Tag: OFDA

The Passing of William Garvelink, Food and Disaster Leader

William Garvelink, from Falls Church, Virginia, who led how US aid could go to persons displaced within their country’s borders, passed away this August 23 unexpectedly.  Known to all as Bill, he studied Latin American history and dreamt of being a university professor before getting work at the Department of State in emergency response.  As colleague Dr. Joe Barbera (Professor of George Washington) reflects, “He ended up creating history, not just teaching it.  He pushed the bounds of humanitarian assistance in ways that were critically important.”

Historically, United States (US) aid to refugees who have crossed borders was managed by the U.S. Department of State where Garvelink worked before moving to USAID, where he pioneered new approaches to assistance to internally-displaced populations.

Garvelink often told the story of how, in 1988, the US Government was failing to assist NGOs working in the Sudan.  Eventually, USAID’s Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) received the go-ahead to bypass diplomatic concerns from Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger who said “Don’t ask permission, just tell (Sudanese President) Bashir and the SPLM that you’re going to provide humanitarian assistance.”  Garvelink recalled “We broke through war lines because people were starving. That was the only calculation that mattered.  That changed everything,” recalled Garvelink. “That’s how humanitarian assistance has been provided ever since.”

In 2010, Garvelink became the first head of USAID’s $3.5 billion/year “Feed the Future” initiative, a new USAID flagship global food security and agriculture program.  He brought to this job a background of leading U.S. disaster assistance teams in countries fighting food crises, Somalia, Rwanda, and beyond, as well as helping launch Operation Lifeline Sudan, a groundbreaking effort to deliver food across conflict lines.  He said “Food security is not charity. It is the foundation of stability, dignity, and peace”.

Disaster field expert, Kate Farnsworth recalls: “Bill was a creative humanitarian and a supportive supervisor. He always saw possibilities for a principled humanitarian response, even in the midst of complex scenarios as in Sudan, Somalia, and Rwanda.  While he was an expert in working the bureaucratic system in Washington and on the Hill, those of us in the field saw how he enjoyed being on the ground and we knew that when Bill arrived on the scene there would be a breakthrough in whatever challenge we were facing.  With his tireless, engaging conversational, down-to-earth style, he endeared himself to donor colleagues, UN, NGOs, and ICRC workers, local communities, governments and “non-state” actors and in short order would develop a plan of action that everyone could buy in to. Even after he left fulltime work, we stayed in touch and I enjoyed reconnecting with him to review old experiences and discuss current humanitarian issues. His passing is the end of an era.”

Disaster shelter expert Chuck Setchell recalls: “Bill was my first supervisor when I began working at the OFDA in 1998.  Behind his genteel demeanor was a sharp, probing mind, a sharp wit, and an intense desire to provide quality, effective assistance to the affected populations we were hoping to support.  Bill asked a lot of questions, was open to new ideas, and took me to task a few times, but he never once failed to support my recommendations.  He set the bar of leadership very high, and pushed me to be a better humanitarian, for which I’m eternally thankful.”

He led USG Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) in critical and often dangerous environments, providing life-saving assistance to communities devastated by conflict and natural calamities.  In recognition of his extensive experience and leadership, Garvelink was appointed as the U.S. Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2007 to 2010.

“I remember when I first joined OFDA in 1996, Bill, then OFDA Deputy Director, was encouraging and affirming, telling me that it was better to make a decision, even if wrong, then to not act,” recalls Emeritus World Hunger Education Service Chairperson, Peter Morris, adding, “He also told me not to be awed by position and rank in government, that in our work field experience was as important.”

Over his career, Garvelink received multiple USAID and State Department commendations, including a Presidential Meritorious Service Award. But those who worked alongside him often cited his field instincts and personal courage. Whether in Mogadishu, Kigali, or Kinshasa, he pressed the U.S. government to act decisively and compassionately, and he mentored a generation of younger humanitarian professionals who today carry forward his legacy.

Dina Esposito, who followed him as the head of USAID’s food security bureau credits Garvelink with her early formative experience, “and informed all that I did after.”  In her view, “He helped set the rules of engagement for U.S. intervention in the post–Cold War era, from Kuwait to Somalia to Bosnia and beyond. With deep faith in humanity and unmatched skill in policymaking, strategy, and operations, he was a compelling voice for action. He drew together the brightest minds of his era and helped unlock U.S. leadership as a force for good, saving millions of lives in war torn countries and inspiring those of us privileged to work with him.”

A USAID colleague, Carol Peasely recalls “Bill was a delight to work with. I would call ‘Bill the Quiet and Effective American.’  He quietly led; was always a gentleman who listened to others; and was a great team player.  That was not always easy to do within USAID where turf battles too often arose. Yet, Bill always had the uncanny ability to bring people together to solve problems and get the job done.  His quiet and calm leadership and collegiality was a model to others and saved countless lives around the world.”

Patricia McIlreavy recalls an engagement with Garvelink: “He had a way of supporting people with both wisdom and humor. In early 1996, I was being interviewed by an NGO VP in Kigali for the Sudan country director role.  Bill, who was visiting in-country on a DART rotation, strolled right up to our table, asked if we were done, and told the visiting VP he hoped she wouldn’t promote me because he wanted to bring me back to OFDA. With a grin, he added that I’d refused him up to that point, since I was holding out for the chance at this role.  It was classic Bill: simultaneously strategic, protective and quietly encouraging. That moment, like so many others, showed how deeply he invested in people, not just programs.”

Peter Morris adds, “Bill was always open to new ideas to improve emergency response and was interested in creative thinking to do our work better.  He had worked with Fred Cuny, Kate Farnsworth, Bob Gersony and Tim Knight in what I would call the ‘heady days’ of Humanitarian Assistance.  Bill had a great memory and could tell great stories that were always personable.  I will really miss him.”

After retirement, Garvelink became an advisor to the International Medical Corps, served on Boards, and became a regular lecturer in university courses, fulfilling his original dream.  Dr. Barbera adds: “His post-retirement efforts in advising and mentoring young professionals interested in humanitarian careers has been inspirational.  Bill Garvelink’s quiet humanitarian commitments changed the world. He will be deeply missed professionally and personally.”

A 400-page oral history of his career is currently being edited by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.  More about his life can be found at:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_J._Garvelink , and https://usaidalumni.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/William-John-Garvelink.pdf

USAID Adds Value in Disaster Response, Says Former Hunger Notes Chair

Opinion piece from the former WHES Board Chair:   Most people do not realize what a huge mistake it would be to eliminate the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as appears to be underway here in February 2025.  It would be like throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater.  I cannot imagine that either Elon Musk or President Trump are aware of full range of ramifications this elimination would have on the world.  If we as a nation eliminate USAID whole cloth, then all the disaster response and humanitarian efforts including the USAID Disaster Assistance (DART) teams would stop.  I know it has been said that the State Department will maintain emergency food and material aid.  In practical terms it is unclear how that can happen, when staff with institutional memory are gone, grant making ability is gone, and the  DART is gone.

I recently stepped down as Volunteer Board Chair from the World Hunger Education Service (WHES) Board.  WHES was started 50 years ago to inform the US Congress about international hunger issues and needs.  It widened its scope in the internet age beyond Congress to the public at large.

Prior to my role on the Board, I worked 23 years in USAID.  My USAID career was with the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) within USAID. At OFDA, I initially served as a contingency planner and nutrition advisor then as a member of the Senior Management Team and Division Director for the Technical Assistance Division which included all the assistance sectors for disaster relief; Health, Pandemic response, Clean Water and Sanitation, Famine and Nutrition, Volcano and Earthquake risks, Floods and Storm risk, Pestilence, Shelter, Anti-trafficking in persons and Protection of Vulnerables.

Growth of Disasters

OFDA grew as post-cold war disasters and responses around the world became greater.  I was in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, then DR Congo which had a internal war taking place as well as Sudan and Kosovo.  Historically, disaster assistance was modeled on refugee camps; including feeding, shelter, health care, and food distribution.  As internal wars increased, the global number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) became greater than the number of refugees. As a result, humanitarian assistance became more dangerous and more complicated.  I was familiar with refugee assistance; before OFDA, I worked in Cambodian refugee camps on the Thai border; in Cambodia on health programs with World Vision, and the Red Cross and then in UN refugee camps in Congo during the Rwandan genocide.

Operational DART Teams

Until last week, USAID, through OFDA, funded many different non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Catholic Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, and World Vision.  However, USAID, through OFDA, was also operational; it had the ability to send Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) to disasters.  The purpose of these teams was to report, to coordinate the US efforts and to fund humanitarian partners.  This was a much better model to keep an eye on the funds, literally in the field.

Another clear advantage was the DART also became a platform for coordination for the whole US Government.  As a DART team leader, I witnessed this on the DART during the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004; The US Navy, Marines, US Air Force reserve, Embassy Jakarta, and USAID all assisted there, in a coordinated effort.  The response dramatically changed Indonesian public opinion of the United States from negative to positive.

I also witnessed this on the 2014-15 DART when the DART platform was used to combat and eventually defeat the Ebola epidemic.  This involved US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), USAID, Embassies in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone and US Defense Department.

Ramifications

During this aid freeze, NGOs will go bankrupt.  The US Government was the largest single supporter of global disaster response and humanitarian efforts.  In my experience, it has always had bipartisan support, and goodwill from the House and the Senate. It would be a terrible mistake to continue down this destructive path.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pandemics and Hunger:  Part 2 of Our Interview with Dr. Ron Waldman

Exclusive content from the World Hunger Education Service.  June 2020.  Dr. Ron Waldman reflects on lessons of pandemic preparedness and response, the roles of the USG and UN and recommended references.

Hunger Notes editors Peter Morris and Steve Hansch interviewed pandemic expert Dr. Ron Waldman (RW), Professor of Global Health at George Washington University’s Milken Institute School of Public Health, Board President of Doctors of the World, author,  and long-time point person for international health in emergencies for USAID and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  This article continues the interview begun at:  www.worldhunger.org/pandemics-crisis-and-hunger-an-interview-an-interview-with-dr-ron-waldman1

What, if anything, most surprises you about how this COVID-19 outbreak has played out? 

RW:   What surprises me is that people seemed to have under-estimated the importance of political leadership when a serious problem affects societal functions as a whole.  Frankly, it surprises me the degree to which this turns out to be important.  When you look at Germany or New Zealand, you see that it was really the ability of those governments to make decisive, intrusive decisions like restricting movement, and to do so with a battery of public health measures instituted simultaneously, that led to reasonably good results.  In those countries where leaders were reluctant to make those decisions at all, or where they made them incrementally, like “Oh-I-don’t-really-want-to-do-this” next step implementation; those countries are getting hit hard.  Those countries that are more decisive have done much better.

Australia made this sort of firm decision ahead of the curve.  Austria is another example of that.  It’s not liberal or conservative, it’s decisive.

It is really interesting how wrong “the experts” were.  For instance, some of the more prominent ranking of countries in regard to their preparedness for an event like this had the US, UK, and France way up at the top of the charts.  That’s because they left out some of the important criteria that comprise preparedness and tended to focus on health-specific, technological factors.

Have any recent public communications concerned you?

RW:   I think there are things that seem to be logical things to do that don’t necessarily have the best science or evidence behind them.  Such as all the calls now for wearing masks in public places.  At the start of the outbreak scientists were saying that it is silly to wear masks or that it’s really the people who are sick who need to wear masks.  But now it has sort of become a given that if you’re outside in a crowded place, you should wear a mask.   It’s come about because it seems to be a logical thing to do.  And now the scientists are saying that the science supports it, although exactly the opposite was true at the onset.  It’s really a bit Brave New World-ian, isn’t it? That’s one mess-up of communications.

All of these times that the scientific experts reverse themselves, it makes science look bad.

And now, the science doesn’t really seem to matter because everything, including masks, has become political symbols.  Republicans aren’t wearing masks, so Democrats condemn them.  What does viral transmission dynamics have to do with political affiliation?  Only in America (and maybe a few other countries).

President Trump has been saying there are States that are just locking down too much.  I don’t know what the evidence basis is for making this conclusion.

There still is a lot of confusion, obviously about testing.  I was upset when they were first talking about “testing, testing, testing”.  The goal is not merely to test.  It’s not like the country that does the most testing wins.  It’s just a shorthand for identifying cases as early as possible by diagnostic means.  They could have said people who meet this case definition should be presumed positive.

The series of events cannot stop with testing – it needs to continue with contact tracing, any of the contacts exhibiting symptoms need to be isolated.  And the others should be quarantined for one incubation period.  That has not been communicated to the public well. Testing, contact tracing, isolation, quarantine.  Now people are starting to understand that, but the WHO Director-General went on about “testing, testing, testing”, as shorthand, and a lot of people picked up on that.  They didn’t understand the broader implications so they didn’t prepare for them

I don’t think people understood there are two completely different kinds of tests:   Diagnostic and antibody tests tell you different things and are useful for different decisions.  This is another bad element of risk communication.

What about Communications related to a vaccine and about herd immunity?

RW:   There seems to be a feeling out there that there is going to be a vaccine in 18 months.   Because scientists said it would take at least 18 months. There’s no vaccine for SARS or MERS (another coronavirus disease).  That’s been one of the holy grails. There’s no guarantee there’s going to be a vaccine, ever!  If it doesn’t happen, there’s going to be a lot of disappointment and rebellion against the scientific community.  The scientific community does not understand how the public takes the pronouncements from scientists.  There are encouraging signs but vaccine development is one thing.  Mass production and equitable distribution are different ball games. Certainly we all hope it can happen.  But we should have modest expectations and not put all our eggs in the vaccine basket (perhaps not as apt a metaphor as in the past).

Another area that is murky is whether or not immunity develops.  Everyone and their brother now can opine.  All the TV doctors are now experts, using words like antibody testing, reproductive number and herd immunity, which many of them don’t understand well. The economists also.  People say that whenever you see an economist on television, they tell you all about the transmission dynamics and the development of immunity.  But whenever you see an epidemiologist, they say “I don’t know”.  That’s what I say in all of my interviews and it should be made clear here:  the starting point is “I don’t know”.  How could anyone know?  The whole point is that this is a new virus that we have never seen before.  It has been in humans for about 5 months. How much can we be expected to know?  Of course we can make inferences from past experiences with similar viruses and other pandemics, but we need to do so modestly and with the expectation of being proved wrong.

There’s this idea now that the so-called strategy of herd immunity is to open early and let the virus run its course, so then everyone will be infected and become immune.  That’s not actually the way it works.

Sweden is more or less pursuing this strategy now, in fact, if not in theory.  Although the Sweden case is complicated and there are other, political and regulatory, reasons why they are only suggesting public health measures to their population, not prescribing them.  Unlike people in many countries, such as the one in which this interview is being conducted, Swedes tend to behave like responsible adults.  But what they are doing is somewhat dangerous.  Some of the smaller studies in Washington State, and other places, and even in Stockholm have found that antibody prevalence in the community is much lower than what was initially predicted.  The virus seems to spread very heterogeneously.  Chris Murray’s data [at the University of Washington University] suggests that by the time this initial wave of transmission has run its course, maybe sometime in mid-August, there will be only about 4-5% antibodies prevalence in the population.  Meaning 96% of the population will remain susceptible to another outbreak next winter.

Can you comment about the kinds of planning and preparedness that you worked on for many years for exactly this type of outbreak?  

RW:   Most of the planning that I was involved in was done in conjunction with a dedicated UN agency, or unit, called the UN Secretariat for Influenza Coordination (UNSIC).  It was chaired by Dr. David Nabarro, had a staff of about 10-15, and received $125 million from USAID and had a number of other donors. As a whole, the pandemic preparedness business began in the 2000s, when the world was facing the threat of the avian influenza virus, also known as “H5N1,” a virus that appeared in 1997.  It was very threatening because almost every human who contracted the virus would die, an 80% case-fatality ratio.  Though, it was not very transmissible, and mostly moved within families.  When an outbreak occurred that year in Hong Kong, because of the spillover threat from animals, the director of the Hong Kong health department gave the order that all the chickens in Hong Kong should be culled.  She is given credit for eliminating the threat.   That Hong Kong health director at that time was Margaret Chan, who later became the Director General of the WHO.  As it turned out, that virus receded and did not pose an immediate threat, though it was still out there.

Then in the early 2000s, Avian influenza cases began to appear again, in Egypt, Indonesia, Africa, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, and elsewhere.

A concurrent trend was that the number of spillover events began to number in the hundreds.  And it became clear to everyone that whether it was H5N1or another virus, the question of a widespread, potentially lethal pandemic became “when, not if.” Consequently, interest grew in preparedness.  The UN created this little unit and the US began to invest in preparedness:  Sending large amounts of money to FAO, WFP, and WHO.

One track was to fund UNSIC and another to fund NGOs to reach the more peripheral parts of countries.  The major donor was the Division of USAID that was headed by Dennis Carroll.  And the State Department also began a pandemic preparedness operation.  John Lange was the U.S. Avian Influenza and Pandemic Ambassador in charge, and he had regular weekly meetings with representatives from USDA, Homeland Security, USAID, State, CDC.

At the same time the CDC began ramping up its own pandemic preparedness.  This must have cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

The USAID program, one that included the NGOs, became H2P, or Humanitarian Pandemic Preparedness, and that’s what I headed up.  There was a lot of procurement of PPE that has lasted to this day, stationed around the world.

USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance [OFDA] had a big hand in that.  We in the USAID Global Health Bureau worked closely with OFDA as well, recognizing that OFDA’s mandate is principally for response, and that their involvement in preparedness was a reach.  It was very frustrating to us working in global health, working on the preparatory aspects that we could never quite get OFDA to deviate from its strict response mandate.

There is one report, the culmination of H2P, that grew to be a small movement, Towards a Safer World.  [http://www.towardsasaferworld.org/?q=content/what-tasw ] There is a monograph with that title that formed the basis of a large meeting held at WFP in Rome which culminated in a large multi-sector meeting in in 2009.  It remains available on a website with the same name.

What are five or so books about pandemics you would recommend?

RW:  I think that the best one would be Camus’ The Plague “La Peste:”   A perfect achievement.

I would also recommend John Barry’s “The Great Influenza”; Pale Rider (The Spanish Flu and How it Changed the World) by Laura Spinney; Sonia Shah’s “Pandemic: Tracking Contagions from Cholera to Ebola and Beyond”; Jonathon’s Quick’s “The End of Epidemics”; and David Quammen’s “Spillover,” which focuses on zoonoses and how pandemics can start.