Patrick Webb, Global Nutritionist Takes Lead at Cornell

July 11, 2026   Patrick Webb, the world’s leading expert about nutrition science, food aid, famine and resilience this week began a new step in his lengthy career.  Webb just joined Cornell University on July 1, 2026, as the inaugural Executive Director of the new Ashley School of Global Development and the Environment in Cornell’s well-known College of Agriculture and Life Sciences (CALS). he will the school’s intellectual identity, global visibility, and interdisciplinary academic programs.

He had been the lead nutritionist at USAID until its disappearance a year ago, after having led various key food/nutrition research/learning programs for USAID at Tufts University’s School of Nutrition.  This included the breakthrough program, the Food Aid Quality Review.  At Tufts, he served as Dean for Academic Affairs at the Friedman School from 2005 to 2014. He also led Tufts’ Food Systems for Nutrition Innovation Lab.

In past periods, he was the lead nutritionist in the U.N.’s largest food aid organization, the World Food Programme, global advisor to a range of UN technical groups, and famine research scholar at the International Food Policy Research Institute.  Hunger Notes reviewed one of his books about famine at: https://www.worldhunger.org/famine-in-africa-causes-responses-and-prevention/  He also edited a 2001 book about Women
Farmers:
Enhancing

Rights,
Recognition
and
Productivity.(Frankfurt,
Germany:
Lang
Verlag.)

In 2024, he was awarded the Jean-Pierre Habicht Lifetime Achievement in Global Nutrition Research Award by the American Society for Nutrition.  This is appropriate in that Habicht spent most of his career as Cornell’s leading global nutritionist.  Another winner of that award was Cornell professor Gretel Pelto, who was Habicht’s wife, for whom Hunger Notes published an obituary last year.

Webb has been prolific in bridging gaps between academia, science and practice, working with aid organizations.  He has authored more than 200 peer-reviewed journal articles

Last year Webb spoke about global health on an instagram interview.

More recently, he was interviewed in a Food Tank video — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kAOBfQhH2rQ . Webb was asked what his work entailed at USAID that most people don’t understand.  “USAID was backstopping what governments or civil society were doing on the ground.” “USAID was playing a broker role in rebuilding Tigray… to design a viable plan forward.  … So much training went on of institutions and governments.  Finally, the ability to measure.  one of the reasons we won’t see impact…  that’s gone, a hit to science and progress.”  He emphasized how the loss of USAID meant the “loss of systems” and “the ability to shape ideas.”  He explained how most of what USAID has focused on for most of its history is building up local capacities, such as in ministries of health, agriculture, finance.

 

U.S. Food Aid (Part 1): Reflections about Food Aid by Long-Term Practitioner

July 7, 2026    by Mara Russell     This is the first in a series of articles by Hunger Notes about the U.S. Food for Peace (FFP) Program.  “Food for Peace Title II Non-Emergency Programs: What are they and Why are they needed?”

In the United States, government-funded “Food for Peace” (FFP) programs  transitioned from USAID to the State Department when the former agency was dissolved  in 2025. Several months later, the Food for Peace program was transferred to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), a large federal agency that had not managed this program previously. Soon after this transition, $452 million in FFP resources was awarded directly to the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) for food activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya and Rwanda.[i]

Then, as recently reported in Hunger Notes, in 2026, USDA released a “Notice of Funding Opportunity” for nonprofits (NGOs) for new Emergency Food for Peace programs, naming the same set of countries that were eligible for food assistance.  These upcoming programs are scheduled to be worth $357 million in total.[ii]  Since a total of $1.2 billion was appropriated by Congress for Food for Peace in FY26,[iii], USDA is now considering how to implement the rest of the funding for “development” or non-emergency food programs, referred to during the past seven years as Resilience Food Security Activities or “RFSAs.”[iv].

One critical variable that non-emergency programs have leveraged during recent cycles of USG funding is timeframe. These NGO-administered programs are generally five years in length, while emergency programs only last for a maximum of two years. Emergency programs are designed to address the impacts of acute (wasting) malnutrition and severe food insecurity. Resources in emergency programs are provided to address short- to medium- term impacts of a severe shock. This can be due to a natural disaster such as an earthquake, a severe storm, drought, or  severe conflict. The spread of an epidemic or pandemic disease can also result in such impacts, either due to a breakdown of production and markets, or due to people being at greater risk of malnutrition due to the impacts of a disease. Or shocks can result from a combination of several things.

On the other hand, non-emergency programs focus on preventing emergencies.   They address the underlying causes of hunger that tend to become more serious when conditions are such that food supplies become limited, or people lose access to food due to the types of shocks outlined above. These underlying causes, such as poverty, cultivation practices that result in poor yields, inadequate services or limited safety-nets that result in food insecurity and malnutrition, lack of income earning opportunities, poor access to water for agriculture and for drinking and inadequate sanitation that can cause water-borne disease- a significant underlying cause of acute and chronic malnutrition, lack of attention to the special nutrition needs of women of childbearing age, pregnant women and young children, and lack of capacity to prepare for potential shocks that impact food security and nutrition. These are complex issues that call for a combination of access to goods and services, while adopting of behaviors and practices within households.  Programs also ensure that the food consumed meets the standards of a healthy diet, prevent water-borne disease, and build resilience to unexpected shocks.

This takes time. There is a limit to what can be done in only one or two years. This is especially the case because according to the 2026 USDA Emergency funding opportunity, it takes between 45 and 90 days from the award of a program until food aid from the Food for Peace program can be exported from the United States, and then up to another 6 months for commodities to arrive in the country where they will be distributed.[v]

A second factor has to do with geography.  Emergency food aid programs are in countries and locations where there is an active ongoing shock, and large concentrations of people, including refugees and internally displaced people, living in a situation of extreme food and nutrition insecurity that should be addressed immediately.  Identification of these locations is guided by early warning systems or methodologies that classify people based on the degree to which they are currently food insecure or malnourished. The system that tends to be most respected internationally is the U.N.’s Integrated Phase Classification or IPC system. During its existence, USAID utilized this system, and now USDA is using it also as a way of designating where and among whom an emergency program should be implemented. In its recent funding request, USDA stated that a minimum of 20% of the population to be targeted with food aid should be living at IPC 3 or higher. The IPC classifies populations at levels 1 through 5 based on the severity of food insecurity as follows: 1 = None/Minimal, 2 = Stressed, 3 = Crisis, 4 = Emergency and 5 = Famine. The “shorthand” clarification used for those populations needing immediate assistance are those at IPC 3+.[vi]

However, non-emergency programs aim to reduce the likelihood that people living in a particular geographic area will experience conditions at or above IPC 3. Countries prioritized for these programs may already have sizeable populations at IPC 3+, but there may not be significant active shock conditions causing this situation. Sometimes, populations may be at IPC 3+ due to a shock that has previously increased food insecurity and malnutrition. For instance, after the Haiti earthquake in 2010, there were emergency programs that addressed food insecurity, malnutrition, reconstruction and access to food for the people impacted by this shock.  However, by 2013, many of the immediate impacts of the quake, such as food insecurity and displacement were initially addressed, but there was a need to address long-term root causes of malnutrition and vulnerability.  At that time USAID implemented a non-emergency program that sought to address these underlying causes and increase the ability of the country to cope with severe shocks.[vii]

Many countries where non-emergency programs are implemented experience cyclical shocks that recur on a periodic basis. They do not always exist in shock situations but may be impacted by droughts or floods during serious weather events, such as El Niño or La Niña events. During the El Niño event in 2023-2024, most of the harvest of the country of Zimbabwe was ruined due to inadequate and poorly timed rainfall.[viii]  However, on-going non-emergency programs continued to increase yields, increase incomes and reduce malnutrition, while emergency programs supported households and communities as necessary with additional food and other emergency assistance. Most of these countries also experience an annual “hunger season”, which tends to occur anywhere from 3-6 months prior to the next harvest when food stocks and cash earned from the prior harvest have been depleted.  Thus, while non-emergency programs are not implemented in contexts where active shocks occur, they may be targeted within fragile environments where hunger seasons make life very tenuous for people living in those geographies.

Another important element in these programs are the participants who are targeted. In emergency programs, large portions of the population are highly vulnerable due to the impacts of a disaster, such as an earthquake, a hurricane or other cyclonic storm, or severe conflict. In these cases, those targeted for assistance may have been displaced, or otherwise lost everything – including their health. In such emergency situations, it does not matter whether people were rich or poor prior to such shocks.

However, Title II non-emergency program participants tend to be those who are poorest, receive the fewest services, and are at greatest risk of malnutrition and food insecurity.  Often the focus is on those who have the least to fall back on when shocks occur and tend to be those most impacted by annual hunger seasons and other severe shocks.  A case in point is the Ethiopia Productive Safety-Net Program (PSNP), which has been supported by Title II non-emergency food aid since its inception in 2005.[ix] The PSNP targets people who are impacted by the annual hunger season through a Cash or Food for Assets (FFA) activity that creates a safety-net during the period of greatest vulnerability in normal years while developing assets that communities can use during good years and fall back on in bad years. The PSNP is supported by the Ethiopian government as well as several other donors. During normal years, a certain number of households are targeted for the program based on their chronic food insecurity and malnutrition. However, during years when poor crop yields and impacts increase the number of households needing food assistance, the number of households targeted increases to also address the needs of those who would not normally be included in the PSNP program.

In addition to selecting participants based on their food insecurity, there is a difference between how emergency and non-emergency programs select participants when it comes to malnutrition. In the case of emergency programs, care is taken to address the needs of people who are acutely malnourished, mainly children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women. In the case of emergency programs, acute malnutrition, in which the body loses weight rapidly, becomes a major risk. Moderate acute malnutrition exists when body weight for height among children under 5 falls below 2 standard deviations from the global mean, and severe acute malnutrition exists when this falls to 3 standard deviations below the mean.  If the rate of wasting malnutrition in a population reaches or exceeds 10%, this is deemed a humanitarian emergency requiring immediate rehabilitation using ready to use therapeutic and supplementary foods  that provide concentrations of fat, calories, protein and other nutrients all aimed at ensuring survival and rapid weight gain. Women of childbearing age, including those who are pregnant or breastfeeding as well as men also benefit from rehabilitation with RUTF or ready to use supplementary foods (RUSF), designed to also rehabilitate people in these conditions. These products are available via Title II.

However, in the case of non-emergency programs, participants are targeted based on the rate of “Stunting”, or chronic malnutrition, which exists when height-for-age among children under the age of 5 falls below 2 standard deviations under the global mean. The logic behind this is that there are milestones for linear growth that children need to reach before the age of 2 to avoid being developmentally disabled and to ensure a healthy life. Infants and young children under age 2 in this condition can recover from this and their linear growth can catch up to normal levels before they reach age 2.  However, after these children reach age 2, it becomes extremely difficult for their growth to catch up.  It is possible for a child to be both chronically and acutely malnourished (also known as “wasted”). It is also possible for stunted children not to be wasted and wasted children not to be stunted. However, there are certainly connections between these different types of malnutrition.  Nonetheless, stunting and wasting are indicative of different situations based on how and when they occur within the population. High levels of acute malnutrition indicate the existence of an acute shock as it does not take long for children to become acutely malnourished. This occurs when children are deprived of the food they need for a period of days or weeks (at most). However, it can take a long time for a child to become stunted. Children become stunted because they lack sufficient nutrients in their diet (both macro- and micro-nutrients) to fulfill their daily requirements. It takes months for a child to become stunted, and it also takes a long time for them to overcome this problem. If there are a lot of stunted children in the population, this indicate that the population is chronically food insecure and poor.

Thus, non-emergency Title II programs target populations with high chronic malnutrition rates among children under 5 as this is a clear red flag that there is a significant poverty and food insecurity problem within these populations. Targeting participants from these areas indicates that while there may not an active shock situation, there may still be a lot of food insecurity – which left unaddressed – could lead to more serious problems.  People living in these contexts are on the edge, and one missed harvest due to a storm or drought or earthquake or locust swarm or violent attack could result in them becoming part of the emergency case load of Title II programs.

Non-emergency Title II programs focus on ensuring that infants are exclusively breastfed until they are six months old, and that beyond that time their diets consist of the types of diverse foods that children of their age need to meet their linear growth milestones by age two. At the same, these programs  also address the underlying causes of chronic malnutrition. They train mothers to feed their children properly, including exclusive breastfeeding, take care to prevent water-borne disease through handwashing and use of clean water. At the same time, these programs recognize that mothers will be unable to feed their children the types of food they need if they are not able to produce or purchase it throughout the year. Raising these issues among all community members can build support and solidarity to ensure that children’s and women’s dietary needs are met. In addition, creation of clean water access and sanitation – including installation of accessible working water points and household latrines – support practices such as frequent handwashing with soap, and reduction of open defecation. These practices in turn reduce water-borne disease from hindering the absorption of the nutritious food being consumed. And, integrating these practices into people’s lives takes a long time, thus the longer timeframe of these programs is critical.

Non-emergency programs also provide a few more benefits that make them important to reduce the emergency caseload of Title II. They target countries and regions that are fragile and shock prone. They can detect changes in conditions,  both positive and negative, which can reduce time lags on responses. If the number of acutely malnourished children begins to escalate – this could easily occur within the areas where populations are most food insecure. If harvests begin to fail due to weather impacts, many farmers in the geography where the program is implemented (they may or may not be participants) will experience these conditions first.  The presence of an implementer (NGO) in these areas can ensure the monitoring of IPC levels, levels of acute malnutrition, impacts on harvests and prevalence of diseases – including those that are water-borne.

At the same time, these programs seek to enable participants to anticipate and cope better with the types of shocks that normally impact these geographic areas. Reviewing the history of the targeted population, it is possible to learn more about the major shocks that typically impact them, and they are sometimes cyclical. For instance, locust swarms may occur every so often in parts of East Africa. Working with communities likely to be impacted by these swarms during years when they don’t occur to prepare for when the locusts return will help participants to cope more effectively when this happens. There are now many agricultural technologies that enable farmers to adapt to drought. This could range from water-harvesting, to irrigation, to use of drought-adopted seeds, to reorienting productive systems through methods such as Resilient Design and Perma-gardening.[x]  The last two types of systems prevented farmers from losing their crops during the El Niño drought event in Zimbabwe mentioned above.[xi] It was a non-emergency Title II programs that provided training to farmers to enable them to maintain their crops in the face of this severe drought.

Finally, one of the key underlying causes of food insecurity is poverty.  Farmers may depend on their crops for food, but they need cash to fall back on when their crops fail, and they need to purchase food from markets. Also, for farmers to maintain their land and plant crops, they need cash for inputs and often to pay for land,  either as the owner or as a renter or lease holder.  It also costs money for children to attend school, and it costs money to get to markets, visit health centers, buy fertilizers and crop-protection products. Maintaining water points and latrines can also cost money because spare parts and their installation is not free. And when the program is over after five years of investment, ensuring that people not only achieve but also sustain their food security will mean that people have a secure source of cash and savings to fall back on.  Otherwise, closing the program will be commensurate to a shock for those who have benefitted from it.

A methodology that has proven itself over the years, and within the past nine years in Title II non-emergency programs has been the Graduation Approach.[xii]  Developed and initiated by BRAC in Bangladesh, this approach has been tested throughout the world in fragile contexts where large numbers of poor and food insecure people live.[xiii] The approach targets extremely poor people, provides them with food assistance safety-nets  and then links them to a savings and loan group where they meet others in their situation and obtain peer group support. At the same time, they are provided training in a livelihood opportunity for which there is demand within their context. This livelihood training could be agricultural (crops or livestock) or non-agricultural in nature and offers people the opportunity to become employed or operate their own business. After their training is complete, participants  receive small grants or assets (such as equipment or animals) that enable them to start their activities until they become viable. During this time, they continue to receive coaching and mentoring so that they can be successful within their chosen livelihood. They also receive training and support with respect to nutrition, water and sanitation and learn to anticipate and respond effectively to shocks. The Graduation Approach has been shown to ensure a high return on investment and results are sustained over time after the end of the program.[xiv]

Now that the program has moved to USDA, the leadership is reviewing the program and will likely make changes that will increase the cost  of food and ocean freight versus what is provided to those in need.[xv]  The recent Emergency Program set of funding opportunities stipulated that at least 50% of program budgets must be devoted to commodities and ocean freight.[xvi] This reduced the funding that could be provided to internal transportation storage and handling to distribute commodities. It also reduced the funds that could be provided for technical interventions such as monitoring of severe food insecurity and levels of acute malnutrition, training mothers about how to monitor and refer their children, and enabling technical interventions that will help people to recover from emergency situations. It is possible that the same 50% requirement may be put in place by USDA for future Non-Emergency Programs, and this could reduce the resources available to enable the sustainable improvement of food security and nutrition in extremely poor and fragile contexts as described above.

Changes in the legislation over the years made it possible to integrate international disaster assistance funds  with emergency Food for Peace programs enabling the use of cash, vouchers and local, regional and international procurement  to ensure that the right resources were available at the right time to address peoples’ needs. This prevented the need to wait 6 – 8  months for U.S. commodities to arrive in country to begin addressing acute malnutrition.  As noted above, the impact of acute malnutrition is rapid and if not addressed quickly will lead to death.

Similarly, U.S. legislative changes enabled the coordinated use of Development Assistance funds with non-emergency Food for Peace programs, which covered the cost of the complex interventions discussed above. These resources also provided the opportunity for programs to transition people away from dependence on U.S. food aid and foreign assistance.  While food aid has been important for non-emergency programs to build stability for those suffering chronic food insecurity, we will not ultimately accomplish Title II’s objectives if people remain dependent on food aid at the end of each program.

As global conditions worsened around the turn of the century, the need for emergency food aid programs increased around the world.  These needs began to reduce the funds available to pay for non-emergency programs. Thus, in the 2008 U.S. Farm Bill, a Non-Emergency “Safe Box” was integrated into Title II legislation to establish minimum funding to ensure that these programs could continue to be implemented. Currently $365 million is designated for the implementation of these programs.  $700 million of USG  funding from FY26 and FY27 allocations may be made available soon for these programs.[xvii]

While much remains unclear about the future of U.S. Title II non-emergency food aid programs, the need for activities that reduce and prevent high levels of acute and chronic food insecurity and malnutrition has not diminished,  and perhaps has increased, during the 18 months since the 2025 Executive Order to pause foreign assistance was announced.[xviii] It is also clear that addressing the underlying causes of food and nutrition insecurity is still important. Hopefully, USDA will hold true to this fundamental mandate of these programs. This will entail implementing these programs over a 5-year timeframe, in fragile geographies where shocks are frequent, among participants who are chronically poor and/or malnourished, while increasing peoples’ ability to cope with shocks, and producing outcomes that are sustainable.  If these are not the Title II mandate’s parameters for non-emergency programs, they run the risk of violating legislation..

Further Reading:

Food for Peace / U.S. Food Aid

Global Hunger, IPC, and Malnutrition

Country-specific articles relevant to your examples (Haiti, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, DRC, etc.)

REFERENCES:

[i] Miolene, Elissa, USDA takes over Food for Peace with $452M World Food Programme deal, 29 January 2026.

[ii] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food for Peace Notice of Funding Opportunity, Fiscal Year 2025, May 13, 2026

[iii] Miolene, Elissa, House locks Food for Peace into USDA with 50% commodity requirement,1 May 2026,

[iv]  These progras were known variously as Development Activity Programs (DAPs), Multi-Year Activity Programs (MYAPs), Development Food Assistance Programs (DFAPs), Development Food Security Activities (DFSAs) and Resilience Food Security Activities (RFSAs). There were differences between these programs, but those differences were not necessarily associated with the names given to them.

[v] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food for Peace Notice of Funding Opportunity, Fiscal Year 2025, May 13, 2026, https://grants.gov/search-results-detail/362375.

[vi] Integrated Phase Classification, https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/ipc-overview-and-classification-system/en/?__cf_chl_f_tk=vmmArOlbSf51oWrK_G0UqCVyP0w6jSuy9SVydqdsIlk-1783098737-1.0.1.1-XKb_PsSY1mVf1b2u8K3Udd85lbGsjDgfDcO0yyY9UrE,

[vii] https://borgenproject.org/kore-lavi-provides-food-security-in-haiti/; accessed July 3, 2026.

[viii] United Nations, UN News, Zimbabwe faces worsening food crisis due to El Niño droughts, 7 August 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/1152936.

[ix] IFPRI, Productive Safety-Net Program, https://essp.ifpri.info/productive-safety-net-program-psnp/, accessed July 3, 2026

[x] FANRPAN, Scaling up Resilience Design in Zimbabwe: Position Paper, https://fanrpan.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Takunda_CareSlideDeck-1.pdf.

[xi] Chitsa, Tanaka, Growing Hope: Community gardens flourish amidst El Nino challenges, 27 August 2024, https://www.carezimbabwe.org/growing-hope-community-gardens-flourish-amidst-el-nino-challenges/.

[xii] AVSI, Graduating to Resilience, https://www.avsi.org/en/graduating-to-resilience

[xiii] BRAC, Graduation Out of Ultra Poverty, https://www.brac.net/solutions/development/ending-poverty/ultra-poor-graduation/

[xiv] Abrams, William, Joshua Goldstein, Larry Reed, Carine Roenen, and Jean Francois Tardif, The Business Case for Investing in Graduation, September 2017, ultra-poverty.org, https://www.ultra-poverty.org/blog-post/the-business-case-for-investing-in-graduation/#.

[xv] Miolene, Elissa, House locks Food for Peace into USDA with 50% commodity requirement, 1 May 2026,

[xvi] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food for Peace Notice of Funding Opportunity, Fiscal Year 2025, May 13, 2026,

[xvii] Miolene, Elissa, US Dept of Agriculture to reboot Food for Peace’s ‘safe box’ programs,

[xviii] The White House, Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid, January 20, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/reevaluating-and-realigning-united-states-foreign-aid/.

Mara Russell is a career programmer of Food for Peace Title II food aid including leading Food Aid Management, and spearheading CARE’s food aid for decades.

Ebola Control Lessons from Past Outbreaks

June 18, 2026    Food insecurity the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has formed a vicious circle this year with the latest Ebola virus outbreak, now the 17th recorded and the largest to date in terms of people infected.

The Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) is an example of an NGO that has been providing large scale food assistance in eastern DRC and has addressed the current and past outbreaks of Ebola with community education, hygiene promotion, and water, sanitation, and hygiene.

Lessons from the earlier West African Ebola outbreak include the value of self-isolation (self quarantine of people who may have been exposed to Ebola) which was a critical measure to interrupt transmission, and, in turn, self-isolation depended on aid agencies providing ample food aid to compensate the family for lost income.   Today, the World Food Programme is doing the same thing, providing food aid to contacts and patients in DRC.

The map below shows the current spread, in 2026 of the virus, and possible future routes of spread.

In the West Africa outbreak there were 11,323 recorded deaths but probably over 30,000 actual deaths, where the majority of Ebola cases were never reported.  The United States Government alone spent some $2 billion on that earlier Ebola response.  The United Kingdom spent £667 million (roughly $850 million–$1 billion at 2014–2016 exchange rates), and the World Health Organization spent some $500 million.

The USAID evaluation of that outbreak response was commissioned by Jeremy Konyndyk, then Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. Writing in the New York Times on June 13, he warned that the current DRC outbreak could become the worst ever.  He reports that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) projects that more than 20,000 cases may occur by late August. Konyndyk notes: “As bad as this situation is, we have a playbook for addressing such crises. But it requires a huge team effort.” He calls for specialized clinics, large‑scale contact tracing, safe burial management, and adequate personal protective equipment for health workers. However, he cautions that “security has deteriorated markedly as the government has lost control of large parts of the area.”

With clear relevance for the current global Ebola outbreak, a series of lesson‑learning roundtables were held in 2017 at George Washington University, Harvard University, and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. These discussions were part of a lessons‑learning evaluation requested by USAID and were intended to reflect on operational challenges during the West African Ebola crisis.  Each roundtable included seasoned emergency practitioners who had overseen or implemented programs in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea during the lethal 2013–2016 outbreaks.

The Harvard Roundtable concluded that the greatest challenges in the Ebola response involved trust, including community skepticism and occasional violence. One participant warned that “we are setting ourselves up for the same problems all over again.” Families were initially reluctant to cooperate with referral systems in which infected relatives were taken away with little explanation. As one participant noted, once treatment centers were introduced and communities saw that Ebola was not always a death sentence, and that patients could both enter and leave safely, community transmission began to decline. Another participant observed that promising “Community Care Centers” were denied or delayed funding unless the NGO also staffed a larger hospital. Others emphasized that faith‑based organizations were often more effective at face‑to‑face engagement with communities.

The 2016 lessons roundtable held with U.S. military representatives highlighted the indispensable role of the U.S. Navy’s Mobile Diagnostic Laboratories (MDLs) in West Africa. Operated by the Naval Medical Research Center (NMRC) in Guinea and Sierra Leone, these PCR‑based laboratories provided the only rapid diagnostic capacity early in the outbreak. The U.S. Air Force also played a critical role in airlifting doctors and epidemiologists across Liberia during the fall of 2014.

The roundtable at George Washington University’s Milken Institute School of Public Health, composed largely of NGO headquarters emergency coordinators—generated two major cautions about international response. First, although each NGO had developed new guidelines and standard operating procedures for Ebola‑type emergencies, there was no funding to package, archive, or preserve these materials for future use, and many were already being lost. There was no forward planning for how such lessons might be applied in future outbreaks, including today in the DRC.  Second, although not on the agenda, participants volunteered that their organizations now have serious reservations about having responded at all, given the massive legal and duty‑of‑care liabilities they incurred. Donors urged NGOs to respond, but were unable to shield them from punitive audits afterward.

Key lessons about reducing transmission of Ebola in West Africa in 2014-2016 were published from a USG-commissioned  evaluation  which looked at all donors, UN agencies, NGOs, academia and other actors.  The reports from that evaluation are linked below.

Four key lessons jump out from the research:

First, the aid response of separating family members with symptoms of Ebola had the unintended effect of discouraging honest reporting or referrals, such that the total official death count across West Africa was much lower than the true cause of death.

Second, what mattered the most in interrupting transmission was when local populations observed deaths of people they knew which led them to take seriously new changes in behavior (not touching the bodies of people wiht Ebola).  This was the essential change that had to occur.

Third, much of the efforts overall by aid agencies had less of an effect in “bending the curve” of the epidemic than the simple communications by the families and communities affected.

Fourth, while many health professionals died early in the outbreak, attention to protecting them, including provision of protective gowns/gloves and equipment was necessary for further work to be achieved.

Food and Nutrition:

Food aid functioned less as a nutrition intervention and more as an enabler of disease control.  Its main value was making isolation and quarantine viable. Qualitative data indicated that food distributions to isolation and treatment units, facilitated by Food for Peace (FFP), improved the effectiveness of isolation, quarantine, and  response actions at community-based sites of transmission. FFP food distribution played a critical role in supporting isolation and restrictions on mobility,  in response to warnings from implementing partners about food shortages among quarantined communities.

The scale was significant:  through the end of 2014, USAID awarded nearly $35 million in food assistance to WFP through the Office of Food for Peace.  Examples include WFP providing all patients discharged from the Guékédou treatment unit in Guinea with a 60-day food ration on leaving, and continuing general distributions of 45-day rations (rice, oil, pulses, salt) in affected communities.

 The proportion of quarantined households that received food support was roughly similar across all three countries, between 60 and 70 percent.  In Guinea, quarantined families with Ebola cases were more likely to have received food support in urban areas (89%) than in rural areas (53%),  part of a broader urban bias the evaluation flagged in how supplies were targeted. Notably, the reports treat food almost entirely as rations/in-kind support for isolation; there is essentially no analysis of nutritional outcomes per se.

Behavior change

Behavior change was identified as one of the most decisive factors in bending the epidemic curve — arguably more than clinical capacity. The most effective USG-funded activities were nationally-led incident management and coordination, social mobilization, and safe human remains management; as OFDA scaled up community engagement — health education, household isolation, hygiene kits, community outreach, adapting safe burial practices, and involving local leadership — a downward trend in new cases is clearly seen in the data.

The substance of the behavior change effort was straightforward but hard to achieve: much of the social mobilization effort was oriented toward changing simple behaviors such as shaking hands, other physical contact, washing hands, and the handling of infected persons and dead bodies. The key lesson was sequencing — which donors under-prioritized at first.  Whereas  early priorities focused on facility-based responses, case isolation, treatment, and safe burial, donors and NGOs failed to prioritize social mobilization and community-level responses.  Key lesson: social mobilization is the most relevant at the outset of the response.  Aid agencies should hire and deploy anthropologists.

When trusted local actors led it, the payoff was fast:  one Government of Guinea informant noted that within 1–2 months of accelerated social mobilization, the number of prefectures reporting social resistance dropped from 27 to 4.

A cross-cutting theme among evaluators were that while more than 90% of activity monitoring targets were reported as achieved, this reflected only activities and reveals little about actual change in bending the epidemic curve,  a major limitation in analyzing the USG contribution.

These reports, led by the independent evaluation organization IBTCI were available on the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse until a year ago when the Administration dissoved it.  They are accessible via these links below:

 Synopsis:     https://www.worldhunger.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Synopsis-of-Ebola-West-Africa-Evaluation.pdf

        Coordination:  https://www.worldhunger.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ebola-Response-Eval-4-Coordination.pdf

        Effectiveness:  https://www.worldhunger.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ebola-ibtci-eval-effectivenes-1.pdf

         Relevance:   https://www.worldhunger.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ebola-evaluation-Relevance-of-response-3.pdf

        Components:   https://www.worldhunger.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ebola-evaluation-vol.-2-effectiveness-of-components-2018.pdf

A 2020 review of some selected lessons about the West Africa and DRC Ebola responses, largely non-medical, was commissioned by ALNAP here, focusing on community trust and messaging.

at the same time, ALNAP recommends these infection and control guidelines from WHO.

An earlier article about pandemics and hunger was published by Hunger Notes here.   A Hunger Notes interview about Covid-19 and hunger also addresses these relationships.

See also the review about public health communication campaigns.

In Memoriam: Arthur Eugene ‘Gene’ Dewey, A Life of Service and Compassion

 Gene Dewey, who passed away on February 22nd, was one of the great humanitarian leaders of his generation, inspiring many people and managing to move food and relief supplies to needed areas over the course of several decades. He was also an institution builder, seeing the need for new organizations to lead and to train leaders.

His career spanned many of the global emergencies of the last 40 years, from Biafra in the 1960s to Sudan in the 1980s, to Rwanda in the 1990s, to Afghanistan in the 2000s.  While he attained senior levels in the UN and US Government, he never lost the common touch. He was affable and supportive of his colleagues and never stood on ceremony.

Throughout his distinguished career, Ambassador Dewey embodied an unwavering belief in the power of multilateral cooperation to address the world’s most pressing humanitarian crises. His conviction that international challenges required international solutions shaped his approach to diplomacy and refugee protection for more than four decades.

He is survived by his wife Priscilla, his daughter Elizabeth Parce Ainsworth, son in-law Anthony Ainsworth, and grand-daughter, Charlotte.

Arthur Eugene Dewey went by the name of “Gene.”  Testimonials contributed from his friends and colleagues for this obituary appear in the following

I.  Gene’s Life and Mission

Born on February 18, 1933, in Pennsylvania, Gene grew up in a ministerial family that taught him values of service and compassion, which would define his life’s work.  Gene graduated from West Point Military Academy in 1956 and began a distinguished 25-year military career. After earning a Master of Science in Engineering from Princeton University in 1961, Gene deployed to Southeast Asia for two combat tours.  For his leadership during a multinational prisoner rescue operation in Cambodia, he earned the Distinguished Flying Cross and six additional air medals.

Philip Sargisson (UNHCR):  “Gene was a highly principled yet particularly warm human being. We worked together, traveled together and remained close friends.

His advocacy for streamlined international aid structures and enhanced civil-military cooperation in humanitarian response reflected his belief that effective assistance required both strategic coordination and operational flexibility.  His vision influenced how the aid agencies respond to displacement crises today.

Betsy Lippman (State Dept):  “Gene Dewey was the ultimate humanitarian and a gentleman in the old style.  One of a kind.  He will be truly missed.”

II. Gene’s Leadership in Fighting Global Hunger

Gene fought malnutrition and hunger in numerous capacities, starting as a White House Fellow in 1968 when he was posted to USAID to coordinate civilian food aid for the Biafra famine (also known as the Nigerian Civil War), which was the first real-time, big night-time news crisis in Africa.

Susan Martin (Georgetown):  “I met Gene in 1981 when he had retired from the military and began working on refugee issues in the State Department.  He was largely responsible for shifting U.S. policy toward finding solutions for the famine in Ethiopia.”

Working at the U.S. Department of State Gene supported the response to the devastating Ethiopian famine of 1984-1985.  He played a pivotal role in convincing the UN Secretary-General to establish the UN Organization for Emergency Operations in Africa that responded to the regional famines across the Horn of Africa including the Ethiopia famine.

Margaret McKelvey (State Dept):  “I cannot count the number of times he [Gene] cited the UN Office of Emergency Operations in Africa work on famine across the continent in the mid 1980s as the UN’s finest hour.”

Angela Berry (UNHCR Nutritionist) met Gene in 1985:  “At that time, I had met many dignitaries. I assumed my list would disappear into some distant bureaucracy. To my astonishment, within weeks everything I had requested began to arrive – tents, blankets, therapeutic food, emergency kits – pouring in with a speed and coordination I had never seen. I knew it was Gene. … Knowing Gene was there, steadfast in his dedication, unwavering in his humanity, was a deep comfort to me and to so many others. Over the decades we continued to exchange messages, sharing concerns about neglected crises and places in need of attention. He always seemed like someone who would be with us forever.”

In 1993, Gene set up and led the Congressional Hunger Center (CHC), which was authorized by Congress in the wake of the dissolution of the House Select Committee on Hunger.  Working closely with Congressional representatives, Gene built up the CHC.    Drawing on his experience with the White House Fellows program, Gene led the CHC to provide two-year fellowships to dozens of young leaders to train fight hunger, working with UN agencies and NGOs.

Margaret Zeigler (CHC):  “He inspired a generation of young leaders who now work to make the world a better place – in the UN system, in the US government, private sector and in the humanitarian non-governmental organizations here and around the world. Gene always lifted up young leaders and especially believed in women, youth and those less advantaged. His favorite words were “we” and “us”.”

Ambassador and former Congressman, Tony Hall chaired the Committee on Hunger from Congress.  He remembers:  “Gene Dewey was one of the most decent and honorable man I’ve ever met.  He was always caring and working to help people who were hurting.”

In 1989 Gene was tapped to lead USAID’s new, unprecedented aid to the former Soviet states when the Soviet Union unraveled and brand, new countries were in need.  He pioneered new ways of providing aid to unconventional populations in Central Asia.  His partner in this effort, Don Krumm, remembers:  “He was a big-minded guy, energetic, and encouraging.  He was always there with positive bravo.  He liked audacity.  Gene kept the supply lines going in.  It was a chance, if we succeeded, to be on top of a transition to democracy.”

Margaret Zeigler explains “CHC still exists today, and is a private, bi-partisan center that keeps a focus in Congress on domestic and international hunger and humanitarian issues and galvanizes action.  It is where our teams established the Bill Emerson Hunger Fellowships and the Mickey Leland International Hunger Fellowships, programs that raise up the next generation of leaders working to end hunger in the United States and around the world.”

 III.  Gene’s Leadership in Refugee Assistance and Protection

While outside of government, during the Rwandan Refugee Crisis in 1995, Gene Dewey arranged, developed a five-point plan shared with the National Security Council and the U.S. President that helped facilitate the deployment of military assets to provide water supply in Goma and the refugee camps around Goma.

Later, as Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration from 2002 to 2005, Dewey oversaw the return of over four million Afghan refugees following the fall of the Taliban.  By mid-2002, approximately 1.6 million refugees had returned home, supported by U.S.-funded UNHCR programs providing transport, shelter, and reintegration assistance.  Dewey championed an innovative Program Secretariat Structure in Afghanistan that paired UN agencies with Afghan government ministries, creating accountability mechanisms while building local capacity. He also initiated the Afghan Conservation Corps, modeled on the U.S. Civilian Conservation Corps, to employ returnees in environmental and infrastructure projects.

      Susan Martin (Georgetown University):   “My most vivid memories of Gene were working with him when he was Deputy UN High Commissioner for Refugees. UNHCR had been pressured by some of its member states to do a better job in protecting the rights of refugee women and children. Some of the UNHCR staff saw the problems faced by women and girls to be social issues, not human rights issues. When I talked with Gene about it, he immediately brought a group of staff members together and let them know that UNHCR had an obligation to protect all refugees and they should cooperate with the efforts underway to address the many problems facing women and children. I will always be thankful for Gene’s support.”

At the Department of State, Gene encouraged Don Krumm  to pioneer early warning of refugee flows, such as in the Fergana Valley in Central Asia.  Don  (State) remembers:  “Gene was always encouraging new thinking.  He was one for pushing the envelope.   He and I got along so well because I would recommend going to the site of the problem, and he trusted me to do that.”

 Anne Richard (State}:  “When he became head of the refugee bureau at the State Department, the humanitarian community expressed huge relief….  He made his mark early on when his issued a fact-based report that defended UNFPA’s role with regard to China’s coercive one child policy. …    His leadership on refugee matters was respected throughout Washington, DC… While a friendly and avuncular figure, he never hesitated to critique humanitarian policies if he thought they were off-track.”

Gene negotiated the reopening of Vietnam’s Orderly Departure Program in 2004, allowing thousands of refugees to resettle safely.  He also advocated for Bhutanese refugees in Nepal and North Korean refugees in China, pressing for their recognition and protection under international law.

Globally, he advocated for “un-warehousing refugees” i.e., out of long-term artificial camps so they could actively participate in finding their own solutions.

Kelly Clements {UNHCR):  “He was known then as a man of conviction and determination to make the lives of others better with Africa a focus during his time at State Department and serving at UNHCR during the 1980’s pivotal adoption of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees and the CIREFCA process which provided a humanitarian framework to implement Cartagena protection principles and solutions in Central America. “

United Nations’ Leadership

Gene’s commitment to multilateralism and “burden sharing” among donors found its fullest expression during his tenure as UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees from 1986 to 1990. Based in Geneva, he served as the second-ranking official at UNHCR during a pivotal period of global displacement. His leadership helped strengthen the agency’s capacity to respond to refugee crises worldwide, and he championed the integration of protection principles into all humanitarian operations.

In this role, Gene worked to enhance coordination among UN agencies, NGOs, and national governments, recognizing that effective humanitarian response required seamless collaboration across institutional boundaries. His efforts to promote burden-sharing among nations and to elevate refugee protection on the international agenda left a lasting imprint on the global refugee system.

Margaret McKelvey (PRM):  “He was tenacious in his views and committed to multilateralism.”

Jan de Wilde (International Organization for Migration):  “Gene was a rare combination of the good and the practical.  Trust found an easy home in him.  His Christian faith was a quiet but driving force in his charitable works, at least as far as I could tell.”

Former U.S.  Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reflected how Gene was devoted to a life of public service.  She called out his “belief that the world’s most difficult challenges require multilateral cooperation.  You represent the highest ideals of public service.”

Dr. Michel Gabaudan worked with Gene at UNHCR in Geneva.  He remembers Gene as “always extremely courteous and looking at how to solve problems, Gene always saw the individuals, and their suffering, behind the policies, or institutional politics that guided them, carried out by our offices. And he always calmly analyzed the broader context in which we operated, which he understood with discerning subtlety. Some 20 years later, when we met regularly during my stints in DC, Gene remained the same concerned, amiable and well informed person we had always known. A true humanitarian gentleman.”

Strategic Partnerships with International Organizations

From long and hard experience, Gene learned that the U.S. Government’s humanitarian efforts were most effective when conducted in partnership with established international organizations. He cultivated long and deep operational relationships with UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration.

In January 2002, Gene was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration where he oversaw a humanitarian budget of over $700 million a year in refugee assistance that flowed through NGOs and international organizations.

Kelly Clements (UNHCR):  “We worked most closely together when he was Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration from 2002 to 2005 and I was Deputy Director of Policy and Resource Planning.  He argued forcefully for the U.S. to address significant humanitarian need from increased displacement in multiple parts of the world, including importantly in and around Afghanistan with senior department, White House, and Congressional leadership.  I remember in particular his first budget defense in front of then Deputy Secretary Robert Zoellick – neither were shrinking violets and it made a lasting impression on me at a young age. He carried the day and our robust budget request proceeded to the White House.”

IV. Charitable Initiatives and Enduring Legacy

Gene co-founded the nonprofit, USA for UNHCR, establishing an enduring bridge between American compassion and global refugee protection. His role as Director Emeritus of USA for IOM further amplified his influence on international migration policy.  In 2018, USA for UNHCR, established “the Gene Dewey Refugee Award” in his honor, recognizing individuals who demonstrate visionary leadership and extraordinary dedication to helping forcibly displaced people.   The award’s criteria, courage, selflessness, sacrifice, and humility, mirror Gene’s values.   Recipients include refugee-led organizations in Uganda to the Eleon Foundation providing therapy for Ukrainian refugee children in Poland.

Jeff Meer (US Association for UNHCR):  “Gene was one of the first people I met who could move smoothly between public and private service.  I learned so much in watching him do that.”

Kelly Clements (UNHCR)  “While there are many Gene stories, the other piece of lasting advice I remember from our PRM days together is something often repeated now, with due credit to Gene.:  ‘there are no lessons learned, only lessons identified.’  We can all take that to heart.”

Eric Schwartz (State) remembers Gene as:  “a true humanitarian who was prepared to speak and lend his expertise without concern about which political party was in the White House. He will truly be missed. May his memory be a blessing.”

Encouragement of Others

Gene’s legacy lives on through the institutions he helped build and the countless lives transformed by his dedication. The award bearing his name continues to inspire new generations of humanitarian leaders, ensuring that his vision for a more compassionate world endures.

Betsy Lippman (State):    “Gene showed me the ropes.  How he used his discerning intelligence, diplomatic skills and knowledge were incredible to watch and learn from.  His passion and caring for the forcibly displaced was so clear and his drive to change their lives for the better and help them find solutions was always at work.”

Margaret Zeigler (CHC)  “First and foremost, in a town like Washington DC, where most people rarely share the limelight, Gene was radically different: he always created space for young people, like me, to get involved in everything he was working on”

Angela Berry (UNHCR) remembers Gene coming through with needed supplies when she reported her assessments.  “He simply told me to stay the course. After a month, he called me back to Headquarters. He never drew me into the immense politics of that mission; he asked only that I remain true to the technical and humanitarian purpose of the work.” 

John Buche (State):  “At my 90th birthday party, after the string quartet had played “Happy Birthday”, I asked Gene to say a “few words”.  Gene began with mentions of my college education, my army experience, my Foreign Service assignments, pointed out meeting me for the first time when I was in Zambia, continued with my assignments working together in PRM, and ended with recollections from our discussions at our luncheon get togethers in retirement. I felt so honored!”

Mukesh Kapilla (UK Government):  “He was a good man and in my dealings with him I found him sincere, serious and sympathetic in co-operating constructively even as global and American politics swirled around us.

Following the news of Gene’s passing, many offered testimonials, as Bill Hyde (IOM) notes:  “Over the past days I’ve watched a cascade of emotion burst forth from decades of civil servants who were touched by Gene Dewey. Every person swiftly pulled up ‘a Gene moment’ – the time he listened when they needed it; the time he paused in his own busy life to guide them to do better; the time he reached out and amplified the effect of their efforts by easing a path. Many were surprised that a senior official like Gene even remembered them to offer help – but that’s exactly the kind of man he was. Gene didn’t need the praise, he simply wanted everyone to serve the best that they could. “

V. Recognition and Personal Life

Margaret McKelvey (State):  “A committed Christian, he often cited the Biblical verse “the truth shall set you free” – not as a theological statement but as an admonition to always give a complete and truthful assessment of a humanitarian situation along with a detailed “get well” plan.“

During his final year, Gene was still at work writing and corresponding and trying to educate the U.S. government about how to save lives, as in this letter to the editor in the Washington Post (May 2, 2025), titled A Missing Sense of Duty, wherein he recalled the USG’s success in 1985 in stopping measles deaths during the Ethiopian famine through vaccinations, and questioning the recent changes in US policy, writing:  “Where is that sense of duty for potential measles victims in America today?  Health leaders who plant unscientific doubts about vaccine safety need to be held accountable.”

A few weeks before his passing, Gene met for lunch with Don Krumm:  “he was looking incredibly spry.  He talked about emergency operations in Africa was a high-water mark in Africa.  We talked about old times.  He said he was working on some draft recommendations.  He was an exemplary person, driven to do good. “

Gene’s  contributions earned distinguished recognition, including the Distinguished Graduate Award from West Point in 2006 and the John W. Gardner Legacy of Leadership Award in 2011.

Angela Berry (UNHCR):  “Quiet. Kind. Sincere. Reflective. These are the qualities I will always associate with Gene Dewey. They are also the qualities that defined his extraordinary gift to the world and to all who had the privilege of knowing him.”

Bill Hyde (IOM):  “I recall a dozen times over the years when I would receive an unexpected note from Gene. Each would convey his awareness, his appreciation, his offer in some way to contribute. And then he would slip away again, asking neither thanks or focus. Only better service. That’s the definition of a humanitarian.”

Throughout his peripatetic humanitarian life, his wife Priscilla provided unwavering support, for which he expressed profound gratitude.

March 8, 2026

Further informaon about Gene Dewey:

To see Ambassador Dewey’s testimony to Congress about Haiti, see the March 3, 2004 CSpan Haiti testimony where he speaks 46 minutes in:  https://www.c-span.org/program/house-committee/political-crisis-in-haiti/197804

https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004buc02/2004buc02.pdf

USAID Library of Project Reports and Evaluations Now Available from Third Parties

By: WHES Board (*Note this post was updated from its original Feb 18, 2025 version to add the two new pages with DEC resources.)

 

American Taxpayers often have questions about how funds for foreign aid work.  In early 2025 there has also been claims — and false information — by Congress and social media about an overall lack of transparency about this aid.

The primary or lead aid agency for the US Government is the United States Agency for International Development or USAID.  In tracking the tens of thousands of projects that have been funded, USAID has maintained a public, transparent, free, easy, searchable database, called the “Development Experience Clearinghouse”, or DEC.   Indeed, World Hunger Education Service has turned to the DEC many times in the last few decades to help provide educational content to the public.

The Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) is large database of several hundred thousand reports for sharing and accessing USAID-funded technical and program documentation, including reports, evaluations, studies, and other resources related to international development.   Most of the independent rigorous evaluations conducted of USAID activities can be freely download or read from this site.  In addition to serving as a historical record of USAID’s work, it also fosters knowledge sharing about American solutions to problems and technical advances between countries.  There is no comparably comprehensive, one-stop-shop source of information about development insights, for instance by the UN or in Europe or the UN.

Reports on the DEC are typically written by groups implementing programs overseas, including American nonprofits, universities, research groups and other independent specialists or front-line implementers summarizing their programs.

Ironically, during the January/February 2025 period of claims by some Congresspeople that USAID is not transparent, the new Administration shut down the DEC, so that it is no longer accessible for American citizens, including students or Congresspersons, to learn from.  No explanation was given about why the new Administration is blocking transparent access to details about USAID-funded programs.

However, two different independent groups have attempted to recreate the DEC (or at least portions of it) and make it available to the public for free again.

The Passing of William Garvelink, Food and Disaster Leader

September 10, 2025      William Garvelink, from Falls Church, Virginia, who led how US aid could go to persons displaced within their country’s borders, passed away this August 23 unexpectedly.  Known to all as Bill, he studied Latin American history and dreamt of being a university professor before getting work at the Department of State in emergency response.  As colleague Dr. Joe Barbera (Professor of George Washington) reflects, “He ended up creating history, not just teaching it.  He pushed the bounds of humanitarian assistance in ways that were critically important.”

Historically, United States (US) aid to refugees who have crossed borders was managed by the U.S. Department of State where Garvelink worked before moving to USAID, where he pioneered new approaches to assistance to internally-displaced populations.

Garvelink often told the story of how, in 1988, the US Government was failing to assist NGOs working in the Sudan.  Eventually, USAID’s Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) received the go-ahead to bypass diplomatic concerns from Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger who said “Don’t ask permission, just tell (Sudanese President) Bashir and the SPLM that you’re going to provide humanitarian assistance.”  Garvelink recalled “We broke through war lines because people were starving. That was the only calculation that mattered.  That changed everything,” recalled Garvelink. “That’s how humanitarian assistance has been provided ever since.”

In 2010, Garvelink became the first head of USAID’s $3.5 billion/year “Feed the Future” initiative, a new USAID flagship global food security and agriculture program.  He brought to this job a background of leading U.S. disaster assistance teams in countries fighting food crises, Somalia, Rwanda, and beyond, as well as helping launch Operation Lifeline Sudan, a groundbreaking effort to deliver food across conflict lines.  He said Food security is not charity. It is the foundation of stability, dignity, and peace”.

Disaster field expert, Kate Farnsworth recalls: “Bill was a creative humanitarian and a supportive supervisor. He always saw possibilities for a principled humanitarian response, even in the midst of complex scenarios as in Sudan, Somalia, and Rwanda.  While he was an expert in working the bureaucratic system in Washington and on the Hill, those of us in the field saw how he enjoyed being on the ground and we knew that when Bill arrived on the scene there would be a breakthrough in whatever challenge we were facing.  With his tireless, engaging conversational, down-to-earth style, he endeared himself to donor colleagues, UN, NGOs, and ICRC workers, local communities, governments and “non-state” actors and in short order would develop a plan of action that everyone could buy in to. Even after he left fulltime work, we stayed in touch and I enjoyed reconnecting with him to review old experiences and discuss current humanitarian issues. His passing is the end of an era.”

Disaster shelter expert Chuck Setchell recalls: “Bill was my first supervisor when I began working at the OFDA in 1998.  Behind his genteel demeanor was a sharp, probing mind, a sharp wit, and an intense desire to provide quality, effective assistance to the affected populations we were hoping to support.  Bill asked a lot of questions, was open to new ideas, and took me to task a few times, but he never once failed to support my recommendations.  He set the bar of leadership very high, and pushed me to be a better humanitarian, for which I’m eternally thankful.

He led USG Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) in critical and often dangerous environments, providing life-saving assistance to communities devastated by conflict and natural calamities.  In recognition of his extensive experience and leadership, Garvelink was appointed as the U.S. Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2007 to 2010.

“I remember when I first joined OFDA in 1996, Bill, then OFDA Deputy Director, was encouraging and affirming, telling me that it was better to make a decision, even if wrong, then to not act,” recalls Emeritus World Hunger Education Service Chairperson, Peter Morris, adding, “He also told me not to be awed by position and rank in government, that in our work field experience was as important.”

Over his career, Garvelink received multiple USAID and State Department commendations, including a Presidential Meritorious Service Award. But those who worked alongside him often cited his field instincts and personal courage. Whether in Mogadishu, Kigali, or Kinshasa, he pressed the U.S. government to act decisively and compassionately, and he mentored a generation of younger humanitarian professionals who today carry forward his legacy.

Dina Esposito, who followed him as the head of USAID’s food security bureau credits Garvelink with her early formative experience, “and informed all that I did after.”  In her view, “He helped set the rules of engagement for U.S. intervention in the post–Cold War era, from Kuwait to Somalia to Bosnia and beyond. With deep faith in humanity and unmatched skill in policymaking, strategy, and operations, he was a compelling voice for action. He drew together the brightest minds of his era and helped unlock U.S. leadership as a force for good, saving millions of lives in war torn countries and inspiring those of us privileged to work with him.”

A USAID colleague, Carol Peasely recalls “Bill was a delight to work with. I would call ‘Bill the Quiet and Effective American.’  He quietly led; was always a gentleman who listened to others; and was a great team player.  That was not always easy to do within USAID where turf battles too often arose. Yet, Bill always had the uncanny ability to bring people together to solve problems and get the job done.  His quiet and calm leadership and collegiality was a model to others and saved countless lives around the world.”

Patricia McIlreavy recalls an engagement with Garvelink: “He had a way of supporting people with both wisdom and humor. In early 1996, I was being interviewed by an NGO VP in Kigali for the Sudan country director role.  Bill, who was visiting in-country on a DART rotation, strolled right up to our table, asked if we were done, and told the visiting VP he hoped she wouldn’t promote me because he wanted to bring me back to OFDA. With a grin, he added that I’d refused him up to that point, since I was holding out for the chance at this role.  It was classic Bill: simultaneously strategic, protective and quietly encouraging. That moment, like so many others, showed how deeply he invested in people, not just programs.”

Peter Morris adds, “Bill was always open to new ideas to improve emergency response and was interested in creative thinking to do our work better.  He had worked with Fred Cuny, Kate Farnsworth, Bob Gersony and Tim Knight in what I would call the ‘heady days’ of Humanitarian Assistance.  Bill had a great memory and could tell great stories that were always personable.  I will really miss him.”

After retirement, Garvelink became an advisor to the International Medical Corps, served on Boards, and became a regular lecturer in university courses, fulfilling his original dream.  Dr. Barbera adds: “His post-retirement efforts in advising and mentoring young professionals interested in humanitarian careers has been inspirational.  Bill Garvelink’s quiet humanitarian commitments changed the world. He will be deeply missed professionally and personally.”

Testimonies from his memorial service in October 2025 can be watched at:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QowC1jHl8Zo

A 400-page oral history of his career is currently being edited by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.  More about his life can be found at:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_J._Garvelink , and https://usaidalumni.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/William-John-Garvelink.pdf

The end of my career in global health

The election of Donald Trump in November 2024 was a gut punch, but I did not know then that the real destruction of the world as I knew it would begin to unfold in January 2025, when Trump began the destruction of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shuttering almost all of the foreign development assistance that the United States had long led the world in providing.

I have worked in international development assistance for my entire career. I became interested in public health because of a volunteer activity at age 16 when I signed up with a private volunteer organization, Amigos de las Americas, in the summer of 1976 and spent a month in Nicaragua vaccinating children door-to-door with a local Ministry of Health promotor. That experience hooked me on public health, and I spent the next four summers working for Amigos, first as a supervisor of a group of volunteers in Honduras and then three summers in Paraguay. This experience was formative as I learned to speak Spanish fluently and how to deal with mayors, customs officers, and Ministry of Health officials. When I graduated from college, I knew I wanted to pursue a career in international health. I applied and was accepted to the International Health Program of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Hygiene and Public Health.

My Hopkins advisor had received a grant from the Primary Health Care Operations Research (PRICOR) Project, a USAID-funded program to support studies to find ways to improve primary health care (PHC) programs. PRICOR was managed by University Research Co., LLC (URC). The grant was to study community financing of water supply and the Visitadora community health worker program in Brazil. Since I spoke Portuguese, my advisor sent me to Rio de Janeiro to interview one of the principals managing the Visitadora program at the Fundaçāo Serviços Especiais de Saúde Pública (FSESP). In the spring of 1983, I spent a week interviewing FSESP officials and reviewing documents about the program. When I came back from Brazil, I met with my advisor and the PRICOR monitor for the grant, who told me that PRICOR was starting an internship program and encouraged me to apply.

On October 24, 1983, I started at PRICOR as the Spanish-speaking intern, working alongside another recent MPH graduate who spoke French. We supported the staff of five senior scientists at PRICOR who managed funded studies and developed monographs on PHC operations research. As part of the oversight of PRICOR studies, we each accompanied a senior scientist to visit country teams and supported proposal development workshops. After the year-long internship, both of us were offered full-time jobs, and we became involved with other International Division projects and business development activities of URC.

PRICOR I was followed in 1985 by PRICOR II, and PRICOR II by the Quality Assurance Project (QAP) in 1990. I worked on PRICOR II, QAP I, II, and III, working part-time when my children were little. I was fortunate to have pediatrician David Nicholas as my supervisor who was very supportive of family life and flexible working arrangements. This kind of support and my keen interest in the work of QAP and its successor projects made it easy to stay at URC. I went back to work on QAP full-time when my youngest started kindergarten.

When QAP began to focus more on collaborative improvement methods—where purposeful learning among improvement teams is a critical part of the approach—my focus shifted from communication to knowledge management. The inclusion of knowledge management in a project about improving health care was due in large measure to the foresight of Dr. James Heiby, the USAID Project Manager for PRICOR II and QAP.

When QAP was followed by the USAID Health Care Improvement (HCI) Project in 2007, my work increasingly focused on learning from improvement work and creating knowledge products to convey that learning to others. This emphasis on learning and knowledge management became even more important on the USAID Applying Science to Strengthen and Improve Systems (ASSIST) Project (2012-2020). When ASSIST was extended in 2016 to support Zika prevention and treatment in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the value of knowledge management became even clearer, since knowledge management focuses on how to learn from our work and apply that learning to have more impact. The last part of ASSIST through June 2020 was perhaps my most impactful development assistance work, since the improvements we supported benefited not only families affected by Zika but also strengthened prenatal care, newborn care, and early child development services for all mothers and children in 13 LAC countries.

The beginning of the end of my career was Trump’s January 21 Executive Order freezing U.S. foreign assistance pending a 90-day review. Then on February 3, Elon Musk announced on X that “We spent the weekend feeding USAID into the wood chipper. Could have gone to some great parties. Did that instead.” Under the direction of the U.S. Department of Government Efficiency, USAID’s headquarters in Washington, DC was closed, over 2,000 USAID staff immediately terminated, and another 4,765 direct hires placed on administrative leave. By early February, USAID contractors and implementing partners, including those providing humanitarian assistance and emergency food relief, began receiving stop-work orders. Some of these contractors and implementing partners then received communication that the stop-work orders were lifted, but then in many cases were contacted again to say the stop-work orders were still in effect. By July 1, most of the 10,000 staff that USAID had worldwide had been terminated, except for a few hundred who were transferred to the State Department to manage what was left of U.S. foreign assistance.

Effectively gutting the USAID workforce meant that actions to issue waivers for lifesaving programs, as the Trump Administration claimed it was doing, or to support the continuance of “approved” programs, were not happening. USAID’s payment system was frozen, and as a result, most contractors and implementing partners like NGOs and universities had not been paid for work they did before the freeze, and most have been forced to lay off staff or even cease operations.

While U.S. Secretary of State Macro Rubio, who appointed himself acting administrator of USAID, repeatedly said he had issued a blanket waiver for lifesaving programs, including food and medical aid, there being no staff left at implementing partners or USAID meant that promises of such waivers were intentionally misleading and untrue. In early March, Rubio announced that 5,200 USAID programs worth over $1.3 billion had been terminated and that about 1,000 USAID programs would be continued, somehow, but administered by the State Department.

The chaotic way in which USAID implementing partners and grantees were notified of the cuts (often, receiving news that the program was cut, then that the program was reinstated, and then cut again) was cruel. USAID staff were locked out of their emails and offices, placed on administrative leave, and eventually terminated.

Having worked for USAID-funded projects for over 40 years, I know firsthand how USAID was a force for good in the world. As a knowledge management practitioner, I have especially admired how USAID has been a champion of learning, both internally within its own operations and externally as a development strategy. USAID encouraged all of its implementing partners to systemically derive key lessons and knowledge products from the work USAID funded and to make them freely available on the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse.

I have seen over the past decades a continuous push by staff at USAID to do development better—to make the investments of U.S. taxpayer dollars more impactful and more sustainable. USAID’s policy emphasis on localization and locally led development signaled important shifts in how USAID did business—lessons that will likely not be internalized by staff at the Department of State.

Why should Americans care?  For several reasons.  First, USAID, until it was decimated, was the world’s largest provider of food aid, nutritional, health, and humanitarian assistance, saving millions of lives of women and children around the world.  A recent article in the Lancet used rigorous methods to quantify the impact of USAID assistance over the past 20 years and estimated that USAID programs prevented the death of over 30 million children under five and the deaths of over 25 million people living with HIV and of 8 million with malaria. Cancellation of this aid has direct and immediate impact on vulnerable people. Another recently published study in the Lancet estimated the impact over the next five years of eliminating this assistance as:
       • 4.1 million additional AIDS-related deaths
       • 600,000 additional TB-related deaths
       • 2.5 million additional child deaths from other causes
       • 40-55 million additional unplanned pregnancies
       • 12-16 million unsafe abortions
       • 340,000 additional maternal deaths
       • 630,000 additional stillbirths

Second, the destruction of USAID hurts American businesses and farmers. USAID had a well- established strategy to prioritize contracts for small American companies like Rhode Island-based Edesia which manufactures a lifesaving paste for severely malnourished babies. Cancellation of Edesia’s contract not only harmed its 150 employees but also the farmers across 25 states, the U.S. cargo ships Edesia paid to deliver hundreds of metric tons of its therapeutic paste around the world, and finally, to the international organizations that distributed it to malnourished children.

Third, this assistance, proudly branded by USAID as “From the American People”, created good will towards the United States and its citizens. It also contributed to America’s and global health security by fighting infectious diseases and strengthening local capacity to detect and fight scourges like Ebola, Mpox, and Avian flu which continue to be threats to the United States. Wholesale cancellation of support for infectious disease and research on how to prevent and mitigate pandemics makes Americans less safe and more vulnerable.

I know that my situation, having enjoyed a full and meaningful career and being financially secure, is much better than that of most of my colleagues in the U.S. and other countries. Beyond my sadness at the destruction of USAID and the callous way in which the development assistance sector and so many livelihoods and careers were eliminated, I am fearful of the lasting damage inflicted on our country and the world.

*Views expressed represent the author’s views and not those of WHES.

Future of America’s Assistance for Global Health – Roundtable

Hunger Notes joins with other sponsors in convening an expert discussion  on July 17, 2025 about the role of American foreign aid in global health, looking ahead 5+ years.  The Consortium of Universities for Global Health, the Partnership for Quality Medical Donations, the World Hunger Education Service, and George Washington University’s Milken Institute School of Public Health are organizing an online (Zoom) roundtable conversation of American public health professionals about how future United States foreign assistance can best promote global health in least developed countries.

It asks about the ongoing battle against the risks of death and illness among children in many lesser developed countries, but also what are new risks that may become disease priorities?  Neglected tropical  diseases or pandemics?

What American research is making a difference or will be in solving emerging problems?  Where are emerging gaps?  Should U.S. government aid target pneumonia, measles, tuberculosis, malaria, HIV/AIDS, malnutrition or which other priorities?

What are new opportunities for partnerships?  Which new technologies from America will make a difference?  What are the best roles for U.S. NGOs, networks, drug manufacturers, medical equipment providers and U.S. universities?

Results from this roundtable will be synthesized into a 5-page white paper that will be shared with the U.S. Congress, State Department and media.

Hunger  Notes welcomes your inputs on these issues, as well as questions to be posed.  WorldhungerEd@gmail.com.  Questions can also be addressed to:  ForeignAidRoundtable@gmail.com .

This roundtable is one among a series of similar roundtables organized this year about the future of American foreign aid.

Famine Early Warning System Restarted

Correction & Update:  Hunger Notes reported on March 19 about the cancellation of the important, 40-year-old Famine Early Warning System program, created and funded by USAID.  While true at the time, FEWS NET has been re-established. You can access it here.

The May 2025 prediction report is available here and  reports that “Conflict remains the most severe and widespread driver, particularly in settings with protracted violence or rising geopolitical tensions in East Africa, the Middle East, the Sahel, Central Africa, and Haiti. The  intersection of insecurity, inflation, and limited humanitarian access presents critical concerns across the most affected regions…the residual effects of prior droughts and floods are expected to contribute to food insecurity in parts of southern Africa, eastern Africa, and Afghanistan. Additionally, available weather forecasts suggest rainfall patterns in Sudan, South Sudan, and West Africa may mirror those of 2024, bringing flooding to riverine, wetland, and low-lying areas and dry conditions in the Gulf of Guinea. If this materializes, the resultant loss of cereal crops, cash crops, and livestock will be most acute in areas already impacted by concurrent conflict and economic shocks.”

 

– S Hansch, WHES

Roundtable on June 5 about American Foreign Assistance and Faith-Based Organizations

World Hunger Education Service (the nonprofit overseeing this Hunger Notes site), joins with Fordham University, HIAS, Lipscomb University, and George Washington University’s Milken Institute School of Public Health in organizing and convening a virtual (online) roundtable of experts on June 5, 2025, a Thursday,  to discuss how American faith-based organizations may be able to lead in the delivery of foreign aid against poverty, assisting development and providing humanitarian relief.

This will be a roundtable conversation with no panels or presentations, and is open to all faiths.

Invited organizations include operational NGOs, universities, research groups and other faith-based organizations in the United States.

Among the questions the roundtable will discuss are:

  •          How well do faith-based organizations blend donations from different sources (citizens, private sector corporations and foundations) to solve problems and relieve crises? Are they more localized, sustainable and cost-efficient in their assistance?
  •         In which sectors are faith-based organizations best at addressing, comparing for instance hunger, primary health care, basic education, food security, trade, industrialization, governance, marine conservation, or higher education?
  •         Looking ahead to future years, what expanded role should faith-based organizations play in executing new programs funded by the United Statessponsoring organizatons Government?

The roundtable will adhere to “Chatham House” rules in that no quote or perspective will later be attributed to any person or organization, whether in the meeting summary or by anyone attending.  Participants are asked to leave their organizational affiliations “at the door” and speak candidly, as experts, about the issues from their experiences over their careers.

This is one in a series of roundtable about the future of American foreign aid.

Interested faith-based organizations may email to:  WorldhungerEd@gmail.com, or ForeignAidRoundtable@gmail.com