The anthology edited by John Osgood Field, The Challenge of Famine, Recent Experience Lessons Learned” remains one of the premier books about predicting and measuring famine ever published. Field, until his retirement a professor of food studies at Tufts University School of Nutrition, published this in 1993 with Kumarian Press, arrayed a dozen key scholars of famine who including Joel Charney, Mary Anderson, Dirk Stryker, Peter Cutler, Jack Shepard and others. Field wrote the introduction, the first chapter, and the final summary chapter. The book is as appropriate to read today as when it was published as it hones in on the ambiguity of when to say that there is a famine.
Field writes that when in full bloom, famine is dramatically clear to the naked eye. However, he writes, how to recognize famine before it becomes obvious is the dilemma around which much of the book revolves. This is relevant at a time when there are hot debates over which parts of Sudan may or may not be in famine, which parts of Gaza may or may not be in famine with data sets pointing in different directions as to the answer.
Field clarifies that famine is a slow onset disaster, which does not happen suddenly, but has a lengthy gestation. He makes the key point that notwithstanding the complexity of famine and the multiple factors underlying it, the principal indicators are few and manageable. In other words, famine may be caused by different processes, but there are fewer cases, but the data for recognizing famine are fewer. The dilemma facing early warning is that it is very difficult, perhaps impossible to be definitive, clear and compelling about something that does not yet exist. Ambiguity is inherent in famine prediction.
This means that political decision making will come into play. Early warning does not eliminate the role of politics. Both political early warning and administrative early warning have better track records in inducing early decision making and response than early warning systems that are purely technical.
Writing about the famine codes in India, Field dissects detection and response with responsibility of the same individuals who typically were district level officials.
Contributor William Torrey reflects on community famine surveillance in Sudan, which is very timely in 2025. Torrey dives into Darfur, including about participation by locals in Al-Fasher who were also involved in relief work, early warning, and famine response.
In his chapter about Oxfam America’s disaster response, Joel Charney mentions that honest reflection and self-evaluation are not exactly hallmarks of the voluntary agency community. “According to their own public relations pieces, it seems that the agencies always do well regardless of the grave mistakes in judgment that journalists and other independent investigators continually uncover.” He reviews the 1978 famine in Cambodia.
Mary B. Anderson and Peter Woodrow draw on their extensive case studies of disasters in many countries for key lessons, such as how disaster victims have important capacities which are not destroyed in disaster and therefore should be built on. They argue that outside aid to these victims must be provided in ways that recognize and support these capacities.
In his chapter, Jack Shepard summarizes his research into American assistance to Ethiopia during the 1981-1985 famine period. He recounts hos U.S. food aid became an important part of foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s at a time of increasing American food production and increasing malnutrition around the world. Shepherd recounts the evolution of aid policies including destabilizing Marxist regimes. “Nowhere is the Reagan policy more clear than in its treatment of Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the official relief and development agency of the American Roman Catholic Community. From 1982 through 1984 the administration deliberately delayed its response to emergency food aid requests for Ethiopia by CRS.” In time, US food aid ramped up largely cross-border through Sudan into Tigray and Eritrea (fighting against the government of Ethiopia).
The most distinctive chapter was by Peter Cutler: “Responses to Famine and Why They Are Allowed to Happen.” Among Cutler’s observations is that rural famine victims are likely to become a political issue only if their case is taken up by influential urban elites, such as university students or the press. He catalogs various contradictions in our aid system.
For instance, NGOs are in a contradictory position with regard to famine control. On the one hand, their field staff are among the best informed of all actors operating in a famine zone, yet at the same time they are the least likely to challenge the system or influence governments. This is because NGOs are highly vulnerable. Cutler concludes the professional relief and development agencies will avoid the risks of challenging donors and the host governments when famine breaks out among unpopular groups of victims.
Publisher: Kumarian Press, West Hartford Connecticut. ISBN: 1-56549-019-3
hor’s interviews cover not only the conditions driving food insecurity, but the emotional lives of the local aid workers who are passionate about their work and emotional about the problems they see firsthand. As she says “Drivers, logistics managers, translators, data collectors, researchers and field monitors and the like were all necessary to aid operations because, essentially, they make projects happen.” She compares the expectations and experiences of locals working with the UN, with Non-governmental Organizations, and the Ethiopian government. The book returns often to this theme: “the global humanitarian industry depends on ample supplies of cheap, temporary, flexible and expendable labor from the localities where it intervenes — ironically to proffer a narrative of improving the lives of locals.” She gives voices to the 95% of humanitarian personnel who are from the countries and communities in crisis.
n Ethiopia have been saturated with surveys by NGOs who also promise assistance that doesn’t come.