Tag: ADRA

U.S. Food Aid (Part 6): A Timeline of U.S. Food Aid

July 20, 2026    This is the sixth posting in an effort to inform the public and USDA about Food For Peace lessons and directions.  Below is a timeline of selected milestones in the history of U.S. food aid sent overseas. World Hunger Education Service compiled this from a range of sources with inputs from various experts. It selects for different ways that the US has provided foods to other countries with a particular emphasis on Food for Peace, PL 480, Title II.

Notably, at the time of this publication the key food aid initiative is the same as the first, in 1812: aid to Venezuela in response to an earthquake. Contents in this table is meant to complement and not reiterate content published in other articles here at Hunger Notes.   Photo credit:  The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston

Timeframe U.S. Food Aid Milestones
1812 USG sends food aid to Venezuela after earthquake. President James Madison and Congress appropriate $50,000 for wheat flour aid.
1847 Choctaw nation in Oklahoma raises famine relief funds for Ireland.
1914-1919 Commission for Relief in Belgium during WWI channels U.S. wheat that fed 10 million people in Belgium and Northern France, daily. Future president Herbert Hoover organizes first large scale food logistics to combat famine.
1918-22 American Relief Administration provides 700,000 MT of famine-relief food aid to Russia, Poland, Austria.
1930 U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service posts agricultural attachés around the world, starting in South Africa, Sydney, Belgrade.
1943 Catholic Relief Services (CRS) channels food aid in war-torn Europe. U.S. foods for Europe went through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the UN Food and Agricultural Organization.
1944 Dutch famine (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague) led to US Operation Chowhound of B-17 Airdrops of flour, meat, eggs. Later US military trucked in food as Operation Faust.
1945 WWII famine relief. George McGovern in the 741st Bomb Squadron flew surplus food aid to Trieste in northeastern Italy. George McGovern later becomes first director of the Office of Food for Peace, and Democratic nominee for President.
1945-47 CARE Packages as WWII relief, using surplus US Army “10-in-1” rations stockpiled for the canceled invasion of Japan. CARE leaders negotiated with the Army to acquire nearly 3 million pre-packaged rations. Post-WWII US aid also flowed through multilateral channels like UNRRA, the Marshall Plan/GARIOA. CARE and CRS bridged U.S. surpluses through private networks.
1948-49 USG and UK airlift 296,000 tons of food (and coal) to West Berlin. CARE delivered 230,000 packages to Berlin on its own planes.
1948-51 American Friends Service Committee, CARE, and USG provide aid to famine threatened parts of India during the Partition that created India & Pakistan. US passed India Emergency Food Aid Act providing 2 million MT of grain.
1950s India looms large as major concern for large food shortages & famine. US provided large scale grain shipments under Title I and II.
1950s US holds large domestic reserves, including surplus dairy products. FFP framed as a benefit to US farmers as safety valve for purchasing surplus production.
1954 FFP assistance to Korea includes large quantities of wheat flour shipped under Title I, a total of $1.6 billion through 1974. Later in 1987, Korea became a food donor.
1954 Western Wheat Associates (U.S. wheat growers) used food aid for market development, teaching bakers in Japan and India how to use wheat flour.
1954 PL 480 signed into law by President Eisenhower with primarily Title 1 government to government food going to governments.
1954-59 Food aid to Pakistan, Japan, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Spain.
1955 CARE’s Board of Directors votes to not dissolve, but to refocus the organization’s aid from Europe to other continents, hence the name changes from Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe to “Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere.” This passed by a single vote. CARE implements Title I and II food aid in Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, India and Dominican Republic.
1958 “Food and Fiber as a Force for Freedom” Senate report recommends food as a force for democracy and coins the phrase “food for peace”, written by Senator Hubert Humphrey, future nominee for US president.
1959 INCAP in Central America creates Incaparina weaning food to prevent malnutrition.
1961 President John F. Kennedy rebrands the initiative “Food for Peace” and consolidates U.S. overseas assistance under the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Title III food aid created to incentivize agricultural modernization.
1961 WFP proposed by George McGovern, the first director of the U.S. Food for Peace program, as a three-year UN “experiment” to internationalize food aid.
1963 FFP fuels Operation Niños: Ag Secretary Orville Freeman claimed that U.S. food reached one in four Latin American children, that rural school-meal programs in Bolivia and Peru doubled school attendance. Food for Work also in S America.
1966 Egypt gets soft loans to purchase PL 480 food.
1966 Food aid in India peaked during the severe Indian famine of 1965–1966. During this time, the U.S. used food aid as a heavy diplomatic lever. CARE receives food aid for emergency food program in drought areas. President Johnson involved in every food aid decision related to India.
1966 The 1966 Food for Peace Act PL 89-808 reframes aid from surplus disposal to development conditionality and economic development. President Johnson transfers FFP direction from the White House to the State Department. Johnson emphasized agricultural reforms as a precondition for a country to receive food aid.
1966 Likuni Phala fortified weaning food is pioneered in Malawi.
1968 USAID offers Corn-Soy Milk (CSM) and Corn-Soy Blend (CSB) as fortified foods.
1968-69 U.S. C-97 Stratofreighters (Boeing) help deliver $50M of food aid to Biafra during war in Nigeria, via CRS, CARE, the ICRC and Joint Church Aid. First large scale deployment of new CSB. First live-televised famine; introduced kwashiorkor.
1972 World food crisis, Sahel famine.
1972-1974 Dan Shaughnessy directs Food for Peace and planning for the 1974 UN World Food Conference. Henry Kissinger plays central role in targeting countries for food aid.
1975 Integrated Child Development Services large child nutrition program in India. USG Corn Soya Milk and non-fat dried milk provided through South India Flour Mills for CARE’s “balahar” fortified food for school feeding, led by Tim Lavelle.
1976 World Hunger Education Service begins educating the public and USG about food aid issues and begins quarterly publication of the journal, Hunger Notes.
1977 Title III food aid revised to focus on barter for debt forgiveness and tying aid more explicitly to policy reforms and long-term development in recipient countries.
1979 Two key publications: Amartya Sen’s Poverty & Famines demonstrates that food insecurity is not only about food availability but also about access. Lincoln Chen demonstrates that risk of death increases non-linearly by degree of child wasting.
1979 U.S. donates polished (thiamine removed) white rice to anti-Khmer Rouge groups in Cambodia, resulting in epidemic beriberi (deficiency disease).
1980s Maternal Child Health (MCH) is main type of project supported by food aid, having grown during the 1970s. Food for Work also common for roads/infrastructure.
1983 Church World Service (CWS) stops taking USG FFP resources, following controversial episode of 60 Minutes on CBS about CWS programs in countries with communist governments. CWS goes overnight from being the largest food aid agency in the world to one of the smallest.
1984 Burma Border Consortium of NGOs formed, purchasing food locally for Burmese refugees in camps in Thailand, supported by the U.S. Department of State.
1985 Food for Progress Act explicitly references “Private Voluntary Organizations” or PVOs. Food for Progress authorized CCC financing for grants or credit sales to support agricultural development in developing countries and emerging democracies.
1985 6 million MT of food sent for African famine. Two supplemental appropriations made for Ethiopia famine. FFP manages $500M for Ethiopia alone, plus more for Sudan, and across 21 African countries.
1985 Farm Bill promotes PVO/NGO monetization, using Title II as an alternative revenue stream to direct-dollar grants. U.S. Dry Bean Council positioned pintos and black beans as shelf-stable, high-value food for NGOs to monetize. Initially monetization was to pay for internal transport, which was later funded by USAID in the 1990s.
1985 Ellen Levinson creates the Coalition for Food Aid of NGOs in Washington, DC to promote the roles of NGOs in food aid. Title II Enhancement Grant (later, Title II Strengthening Grant) for PVO headquarters capacity building.
1986 Famine Early Warning System Network (later named FEWS.NET), established on the advice of Tufts University’s President Jean Meyer. Credit also to John Field.
1989 Collapse of Soviet Union shifts emergency food aid gradually away from refugees fleeing regimes in host countries, instead to internally displaced persons.
1990 Food Aid Management funded by FFP with 5 original PVO members.
1990 Fred Cuny pioneers local purchase of food as a more appropriate response to food needs in Ethiopia.
1990s PVOs promote local village “grain reserves” with food aid for resilience.
1990-93 End of US food aid to Somalia leads to famine throughout 1992. President Bush directs US airlifts food via C-130s in late 1992. U.S. Food aid monetized to reduce retail prices across the country in 1993, but after famine has receded.
1990 “Partial monetization” turns into “100% monetization” for many NGOs.
1991 Famine Mitigation Project of experts convened by USAID to recommend best practices to prevention of famine. Including livestock, water, local food purchase.
1992 Food aid mobilization to former Soviet states where food insecurity tied to pensions lost from ruble devaluation. USG works through Red Cross movement. Operation Provide Hope channeled 25,000 MT to the Caucasus and Central Asian “Stans.” ADRA involved in Armenia and other states.
1992 Bosnia: Operation Provide Promise began July 2, 1992, becoming the longest-running humanitarian airlift in history. USG provided sorties into besieged Sarajevo, delivering food and other aid to civilians trapped by the Yugoslav war.
1992 Food Aid Management (FAM) publishes Generally Accepted Commodity Accountability Principles, GACAP, representing all NGOs working with US food aid.
1990s PVO/NGO “cooperating sponsors” include CRS, CARE, World Vision, Save the Children, ADRA, Land O Lakes, ACDI/VOCA, Food for the Hungry International, Project Concern, Africare, Technoserve, Partners for Development, World Relief, Mercy Corps, Lutheran World Relief, IOCC, UMCOR, and International Relief and Development. CARE is often lead food agency in refugee camps, while CRS is lead for IDPs.
1992-1994 FFP defines food security as: availability plus access plus bio-utilization.
1993-1996 FFP Director Robert Kramer rebalances food aid from entrenched USAID Mission projects to areas of greatest need (emergencies), and pushed WFP to recognize the greater priority in emergencies of food.
1993 FAM publishes NGO manual, Monetizing Food Aid, a Guide for PVOs.
1992 CRS’ Mike D’Adamo travels to Rome to strike a partnership with WFP, opening an era of WFP collaboration with NGOs.
1994 CARE and CRS account for roughly 72% of PVOs’ regular Title II programs.
1995 2 million refugees plus almost as many IDPs received some 240,000 MT of food in Rwanda and neighboring countries, following genocide and flight.
1995-97 North Korea’s famine received over 1.1 million metric tons.
1996 André Briend & Michel Lescanne create Plumpy’Nut, the first RUTF, at Nutriset.
1997 WFP strikes agreements partnering with NGOs for distribution activities.
1998 USG requires vegetable oil be fortified with vitamin A (and later, Vitamin D).
1997-2001 Asian financial crisis as currencies lost purchasing power. NGOs like IRD, and WFP used food aid as social protection safety nets.
1999 The majority of US food aid now channeled through WFP, not NGOs.
1999 USAID, FAM and the Canadian Govt convene food experts at a symposium at the American Red Cross to document feasibility of fortifying emergency food aid at the local level to mitigate micronutrient deficiency diseases widely seen among refugees.
2000 Global Food for Education Initiative $300 million, with CCC resources. Over next two decades, 5.5 billion meals for 31 million school children in 48 countries.
2000 Congress passes International Food Relief Partnership Act, amending Title II to authorized grants to US nonprofits to create shelf-stable food products for aid, such as Breedlove Foods in Texas.
2001 FFP Officer Tim Lavelle organizes long-term Bridge of Friendship pipeline from hub of Termez over the Amu Darya river from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan, facilitating hundreds of thousands of tons of famine-preventing food aid into Afghanistan.
2002 FFP nutritionist Tom Marchione promotes new formulations of CSB and nutrient-dense foods as part of commodity docket.
2002 CTC/CMAM modality for treating malnourished children with RUTF promoted.
2002 New McGovern-Dole Food for Education program passed in 2002 Farm Bill. This moves school feeding from Food for Peace to USDA.
2002 No more funding for Title III, a government-to-government program under PL 480 where the foreign government sold food for local currency proceeds.
2003 Large-scale U.S. emergency food aid rejected by five southern African famine-affected countries because US corn is genetically modified. Eventually the grain was milled in S. Africa before transporting to Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, etc.
2000s Food aid targets HIV/AIDS response primarily in sub-Sahara Africa. USAID Administrator Natsios pushes for more flexibility for local purchase of food.
2003 Dr. Patricia Wolff from Washington University, St Louis, founds “Meds & Foods for Kids” in Haiti and produces Medika Mamba.
2003 FANTA and FFP develop criteria for prioritization of non-emergency countries.
2004 Jeanie Markunas retires from long career overseeing Food for Peace.
2004 C-SAFE consortium (World Vision, CARE, CRS) manages food aid across southern Africa, with the World Food Programme as a sub-grantee.
2004 Globally, World Vision now channels food aid mostly as a sub-awardee under WFP whereas a few years earlier it was primarily a prime.
2005–2011 RUTF increasingly mainstreamed among NGOs, UNICEF & USAID as part of a shift from blended-flour to lipid-based products for targeted feeding of malnourished.
2006 SMART survey manual released, about measuring acute malnutrition and mortality, with the intent to standardize reliable data across agencies. In 2008, the Global Nutrition Cluster designated Action Against Hunger (ACF) as the global convener of SMART, including ongoing infrastructure, guidance, consultations. FAM hosts a workshop about SMART for monitoring malnutrition.
2008 Farm Bill Sec. 3206 created the pilot USDA Local and Regional Food Aid Procurement Program. The rule established grants for field-based projects consisting of local or regional procurement.
2007 USAID & IFRC plan food aid reserves for future pandemics that contract markets.
2008 Prices for corn and oil increased 125% over a short period, increasing malnutrition worldwide. The USG provided additional $2.8 billion across all international food aid programs, delivering 2.3 million metric tons for 43 million people.
2009 Decades of US food aid to India ends. Meanwhile, India donates food to WFP.
2009 Land O’Lakes International Development nonprofit pilots local purchase of food baskets in Zambia for people with HIV.
2009 Food Aid Quality Review research starts at Tufts University School of Nutrition.
2010 Congress approves The Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) to allow cash and voucher assistance, instead of only in-kind commodities, using International Disaster Assistance funds.
2010 MSF launches “starved for attention” campaign criticizing the US for donating CSB instead of only procuring RUTF.
2010s Ongoing scale up of RUF production by MANA and Edesia (U.S. NGOs).
2010-2011 Despite early warnings, over 200,000 Somalis die when US cuts off food aid because of Patriot Act. Food aid reinstated only after hunger season ended in 2011.
2010s “Sequencing, layering, and integration” promoted in FFP program designs.
2012 International Food Assistance Improvement Act of 2012 (H.R. 4141) sought to enhance nutritional quality and cost-effectiveness of food aid
2014 Farm Bill expanded Section 202(e) flexibility. USAID increase in authorized 202(e) funding to provide cash transfers, food vouchers, & local purchase modalities.
2014 Charles Hanrahan retires from the Congressional Research Service, after 29 years researching international food aid.
2015 Resilience Food Security Activities (RFSAs) formally introduced as new design of FFP development programs.
Mid 2010s Multi-year, development cooperative agreements, “MYAPs”, replaced by “DFAPs” as main form of FFP projects implemented by NGOs.
2017 Food to four well-publicized man-made famines: S Sudan, Somalia, Yemen & Nigeria.
2018 89% of FFP resources for emergencies. Development food aid % at all time low.
RFSAs emphasize new “graduation model”, along with theories-of-change, learning, and ‘pause and reflect.’
2019 USAID funds Nawiri resilience (RFSA) program in Kenya for northern, arid lands.
2020 Top recipient countries of US food aid from 2015 to 2020 were Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, DRC, Sudan, Afghanistan, Kenya, and Nigeria.
2022 Response to Ukraine war leads to full draining of the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust. USG also provides $388 million for shipping/freight, totaling $670 million.
2023 USG and WFP shut down food pipelines to Ethiopia. USAID Administrator on June 8 suspended food aid across Ethiopia because of widespread, coordinated theft of U.S. food by multiple actors (including to military units and markets). This stopped aid for ~20 million people amid drought and post-conflict needs.
2024 First RFSA program in Somalia.
2025 DOGE terminates many FFP (RFSA) and Food for Progress programs, while authority for FFP and FEWS shifted to State Department. A few RFSAs are re-started: Mercy Corps in Kenya, ADRA in DRC, Food for the Hungry in Ethiopia, and CRS in Haiti.
2025 December: FFP transitions again, to US Department of Agriculture which in February commits $452 million to WFP and bids new emergency programs for DRC, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya, & Rwanda.
2026 July: FFP announces $235 million to CRS for Ethiopia and Sudan.
2026 USG provides private and UN food aid in recovery from earthquake in Venezuela.

Ebola Control Lessons from Past Outbreaks

June 18, 2026    Food insecurity the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has formed a vicious circle this year with the latest Ebola virus outbreak, now the 17th recorded and the largest to date in terms of people infected.

The Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) is an example of an NGO that has been providing large scale food assistance in eastern DRC and has addressed the current and past outbreaks of Ebola with community education, hygiene promotion, and water, sanitation, and hygiene.

Lessons from the earlier West African Ebola outbreak include the value of self-isolation (self quarantine of people who may have been exposed to Ebola) which was a critical measure to interrupt transmission, and, in turn, self-isolation depended on aid agencies providing ample food aid to compensate the family for lost income.   Today, the World Food Programme is doing the same thing, providing food aid to contacts and patients in DRC.

The map below shows the current spread, in 2026 of the virus, and possible future routes of spread.

In the West Africa outbreak there were 11,323 recorded deaths but probably over 30,000 actual deaths, where the majority of Ebola cases were never reported.  The United States Government alone spent some $2 billion on that earlier Ebola response.  The United Kingdom spent £667 million (roughly $850 million–$1 billion at 2014–2016 exchange rates), and the World Health Organization spent some $500 million.

The USAID evaluation of that outbreak response was commissioned by Jeremy Konyndyk, then Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. Writing in the New York Times on June 13, he warned that the current DRC outbreak could become the worst ever.  He reports that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) projects that more than 20,000 cases may occur by late August. Konyndyk notes: “As bad as this situation is, we have a playbook for addressing such crises. But it requires a huge team effort.” He calls for specialized clinics, large‑scale contact tracing, safe burial management, and adequate personal protective equipment for health workers. However, he cautions that “security has deteriorated markedly as the government has lost control of large parts of the area.”

With clear relevance for the current global Ebola outbreak, a series of lesson‑learning roundtables were held in 2017 at George Washington University, Harvard University, and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. These discussions were part of a lessons‑learning evaluation requested by USAID and were intended to reflect on operational challenges during the West African Ebola crisis.  Each roundtable included seasoned emergency practitioners who had overseen or implemented programs in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea during the lethal 2013–2016 outbreaks.

The Harvard Roundtable concluded that the greatest challenges in the Ebola response involved trust, including community skepticism and occasional violence. One participant warned that “we are setting ourselves up for the same problems all over again.” Families were initially reluctant to cooperate with referral systems in which infected relatives were taken away with little explanation. As one participant noted, once treatment centers were introduced and communities saw that Ebola was not always a death sentence, and that patients could both enter and leave safely, community transmission began to decline. Another participant observed that promising “Community Care Centers” were denied or delayed funding unless the NGO also staffed a larger hospital. Others emphasized that faith‑based organizations were often more effective at face‑to‑face engagement with communities.

The 2016 lessons roundtable held with U.S. military representatives highlighted the indispensable role of the U.S. Navy’s Mobile Diagnostic Laboratories (MDLs) in West Africa. Operated by the Naval Medical Research Center (NMRC) in Guinea and Sierra Leone, these PCR‑based laboratories provided the only rapid diagnostic capacity early in the outbreak. The U.S. Air Force also played a critical role in airlifting doctors and epidemiologists across Liberia during the fall of 2014.

The roundtable at George Washington University’s Milken Institute School of Public Health, composed largely of NGO headquarters emergency coordinators—generated two major cautions about international response. First, although each NGO had developed new guidelines and standard operating procedures for Ebola‑type emergencies, there was no funding to package, archive, or preserve these materials for future use, and many were already being lost. There was no forward planning for how such lessons might be applied in future outbreaks, including today in the DRC.  Second, although not on the agenda, participants volunteered that their organizations now have serious reservations about having responded at all, given the massive legal and duty‑of‑care liabilities they incurred. Donors urged NGOs to respond, but were unable to shield them from punitive audits afterward.

Key lessons about reducing transmission of Ebola in West Africa in 2014-2016 were published from a USG-commissioned  evaluation  which looked at all donors, UN agencies, NGOs, academia and other actors.  The reports from that evaluation are linked below.

Four key lessons jump out from the research:

First, the aid response of separating family members with symptoms of Ebola had the unintended effect of discouraging honest reporting or referrals, such that the total official death count across West Africa was much lower than the true cause of death.

Second, what mattered the most in interrupting transmission was when local populations observed deaths of people they knew which led them to take seriously new changes in behavior (not touching the bodies of people wiht Ebola).  This was the essential change that had to occur.

Third, much of the efforts overall by aid agencies had less of an effect in “bending the curve” of the epidemic than the simple communications by the families and communities affected.

Fourth, while many health professionals died early in the outbreak, attention to protecting them, including provision of protective gowns/gloves and equipment was necessary for further work to be achieved.

Food and Nutrition:

Food aid functioned less as a nutrition intervention and more as an enabler of disease control.  Its main value was making isolation and quarantine viable. Qualitative data indicated that food distributions to isolation and treatment units, facilitated by Food for Peace (FFP), improved the effectiveness of isolation, quarantine, and  response actions at community-based sites of transmission. FFP food distribution played a critical role in supporting isolation and restrictions on mobility,  in response to warnings from implementing partners about food shortages among quarantined communities.

The scale was significant:  through the end of 2014, USAID awarded nearly $35 million in food assistance to WFP through the Office of Food for Peace.  Examples include WFP providing all patients discharged from the Guékédou treatment unit in Guinea with a 60-day food ration on leaving, and continuing general distributions of 45-day rations (rice, oil, pulses, salt) in affected communities.

 The proportion of quarantined households that received food support was roughly similar across all three countries, between 60 and 70 percent.  In Guinea, quarantined families with Ebola cases were more likely to have received food support in urban areas (89%) than in rural areas (53%),  part of a broader urban bias the evaluation flagged in how supplies were targeted. Notably, the reports treat food almost entirely as rations/in-kind support for isolation; there is essentially no analysis of nutritional outcomes per se.

Behavior change

Behavior change was identified as one of the most decisive factors in bending the epidemic curve — arguably more than clinical capacity. The most effective USG-funded activities were nationally-led incident management and coordination, social mobilization, and safe human remains management; as OFDA scaled up community engagement — health education, household isolation, hygiene kits, community outreach, adapting safe burial practices, and involving local leadership — a downward trend in new cases is clearly seen in the data.

The substance of the behavior change effort was straightforward but hard to achieve: much of the social mobilization effort was oriented toward changing simple behaviors such as shaking hands, other physical contact, washing hands, and the handling of infected persons and dead bodies. The key lesson was sequencing — which donors under-prioritized at first.  Whereas  early priorities focused on facility-based responses, case isolation, treatment, and safe burial, donors and NGOs failed to prioritize social mobilization and community-level responses.  Key lesson: social mobilization is the most relevant at the outset of the response.  Aid agencies should hire and deploy anthropologists.

When trusted local actors led it, the payoff was fast:  one Government of Guinea informant noted that within 1–2 months of accelerated social mobilization, the number of prefectures reporting social resistance dropped from 27 to 4.

A cross-cutting theme among evaluators were that while more than 90% of activity monitoring targets were reported as achieved, this reflected only activities and reveals little about actual change in bending the epidemic curve,  a major limitation in analyzing the USG contribution.

These reports, led by the independent evaluation organization IBTCI were available on the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse until a year ago when the Administration dissoved it.  They are accessible via these links below:

 Synopsis:     https://www.worldhunger.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Synopsis-of-Ebola-West-Africa-Evaluation.pdf

        Coordination:  https://www.worldhunger.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ebola-Response-Eval-4-Coordination.pdf

        Effectiveness:  https://www.worldhunger.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ebola-ibtci-eval-effectivenes-1.pdf

         Relevance:   https://www.worldhunger.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ebola-evaluation-Relevance-of-response-3.pdf

        Components:   https://www.worldhunger.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ebola-evaluation-vol.-2-effectiveness-of-components-2018.pdf

A 2020 review of some selected lessons about the West Africa and DRC Ebola responses, largely non-medical, was commissioned by ALNAP here, focusing on community trust and messaging.

at the same time, ALNAP recommends these infection and control guidelines from WHO.

An earlier article about pandemics and hunger was published by Hunger Notes here.   A Hunger Notes interview about Covid-19 and hunger also addresses these relationships.

Roundtable on June 5 about American Foreign Assistance and Faith-Based Organizations

World Hunger Education Service (the nonprofit overseeing this Hunger Notes site), joins with Fordham University, HIAS, Lipscomb University, and George Washington University’s Milken Institute School of Public Health in organizing and convening a virtual (online) roundtable of experts on June 5, 2025, a Thursday,  to discuss how American faith-based organizations may be able to lead in the delivery of foreign aid against poverty, assisting development and providing humanitarian relief.

This will be a roundtable conversation with no panels or presentations, and is open to all faiths.

Invited organizations include operational NGOs, universities, research groups and other faith-based organizations in the United States.

Among the questions the roundtable will discuss are:

  •          How well do faith-based organizations blend donations from different sources (citizens, private sector corporations and foundations) to solve problems and relieve crises? Are they more localized, sustainable and cost-efficient in their assistance?
  •         In which sectors are faith-based organizations best at addressing, comparing for instance hunger, primary health care, basic education, food security, trade, industrialization, governance, marine conservation, or higher education?
  •         Looking ahead to future years, what expanded role should faith-based organizations play in executing new programs funded by the United Statessponsoring organizatons Government?

The roundtable will adhere to “Chatham House” rules in that no quote or perspective will later be attributed to any person or organization, whether in the meeting summary or by anyone attending.  Participants are asked to leave their organizational affiliations “at the door” and speak candidly, as experts, about the issues from their experiences over their careers.

This is one in a series of roundtable about the future of American foreign aid.

Interested faith-based organizations may email to:  WorldhungerEd@gmail.com, or ForeignAidRoundtable@gmail.com

Prayer Vigil for Foreign Aid Unites Evangelicals for Aid

A prayer vigil for foreign aid was held March 11, among some 50 Christians, at the Capitol Hill Presbyterian Church, attended by Bread for the World, World Relief, Compassion International, Catholic Relief Services, the Adventist Development and Relief Agency, World Renew, Hope International, the Accord Network, and others.

Speakers called on Congress, the Administration and the American people to re-install aid programs serving the hungry around the world.

According to Ministry Watch:  Eugene Cho, president and CEO of  Bread for the World, denounced the “broad, un-targeted cuts” recently implemented at the U.S. Agency for International Development as an assault on vulnerable populations all over the globe.