purchase inputs for the next season. In Honduras, a constitutional crisis reduced government resources and undermined planned phase over of health services. Sustainability plans must account for predictable shocks. Projects should integrate crop insurance, promote diversified income streams, and establish drought resistant infrastructure.

RECOMMENDATIONS

  • •  Post-project sustainability needs to be designed from the start of the project. NGOs should consider embedding lasting resources, build capacity, align with intrinsic motivation, and secure viable linkages.
  • •  Donors should extend timelines when there is evidence of progress. True capacity building and phase over often require more than five years.
  • •  Donors should fund post project evaluations five to ten years after exit. Sustainability is a trajectory, not a one time status.
  • •  Projects should avoid free handouts unless a local source of resources will exist after exit. Fee for service models and business approaches are more sustainable when introduced early.
  • •  Projects should cultivate multiple layers of government ownership. Continuity should not depend on a single political stakeholder. Commitments should be incorporated into municipal plans, budgets, administrative decisions, departmental responsibilities, and civil service job descriptions.
  • •  Projects should ensure that linkages are viable. Responsibilities must be explicit. The receiving institution needs to value the activity and have staff, authority, budget, and supplies. Mechanisms for communication, supervision, and accountability must remain active.
  • •  Projects should plan gradual exits. Communities and local organizations need time to operate independently while the NGO is still present. Abrupt exits often lead to collapse.
  • •   Projects should design for resilience. They should anticipate shocks and build systems that can withstand them.

The studies’ headline conclusion is that achieving high impact at exit does not guarantee long term sustainability.  The researchers found that “even evidence of continued impact at one point in time post exit may not predict long term sustainability.” They argued that sustainability requires resources, capacity, motivation, and linkages. These factors must be deliberately integrated into program design. The study influenced USAID’s Food Assistance and Food Security Strategy. Development awards came to require explicit sustainability plans and exit strategies. The four factor vocabulary entered mainstream guidance. The research provided a blueprint for designing programs that outlive their funding cycles. It showed that lasting development success depends not on short term statistical triumphs but on long term resilience and independent operation.

These studies had a profound influence on USG planning.  FFP’s decade strategy (released October 2016) explicitly reframed the agency’s development goal around sustaining gains; it “broadens the previous goal of reducing food insecurity to one that envisions improving food security and sustaining it,” and commits FFP and partners to “strive for greater impact with greater efficiency and sustainability.” Tufts and its collaborators state the connection directly. In a Tufts Now feature (Jan 2017):  “Food for Peace has already incorporated many of the recommendations from the Tufts study in its guidance to aid organizations.” Implementing partners echoed this; ACDI/VOCA (2021) described FFP as having “incorporated many of the recommendations that arose from Tufts University research into its 2016–2025 strategy, now requiring detailed sustainability plans for all DFSAs.”

Refer to:

https://www.fantaproject.org/research/exit-strategies-ffp

https://www.fantaproject.org/sites/default/files/resources/India-Exit-Strategies-Report-Jan2017.pdf

The past FANTA project (formerly, USAID) also continues to provide summaries and links.

–  Contributed by WHES board member, Steven Hansch

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U.S. Food Aid (Part 6): A Timeline of U.S. Food Aid

July 20, 2026    This is the sixth posting in an effort to inform the public and USDA about Food For Peace lessons and directions.  Below is a timeline of selected milestones in the history of U.S. food aid sent overseas. World Hunger Education Service compiled this from a range of sources with inputs from various experts. It selects for different ways that the US has provided foods to other countries with a particular emphasis on Food for Peace, PL 480, Title II.

Notably, at the time of this publication the key food aid initiative is the same as the first, in 1812: aid to Venezuela in response to an earthquake. Contents in this table is meant to complement and not reiterate content published in other articles here at Hunger Notes.   Photo credit:  The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston.

Timeframe U.S. Food Aid Milestones
1812 USG sends food aid to Venezuela after earthquake. President James Madison and Congress appropriate $50,000 for wheat flour aid.
1847 Choctaw nation in Oklahoma raises famine relief funds for Ireland.
1914-1919 Commission for Relief in Belgium during WWI channels U.S. wheat that fed 10 million people in Belgium and Northern France, daily. Future president Herbert Hoover organizes first large scale food logistics to combat famine.
1918-22 American Relief Administration provides 700,000 MT of famine-relief food aid to Russia, Poland, Austria.
1930 U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service posts agricultural attachés around the world, starting in South Africa, Sydney, Belgrade.
1943 Catholic Relief Services (CRS) channels food aid in war-torn Europe. U.S. foods for Europe went through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the UN Food and Agricultural Organization.
1944 Dutch famine (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague) led to US Operation Chowhound of B-17 Airdrops of flour, meat, eggs. Later US military trucked in food as Operation Faust.
1945 WWII famine relief. George McGovern in the 741st Bomb Squadron flew surplus food aid to Trieste in northeastern Italy. George McGovern later becomes first director of the Office of Food for Peace, and Democratic nominee for President.
1945-47 CARE Packages as WWII relief, using surplus US Army “10-in-1” rations stockpiled for the canceled invasion of Japan. CARE leaders negotiated with the Army to acquire nearly 3 million pre-packaged rations. Post-WWII US aid also flowed through multilateral channels like UNRRA, the Marshall Plan/GARIOA. CARE and CRS bridged U.S. surpluses through private networks.
1948-49 USG and UK airlift 296,000 tons of food (and coal) to West Berlin. CARE delivered 230,000 packages to Berlin on its own planes.
1948-51 American Friends Service Committee, CARE, and USG provide aid to famine threatened parts of India during the Partition that created India & Pakistan. US passed India Emergency Food Aid Act providing 2 million MT of grain.
1950s India looms large as major concern for large food shortages & famine. US provided large scale grain shipments under Title I and II.
1950s US holds large domestic reserves, including surplus dairy products. FFP framed as a benefit to US farmers as safety valve for purchasing surplus production.
1954 FFP assistance to Korea includes large quantities of wheat flour shipped under Title I, a total of $1.6 billion through 1974. Later in 1987, Korea became a food donor.
1954 Western Wheat Associates (U.S. wheat growers) used food aid for market development, teaching bakers in Japan and India how to use wheat flour.
1954 PL 480 signed into law by President Eisenhower with primarily Title 1 government to government food going to governments.
1954-59 Food aid to Pakistan, Japan, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Spain.
1955 CARE’s Board of Directors votes to not dissolve, but to refocus the organization’s aid from Europe to other continents, hence the name changes from Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe to “Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere.” This passed by a single vote. CARE implements Title I and II food aid in Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, India and Dominican Republic.
1958 “Food and Fiber as a Force for Freedom” Senate report recommends food as a force for democracy and coins the phrase “food for peace”, written by Senator Hubert Humphrey, future nominee for US president.
1959 INCAP in Central America creates Incaparina weaning food to prevent malnutrition.
1961 President John F. Kennedy rebrands the initiative “Food for Peace” and consolidates U.S. overseas assistance under the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Title III food aid created to incentivize agricultural modernization.
1961 WFP proposed by George McGovern, the first director of the U.S. Food for Peace program, as a three-year UN “experiment” to internationalize food aid.
1963 FFP fuels Operation Niños: Ag Secretary Orville Freeman claimed that U.S. food reached one in four Latin American children, that rural school-meal programs in Bolivia and Peru doubled school attendance. Food for Work also in S America.
1966 Egypt gets soft loans to purchase PL 480 food.
1966 Food aid in India peaked during the severe Indian famine of 1965–1966. During this time, the U.S. used food aid as a heavy diplomatic lever. CARE receives food aid for emergency food program in drought areas. President Johnson involved in every food aid decision related to India.
1966 The 1966 Food for Peace Act PL 89-808 reframes aid from surplus disposal to development conditionality and economic development. President Johnson transfers FFP direction from the White House to the State Department. Johnson emphasized agricultural reforms as a precondition for a country to receive food aid.
1966 Likuni Phala fortified weaning food is pioneered in Malawi.
1968 USAID offers Corn-Soy Milk (CSM) and Corn-Soy Blend (CSB) as fortified foods.
1968-69 U.S. C-97 Stratofreighters (Boeing) help deliver $50M of food aid to Biafra during war in Nigeria, via CRS, CARE, the ICRC and Joint Church Aid. First large scale deployment of new CSB. First live-televised famine; introduced kwashiorkor.
1972 World food crisis, Sahel famine.
1972-1974 Dan Shaughnessy directs Food for Peace and planning for the 1974 UN World Food Conference. Henry Kissinger plays central role in targeting countries for food aid.
1975 Integrated Child Development Services large child nutrition program in India. USG Corn Soya Milk and non-fat dried milk provided through South India Flour Mills for CARE’s “balahar” fortified food for school feeding, led by Tim Lavelle.
1976 World Hunger Education Service begins educating the public and USG about food aid issues and begins quarterly publication of the journal, Hunger Notes.
1977 Title III food aid revised to focus on barter for debt forgiveness and tying aid more explicitly to policy reforms and long-term development in recipient countries.
1979 Two key publications: Amartya Sen’s Poverty & Famines demonstrates that food insecurity is not only about food availability but also about access. Lincoln Chen demonstrates that risk of death increases non-linearly by degree of child wasting.
1979 U.S. donates polished (thiamine removed) white rice to anti-Khmer Rouge groups in Cambodia, resulting in epidemic beriberi (deficiency disease).
1980s Maternal Child Health (MCH) is main type of project supported by food aid, having grown during the 1970s. Food for Work also common for roads/infrastructure.
1983 Church World Service (CWS) stops taking USG FFP resources, following controversial episode of 60 Minutes on CBS about CWS programs in countries with communist governments. CWS goes overnight from being the largest food aid agency in the world to one of the smallest.
1984 Burma Border Consortium of NGOs formed, purchasing food locally for Burmese refugees in camps in Thailand, supported by the U.S. Department of State.
1985 Food for Progress Act explicitly references “Private Voluntary Organizations” or PVOs. Food for Progress authorized CCC financing for grants or credit sales to support agricultural development in developing countries and emerging democracies.
1985 6 million MT of food sent for African famine. Two supplemental appropriations made for Ethiopia famine. FFP manages $500M for Ethiopia alone, plus more for Sudan, and across 21 African countries.
1985 Farm Bill promotes PVO/NGO monetization, using Title II as an alternative revenue stream to direct-dollar grants. U.S. Dry Bean Council positioned pintos and black beans as shelf-stable, high-value food for NGOs to monetize. Initially monetization was to pay for internal transport, which was later funded by USAID in the 1990s.
1985 Ellen Levinson creates the Coalition for Food Aid of NGOs in Washington, DC to promote the roles of NGOs in food aid. Title II Enhancement Grant (later, Title II Strengthening Grant) for PVO headquarters capacity building.
1986 Famine Early Warning System Network (later named FEWS.NET), established on the advice of Tufts University’s President Jean Meyer. Credit also to John Field.
1989 Collapse of Soviet Union shifts emergency food aid gradually away from refugees fleeing regimes in host countries, instead to internally displaced persons.
1990 Food Aid Management funded by FFP with 5 original PVO members.
1990 Fred Cuny pioneers local purchase of food as a more appropriate response to food needs in Ethiopia.
1990s PVOs promote local village “grain reserves” with food aid for resilience.
1990-93 End of US food aid to Somalia leads to famine throughout 1992. President Bush directs US airlifts food via C-130s in late 1992. U.S. Food aid monetized to reduce retail prices across the country in 1993, but after famine has receded.
1990 “Partial monetization” turns into “100% monetization” for many NGOs.
1991 Famine Mitigation Project of experts convened by USAID to recommend best practices to prevention of famine. Including livestock, water, local food purchase.
1992 Food aid mobilization to former Soviet states where food insecurity tied to pensions lost from ruble devaluation. USG works through Red Cross movement. Operation Provide Hope channeled 25,000 MT to the Caucasus and Central Asian “Stans.” ADRA involved in Armenia and other states.
1992 Bosnia: Operation Provide Promise began July 2, 1992, becoming the longest-running humanitarian airlift in history. USG provided sorties into besieged Sarajevo, delivering food and other aid to civilians trapped by the Yugoslav war.
1992 Food Aid Management (FAM) publishes Generally Accepted Commodity Accountability Principles, GACAP, representing all NGOs working with US food aid.
1990s PVO/NGO “cooperating sponsors” include CRS, CARE, World Vision, Save the Children, ADRA, Land O Lakes, ACDI/VOCA, Food for the Hungry International, Project Concern, Africare, Technoserve, Partners for Development, World Relief, Mercy Corps, Lutheran World Relief, IOCC, UMCOR, and International Relief and Development. CARE is often lead food agency in refugee camps, while CRS is lead for IDPs.
1992-1994 FFP defines food security as: availability plus access plus bio-utilization.
1993-1996 FFP Director Robert Kramer rebalances food aid from entrenched USAID Mission projects to areas of greatest need (emergencies), and pushed WFP to recognize the greater priority in emergencies of food.
1993 FAM publishes NGO manual, Monetizing Food Aid, a Guide for PVOs.
1992 CRS’ Mike D’Adamo travels to Rome to strike a partnership with WFP, opening an era of WFP collaboration with NGOs.
1994 CARE and CRS account for roughly 72% of PVOs’ regular Title II programs.
1995 2 million refugees plus almost as many IDPs received some 240,000 MT of food in Rwanda and neighboring countries, following genocide and flight.
1995-97 North Korea’s famine received over 1.1 million metric tons.
1996 André Briend & Michel Lescanne create Plumpy’Nut, the first RUTF, at Nutriset.
1997 WFP strikes agreements partnering with NGOs for distribution activities.
1998 USG requires vegetable oil be fortified with vitamin A (and later, Vitamin D).
1997-2001 Asian financial crisis as currencies lost purchasing power. NGOs like IRD, and WFP used food aid as social protection safety nets.
1999 The majority of US food aid now channeled through WFP, not NGOs.
1999 USAID, FAM and the Canadian Govt convene food experts at a symposium at the American Red Cross to document feasibility of fortifying emergency food aid at the local level to mitigate micronutrient deficiency diseases widely seen among refugees.
2000 Global Food for Education Initiative $300 million, with CCC resources. Over next two decades, 5.5 billion meals for 31 million school children in 48 countries.
2000 Congress passes International Food Relief Partnership Act, amending Title II to authorized grants to US nonprofits to create shelf-stable food products for aid, such as Breedlove Foods in Texas.
2001 FFP Officer Tim Lavelle organizes long-term Bridge of Friendship pipeline from hub of Termez over the Amu Darya river from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan, facilitating hundreds of thousands of tons of famine-preventing food aid into Afghanistan.
2002 FFP nutritionist Tom Marchione promotes new formulations of CSB and nutrient-dense foods as part of commodity docket.
2002 CTC/CMAM modality for treating malnourished children with RUTF promoted.
2002 New McGovern-Dole Food for Education program passed in 2002 Farm Bill. This moves school feeding from Food for Peace to USDA.
2002 No more funding for Title III, a government-to-government program under PL 480 where the foreign government sold food for local currency proceeds.
2003 Large-scale U.S. emergency food aid rejected by five southern African famine-affected countries because US corn is genetically modified. Eventually the grain was milled in S. Africa before transporting to Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, etc.
2000s Food aid targets HIV/AIDS response primarily in sub-Sahara Africa. USAID Administrator Natsios pushes for more flexibility for local purchase of food.
2003 Dr. Patricia Wolff from Washington University, St Louis, founds “Meds & Foods for Kids” in Haiti and produces Medika Mamba.
2003 FANTA and FFP develop criteria for prioritization of non-emergency countries.
2004 Jeanie Markunas retires from long career overseeing Food for Peace.
2004 C-SAFE consortium (World Vision, CARE, CRS) manages food aid across southern Africa, with the World Food Programme as a sub-grantee.
2004 Globally, World Vision now channels food aid mostly as a sub-awardee under WFP whereas a few years earlier it was primarily a prime.
2005–2011 RUTF increasingly mainstreamed among NGOs, UNICEF & USAID as part of a shift from blended-flour to lipid-based products for targeted feeding of malnourished.
2006 SMART survey manual released, about measuring acute malnutrition and mortality, with the intent to standardize reliable data across agencies. In 2008, the Global Nutrition Cluster designated Action Against Hunger (ACF) as the global convener of SMART, including ongoing infrastructure, guidance, consultations. FAM hosts a workshop about SMART for monitoring malnutrition.
2008 Farm Bill Sec. 3206 created the pilot USDA Local and Regional Food Aid Procurement Program. The rule established grants for field-based projects consisting of local or regional procurement.
2007 USAID & IFRC plan food aid reserves for future pandemics that contract markets.
2008 Prices for corn and oil increased 125% over a short period, increasing malnutrition worldwide. The USG provided additional $2.8 billion across all international food aid programs, delivering 2.3 million metric tons for 43 million people.
2009 Decades of US food aid to India ends. Meanwhile, India donates food to WFP.
2009 Land O’Lakes International Development nonprofit pilots local purchase of food baskets in Zambia for people with HIV.
2009 Food Aid Quality Review research starts at Tufts University School of Nutrition.
2010 Congress approves The Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) to allow cash and voucher assistance, instead of only in-kind commodities, using International Disaster Assistance funds.
2010 MSF launches “starved for attention” campaign criticizing the US for donating CSB instead of only procuring RUTF.
2010s Ongoing scale up of RUF production by MANA and Edesia (U.S. NGOs).
2010-2011 Despite early warnings, over 200,000 Somalis die when US cuts off food aid because of Patriot Act. Food aid reinstated only after hunger season ended in 2011.
2010s “Sequencing, layering, and integration” promoted in FFP program designs.
2012 International Food Assistance Improvement Act of 2012 (H.R. 4141) sought to enhance nutritional quality and cost-effectiveness of food aid
2014 Farm Bill expanded Section 202(e) flexibility. USAID increase in authorized 202(e) funding to provide cash transfers, food vouchers, & local purchase modalities.
2014 Charles Hanrahan retires from the Congressional Research Service, after 29 years researching international food aid.
2015 Resilience Food Security Activities (RFSAs) formally introduced as new design of FFP development programs.
Mid 2010s Multi-year, development cooperative agreements, “MYAPs”, replaced by “DFAPs” as main form of FFP projects implemented by NGOs.
2017 Food to four well-publicized man-made famines: S Sudan, Somalia, Yemen & Nigeria.
2018 89% of FFP resources for emergencies. Development food aid % at all time low.
RFSAs emphasize new “graduation model”, along with theories-of-change, learning, and ‘pause and reflect.’
2019 USAID funds Nawiri resilience (RFSA) program in Kenya for northern, arid lands.
2020 Top recipient countries of US food aid from 2015 to 2020 were Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, DRC, Sudan, Afghanistan, Kenya, and Nigeria.
2022 Response to Ukraine war leads to full draining of the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust. USG also provides $388 million for shipping/freight, totaling $670 million.
2023 USG and WFP shut down food pipelines to Ethiopia. USAID Administrator on June 8 suspended food aid across Ethiopia because of widespread, coordinated theft of U.S. food by multiple actors (including to military units and markets). This stopped aid for ~20 million people amid drought and post-conflict needs.
2024 First RFSA program in Somalia.
2025 DOGE terminates many FFP (RFSA) and Food for Progress programs, while authority for FFP and FEWS shifted to State Department. A few RFSAs are re-started: Mercy Corps in Kenya, ADRA in DRC, Food for the Hungry in Ethiopia, and CRS in Haiti.
2025 December: FFP transitions again, to US Department of Agriculture which in February commits $452 million to WFP and bids new emergency programs for DRC, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya, & Rwanda.
2026 July: FFP announces $235 million to CRS for Ethiopia and Sudan.
2026 USG provides private and UN food aid in recovery from earthquake in Venezuela.

–  Contributed by WHES board members, edited by Steven Hansch

Nigeria’s Ongoing Nutrition Crises

July 4, 2026    In Nigeria, some 35 million people are projected to experience acute and severe food insecurity during the 2026 lean season, according to the most recent Cadre Harmonisé, representing the worst levels of hunger recorded in a decade.  The hunger crisis is worst in the country’s northeast, where an estimated 15,000 people in Borno State are at risk of catastrophic hunger.

In 2026, about 3 million children under five in Nigeria are projected to suffer from life-threatening severe acute malnutrition.  One million of these children are in the cluster of northeastern BAY States.  In addition to conflict and displacement, overcrowding, low maternal income and the use of infant formula are associated with a higher prevalence of wasting.  Nigeria has experienced near 30‑year‑high inflation, driven by rising food prices, supply‑side constraints, and exchange‑rate depreciation.  Food inflation has historically been the dominant driver of headline inflation.  The Government of Nigeria eliminated fuel subsidies and tightened monetary policy; these reforms may improve long‑term economic growth but have raised short‑term living costs.

Recently, displacement and flooding have also fueled cholera and measles outbreaks, with damaged water and sanitation infrastructure and low immunization coverage accelerating transmission.  In North and Central Nigeria, armed groups, rural bandits, and farmer-herder clashes have forced thousands of producers off their land, disrupting farming cycles and leaving large portions of farmland unused. Between 2022 and 2024, farmer-herder conflicts were recorded in 31 states, kidnappings in 10 states, and crop theft in 20 states. Over two million hectares of farmland in northern Nigeria are now inaccessible. 

this NE region borders Lake Chad where violence has increased.   UNHCR reports that more than 77,500 people have been displaced across the Lake Chad Basin since January 2026 as violence intensifies across Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.  According to UNHCR, incidents of violence rose by about 80 per cent between January 2024 and April 2026.  Similarly,  nearly 1,800 attacks and more than 5,700 deaths were recorded between September 2025 and May 2026 alone, reflecting what the agency described as a deepening protection crisis across the basin.

The “maize belt” (Borno, Niger, Plateau, Katsina, Gombe, Bauchi, Kogi, Kaduna, Oyo, Taraba), which produces ~44% of national maize, contains nearly half of that unused farmland.  Between April 2024 and March 2025, Nigeria spent $2.39 billion on food imports, 11.6% higher than the previous year, despite government commitments to boost local production.

Nigeria’s population roughly doubled from ~95–97 million in 1990 to ~232–237 million by 2024–2025 (growth rate ~2.1–2.4% annually). The under-5 population surged similarly. Agriculture (now ~24–28% of GDP, down historically) has grown too slowly (~2–3% annually in recent periods) to match, leading to rising food imports, per-capita production shortfalls, and pressure on resources. Smallholder-dominated, rain-fed systems with high post-harvest losses cannot keep up.  Nigeria’s child population is so large that even a stable or slightly declining malnutrition rate can mean millions of children affected.

Stunting remained alarmingly high, ranging from 7.2% (Osun, South West) to 61% (Kaduna, North Central), while wasting was as high as 29% (FCT Abuja, Central).  Stunting (chronic malnutrition, measured as height-for-age) among children under 5 fell from around 42–45% in the early 2000s (e.g., ~43% in 2003 NDHS data) to roughly 37% in 2013–2018 surveys and around 31.5–32% in more recent UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates (JME).  The overall prevalence of anemia and vitamin A deficiency ranged between 55.2 to 75.1 % and 5.3 to 67.6%, respectively.

The World Bank estimated the number of impoverished Nigerians rose from 89.8 million at the start of 2023 to 104 million in roughly a year.

SOLUTIONS

The National Home-Grown School Feeding Program (NHGSFP) provides school meals.  The National Social Safety Nets Program (NASSP) Cash Transfer gives cash to poor households.  The Federal Government, with UNICEF and other partners, has committed $30 million to the Small Quantity Lipid-Based Nutrient Supplements (SQ-LNS) initiative, targeting 2 million children aged 6-23 months in high-burden states.

The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization launched a $347 million Emergency and Resilience Plan (2026–2028). The strategy combines rapid agricultural assistance with long-term climate resilience, aiming to restore food production and reduce dependency on food aid for 12.6 million people across the north.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) runs nutrition projects in seven states in Nigeria: Borno, Bauchi, Katsina, Kano, Sokoto, Zamfara, and Kebbi. IOM tracks displacement and manages humanitarian hubs; UNHCR co-leads protection and durable-solutions work; Intersos and Helen Keller Intl operate where others have withdrawn.

Other NGOs with long-standing programs in Nigeria include Action Against Hunger, Partners for Development, Malteser, Christian Blind Mission, Save the Children, Plan International, and Catholic Relief Services.

  –  Contributed by WHES board member, Steven Hansch

 

Ethiopia’s Decades-Long Malnutrition Crises

June 16,2026      In Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country, roughly one in eight Ethiopians suffer food shortages in mid-2026 in many region-specific overlapping crises caused by fighting, drought, population displacements, refugees, sky-high prices, and sudden cuts in international aid.

A 2026 humanitarian analysis citing FEWS NET projected about 15. to 16 million Ethiopians in acute food insecurity, with IPC Phase 3 Crisis and Phase 4 Emergency conditions expected in parts of the country by this coming July 2026.  Large parts of eastern and southern Ethiopia are at “Crisis” level, meaning families are skipping meals, selling their animals, and running out of options. Some pockets near Harar, Dire Dawa, and the lowlands of East Hararghe in the east are Emergency level. Conflict-hit areas in Amhara and Tigray are also food insecure.

Children suffer most. Many are “wasted” (too thin for their height), which weakens their immune systems and can cause lifelong problems. In treatment centers in Gambella, the death rate for severely malnourished children reached 3.2%. . Similar death rates appear in Benishangul-Gumuz (2.7%) and South Ethiopia (2.8%). These are regions with almost no aid organizations working on nutrition, even though the need is urgent.

Tigray has repeatedly been a particular famine zone. SMART surveys and rapid nutrition assessments in Tigray and Amhara found child acute malnutrition above 15%, and 20% in four Tigray woredas.  From 2020 to 2022, a war between the government of Ethiopia and Tigray created a humanitarian crisis in Tigray.   Nutrition reporting from Tigray during the war was sparse.  Estimates of famine and civilian deaths during the war range from 96,000 to 378,000.

Causes for Ethiopia’s food crisis today:

  1. Conflict and displacement Fighting in Amhara, parts of Oromia (especially Wellega zones), and earlier wars in Tigray have forced more than 1.5 million people from their homes in Amhara and Afar alone. When people flee, they lose their farms, livestock, and access to clinics. Many health centers were looted or destroyed, so children cannot be screened or treated for malnutrition.
  2. Drought and climate shocks Pastoral communities in the Somali region (especially Doolo and Korahe zones), Afar, and South Ethiopia have suffered years of failed rains. Herders lose their animals — their main source of food and income. Some areas also face floods that destroy crops. These zones are often remote and “data-dark,” meaning they have not been properly surveyed recently, so the true scale of suffering is hidden.
  3. Aid cuts and supply breaks In 2023 a major scandal over stolen food aid led to a nationwide pause in deliveries. In 2025, big funding cuts (especially from the United States) caused the main program that feeds moderately malnourished children to stop across the entire country. Special peanut-paste treatment for severely malnourished kids also ran short. Refugee camps in Gambella region saw nutrition services shut down in several camps.

Foreign Assistance

Over the last fourty years, Ethiopia has received more food aid than any other country, around $20 billion worth, about half of it from the United States.  Most of the food aid has been to avert malnutrition among children or respond to famine.  Food aid was interrupted in 2023 over findings of food theft.

In the last decade, the U.S. Government has invested heavily in a single country-wide program called the Joint Emergency Operations Program (JEOP), led by Catholic Relief Services and including CARE, World Vision, Save the Children, Food for Hungry, ORDA, and REST.  Currently, the US Department of Agriculture is funding WFP in Ethiopia and reviewing proposals for new NGO emergency food and nutrition assistance, likely in the $80 million range.

Separately, the Joint UN Initiative for the Prevention of Wasting was launched in Ethiopia in August 2025 by the Federal Ministry of Health with WHO, UNICEF, and WFP, supported by FCDO. It is a five-year, multisectoral effort to prevent wasting among children 0–18 months in food-insecure settings.

The Ethiopia Nutrition Cluster (a group of UN agencies and NGOs) coordinates humanitarian assistance. dozens of high-need zones, especially in Gambella, South Ethiopia, parts of Somali, and conflict areas of Amhara and Oromia, have zero or only one nutrition partner. These “neglected gap zones” are the places where extra help could save the most lives.

In addition to the agencies mentioned above, aid nonprofits (NGOs) that address food and nutrition in Ethiopia include:  Oxfam, Welthungerhilfe, GOAL, Mercy Corps, Action Against Hunger, Project Hope, Tearfund, Plan International, Concern Worldwide, Islamic Relief, Cordaid, Terre des Hommes, and Norwegian Church Aid.

Many aid agencies work via networks such as the half-century-old  Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations (CCRDA).   In Tigray, a long-term relief agency that managed food aid in multiple famines is the Relief Society of Tigray, known as REST.

–  Contributed by WHES board member, Steven Hansch

 

New Food for Peace Programming by the U.S. Department of Agriculture

May 24, 2026    BACKGROUND:   The primary way that the United States government, working with nonprofits, has fought hunger and malnutrition around the world has been through the U.S. Food for Peace program (originally Public Law 480, or PL 480), which began in 1954 and was expanded by President Kennedy in 1961, at which time it took on the name Food for Peace (FFP). Over seven decades, it has reached roughly 4 billion people in 150 countries through a mix of emergency relief and longer‑term development projects. Annual funding has typically ranged from $1.2–2 billion in recent years for the core Title II program (the main grant‑based humanitarian component), though overall international food assistance outlays have averaged $2–2.6 billion, fluctuating with global needs.

The structure and flow of resources for FFP begin with Congress, where appropriations come through agriculture and foreign operations bills. In its early history, most FFP aid went to “development,” but over time the balance has shifted toward emergencies. The main food commodities provided by the United States have been wheat, rice, sorghum, corn‑soy blends, beans, peas, lentils, vegetable oil, and ready‑to‑use supplemental foods. These are purchased competitively from U.S. farmers and producers and often bagged on ocean freighters bound for Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

RECENT ADMINISRATIVE SHIFTS:   After the Trump Administration dissolved USAID in 2025, FFP planning and administration moved temporarily to the State Department and then, in late 2025, to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, with a strong “America First” focus on buying American‑grown foods. In December 2025, USDA and the U.S. Department of State signed an interagency agreement for USDA to take over FFP. USDA has long supervised other in‑kind international food aid programs, including the school‑feeding‑focused McGovern‑Dole Food for Education and the development‑focused Food for Progress (FFPr) programs, each delivered via partnerships with NGOs and the U.N. World Food Programme.

For many months it had been unclear how USDA would redesign FFP, how it would work with other organizations to deliver aid, and where. Then, in early May 2026, USDA announced a $350 million allocation of foods to WFP. In response, U.S. Wheat Associates announced that it “welcomes the announcement of the award of 20,000 metric tons (MT) (735,000 bushels) for emergency feeding programs under the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) administration of the FFP program.”

NEW OFFERINGS

The new May 2026 Notice of Funding Opportunities published by USDA for NGO proposals sets out three reforms USDA has applied to the inherited portfolio:

  • *-100% U.S. origin for every commodity procured.
  • *-Strict traceability of every taxpayer dollar to guard against fraud, waste, and diversion.
  • *-“Offboarding and graduating” criteria, so that Title II funding “prioritizes emergency and in‑need geographies rather than forever‑aid countries.”

At present, the geographic scope has narrowed. NGO applications can only be submitted for seven countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya, and Rwanda—a notable contraction from the broader Title II caseload USAID historically managed. Award sizes range from $20 million to $200 million, with USDA anticipating seven to fourteen awards out of $357 million in available federal funding, and a performance period of 18 to 24 months. The application submission deadline was June 12, 2026. Eligible applicants include public or private organizations, including intergovernmental organizations, language that explicitly keeps WFP and similar multilateral partners involved, while foreign governments are excluded.

With the large‑scale defunding of U.S. NGOs and other aid partners in 2025, intense competition for these new FFP program awards is expected.  NGOs such as CARE, CRS, World Vision, Mercy Corps, Save the Children and Action Against Hunger applied for FFP grants.

At the same time, USDA is layering the program on top of its existing Food for Progress (FFPr) framework. Separate from Title II FFP, the new FY26 Food for Progress solicitation to NGOs—released last week, closing July 6, 2026, with awards expected by late September—makes up to $226 million available across seven countries: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ecuador, Morocco, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, with awards of $28–35 million over four‑to‑five‑year performance periods. Food for Progress operates on a monetization model authorized under the Food Security Act of 1985 (7 U.S.C. § 1736o) in which the USDA buys U.S. commodities domestically and ships them overseas, the NGO sells them in emerging markets, and the NGO uses the proceeds to fund agricultural development.  Monetization used to be standard as well for FFP programs particularly in the 1990s.

Both of these competitions for bids are concurrent with USDA funding opportunities for school feeding (McGovern‑Dole).

See also:  USDA:  https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/food-peace

https://alliancetoendhunger.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/FINAL-FY27-ATEH-Senate-Agriculture-Appropriations-Letter-1.pdf

and:  https://www.devex.com/news/house-locks-food-for-peace-into-usda-with-50-commodity-requirement-112420

A primer from the Congressional Research Service here

Roundtable Meeting NGOs’ the Duty of Care for National Staff

May 9, 2026       Increasingly aid agencies have argued for more decision- making, resources and active roles for “local”, or national, actors in aid programs, including food, nutrition and other development and humanitarian efforts.  At the same time, aid agencies have taken efforts to provide balanced “duty of care” (DoC) for local employees, partners, volunteers and their families during disasters.  But best practice standards remain unclear and there are many challenges, if not barriers, to achieving the goals of DoC across security, training, psychosocial care, rest and relaxation, legal support, relocation and other dimensions.

On March 13, World Hunger Education serivce (publisher of this online educational platform, “Hunger Notes”) partnered with Compassion International and George Washington University in hosting a roundtable of experts from two dozen aid agencies, for a two-hour open discussion to share lessons about DoC.

A central concern was the persistent gap between policy and practice. Local staff often work in dangerous environments, carry the “double burden” of being both responders and affected community members, and have limited access to evacuation, psychosocial support, family assistance, and equitable medical care. Participants also noted that security, HR, and wellness systems remain siloed within organizational systems and responsibilities, weakening crisis response.

One participant said, “In disasters national staff deployed away from home are exposed to crisis contexts and deserve the same evacuation protections as international staff.”

The roundtable highlighted additional problems in federated NGO structures and sub-granting systems, where responsibility for partner staff is often unclear. Family support, remote work options during conflict, and coverage for indirect workers remain underdeveloped. At the same time, participants cited emerging improvements: more donor attention, growing mental health awareness, contextualized well-being frameworks, and some stronger onboarding and training models.

“Framing duty of care as mission-driven (not compliance- or HR-driven) is the key to getting executive support.”

Overall, the meeting concluded that NGOs need clearer definitions of who is covered, more equitable protections for local staff, harmonized policies, better training, and a stronger cross-sector community of practice.

See this downloadable below: 

Roundtable Summary Duty of Care (public)

Hunger Crisis in Myanmar/Burma

May 2, 2026      According to the latest Hunger Hotspots Report, 16.7 million people, or one in three citizens of Myanmar (also known as Burma), are acutely food insecure, a sharp increase from 13.3 million in 2024. Myanmar now ranks fifth globally for the highest number of people facing severe hunger.

More than 400,000 young children and mothers suffering from acute malnutrition are surviving on nutrient-deprived diets of plain rice or watery porridge. WFP’s country director has said the crisis is invisible to the world. WFP can target just 1.5 million of the 12.4 million people in need and requires $150 million to do even that. No recent national prevalence data exist on wasting, but subnational surveys (for example, one in Yangon and Ayeyarwady Regions in late 2023) found about 8 percent wasting, slightly higher than the prior national figure. Broader food security and nutrition monitoring, including Myanmar Household Welfare Survey rounds from 2021 to 2025, shows worsening dietary diversity, higher food insecurity affecting millions, and increased household hunger since 2021.

Related to malnutrition, Myanmar’s under-five mortality rate—39 deaths per 1,000 live births—is nearly three times higher than the East Asia and Pacific regional average of 14.4.

The roots of the current hunger crisis lie in the military takeover of the government in February 2021. Since the coup, intensifying conflict has led to an estimated 15.2 million people, nearly a third of Myanmar’s population, facing acute food insecurity in 2025. The junta has retaliated against resistance forces by blockading aid, restricting humanitarian access, limiting trade routes, and targeting humanitarian workers, further compounding the food crisis. Military attacks have destroyed agricultural equipment and contaminated farmland with landmines and unexploded ordnance, exacerbating challenges for local food production. The average price of a basic food basket has increased fourfold compared with prices before the military takeover.

The situation is particularly critical in Rakhine State, home to the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities. UNDP has reported that Rakhine State is on the brink of famine, with two million people at risk of starvation. The Myanmar military’s near-total blockade of humanitarian aid to Rakhine State since 2023 violates international humanitarian law and likely constitutes a war crime.

Many readers may remember the large 7.7-magnitude earthquake that struck central Myanmar on March 28, 2025, killing more than 3,700 people, destroying infrastructure, and reverberating through neighboring countries. A large share of aid donations was made in response to that quake.

International aid organizations working to address malnutrition in Myanmar include Action Against Hunger (ACF), Save the Children, Mercy Corps, Solidarités International, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and Catholic Relief Services (CRS).

World Vision provides aid in 11 of the country’s 14 states and regions. ACF is currently implementing projects addressing malnutrition, mental health and care practices, food security and livelihoods, water, sanitation, and hygiene, nutrition security, and disaster risk reduction in Chin State, Kayah State, and Rakhine State. MSF has mobile teams in Naga and Sagaing, a remote, mountainous region in northern Myanmar where communities have limited access to basic healthcare. Despite restrictions on humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas, mobile teams based in Sittwe, in central Rakhine, offer primary healthcare and emergency referrals for patients from all communities.  The IRC works in Rakhine, Kachin, Kayin, and Shan States in close collaboration with the Ministry of Health.  Save the Children provides aid in Mandalay, Sagaing, Bago, Magway, Shan, and Naypyidaw. CRS’s current projects in Myanmar focus on agriculture and livelihoods and support for emergency response. CRS works with local Caritas partners to build capacity for community-led project design and implementation.  CRS Myanmar also supports partners in Kachin on community-led shelter efforts and provides technical assistance in community-led return and resettlement.

Community Partners International (CPI) provides community-based healthcare, particularly in conflict-affected border regions where government services are non-existent.  This includes “Backpack Medics,” who travel to remote villages to provide primary care, trauma surgery, and vaccinations. CPI also runs maternity waiting homes and trains community health workers to support safe births in conflict zones.

In Myanmar, the UN World Food Program (WFP) provides food rations to vulnerable populations, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and people affected by natural disasters or conflict.  WFP also runs school feeding programs in areas with high food insecurity, providing nutritious meals to children in schools.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provides nutrition and health support for war victims in Myanmar.  In 2024 and 2025, the ICRC provided food rations, including rice, oil, and beans, to thousands of displaced families in areas such as northern Shan State, Mandalay, and Sagaing.

To the east of Myanmar, there are some two million refugees in Thailand.  The Border Consortium (formerly the Burma Border Consortium) of NGOs has operated in  nine refugee camps along the Thai–Myanmar border since the 1980s, providing foodIt remains the primary agency responsible for food assistance.  However, its operations have been severely reduced. By mid‑2025, TBC announced that food assistance for most households would be cut by 75% or eliminated entirely.

–  Contributed by WHES board member, Steven Hansch