Tag: Early Warning

Review of “Channeling Cassandra”

Dennis King’s new monograph, Channeling Cassandra, draws on his over 35 years of experience managing information about international humanitarian disasters, including his creation of ReliefWeb.com and overseeing USAID and US Department of State humanitarian information systems.

Published by the National Intelligence University, the monograph makes the important insight that while there have been endless gigabytes of humanitarian data and publications about information management, there has been relatively little on analysis, or interpreting data, particularly how evidence is used to make decisions.

This book refers to food aid as part of the response to crises of varying severity, and in response to food insecurity driven by climate change.

King asserts that “a keystone for improving humanitarian response is understanding complexity.”  He gives examples of how analysis of humanitarian needs and options require a multi-disciplinary lens.  He writes, “The problem is rarely a lack of information; it is the inability of decision-makers to process complexity and the tendency to prioritize political expediency over humanitarian early warning.”

“Humanitarian crises are non-linear systems where small changes in one variable (like a grain price or a local skirmish) can lead to catastrophic system-wide failures.”

King cautions against causation bias and linear-logic fallacies.  He distinguishes between descriptive analysis of humanitarian emergencies, explanatory analysis, evaluation, comparisons, predictive esimation and anticipatory analysis.

He encourages analysts to consider black swan events that are rare and unanticipated (such as pandemics), gray rhinos that are probable, yet neglected threats; “boiling frogs” that are slow-simmering crises that build in scale and harm; and “Dragon Kings” that are first-time events such as nuclear weapons, transational cyber-shutdown, sea level rise or a solar storm.

He views complexity as a growing problem in part because of accelerating climate change.  “Climate disasters are occuring in unexpected locations.  2023 alone saw tropical storm-induced flooding in Libya; wildfires in Hawaii, Canada and Greece, floods in Niger, drought in the horse latitudes of South America and heat waves in Europe.  Most unresolved armed conflicts have been ongoing for more than 10 years” and have displaced generations of refugees and internally displaced persons.

King utilizes several historical and contemporary disasters to illustrate the “Intelligence-Policy Gap.”

One section reviews applications of technology including information and communication (ICT), Geospatial analysis from remote sensing, and newer applications of artificial intelligence.

He recounts the 2004 Indian Ocean tsnumi, the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, and civil wars in South Sudan and Syria.

He examines how the Ebola outbreak in west Africa that became a priority in 2014 had siloed intelligence and interpretation (medical vs. security) that inhibited a more unified response.

King fears that “the humanitarian ecosystem has not adapted to these threats, challenges and actors…  this has led many to proclaim the international humanitarian system is both broke and broken.”

His recommendations are to adapt to complexity (monitor and adapt), facilitate decision-making, enhance alternative analyses and understand that technology can often introduce more noise than signal.

– Hunger Notes board member Steven Hansch

Book Classic: The Challenge of Famine, Recent Experience and Lessons Learned by John Osgood Field

The anthology edited by John Osgood Field, The Challenge of Famine, Recent Experience Lessons Learned” remains one of the premier books about predicting and measuring famine ever published.  Field, until his retirement a professor of food studies at Tufts University School of Nutrition, published this in 1993 with Kumarian Press, arrayed a dozen key scholars of famine who including Joel Charney, Mary Anderson, Dirk Stryker, Peter Cutler, Jack Shepard and others.  Field wrote the introduction, the first chapter, and the final summary chapter.  The book is as appropriate to read today as when it was published as it hones in on the ambiguity of when to say that there is a famine.

Field writes that when in full bloom, famine is dramatically clear to the naked eye.  However, he writes, how to recognize famine before it becomes obvious is the dilemma around which much of the book revolves. This is relevant at a time when there are hot debates over which parts of Sudan may or may not be in famine, which parts of Gaza may or may not be in famine with data sets pointing in different directions as to the answer.

Field clarifies that famine is a slow onset disaster, which does not happen suddenly, but has a lengthy gestation. He makes the key point that notwithstanding the complexity of famine and the multiple factors underlying it, the principal indicators are few and manageable. In other words, famine may be caused by different processes, but there are fewer cases, but the data for recognizing famine are fewer. The dilemma facing early warning is that it is very difficult, perhaps impossible to be definitive, clear and compelling about something that does not yet exist. Ambiguity is inherent in famine prediction.

This means that political decision making will come into play. Early warning does not eliminate the role of politics. Both political early warning and administrative early warning have better track records in inducing early decision making and response than early warning systems that are purely technical.

Writing about the famine codes in India, Field dissects detection and response with responsibility of the same individuals who typically were district level officials.

Contributor William Torrey reflects on community famine surveillance in Sudan, which is very timely in 2025.  Torrey dives into Darfur, including about participation by locals in Al-Fasher who were also involved in relief work, early warning, and famine response.

In his chapter about Oxfam America’s disaster response, Joel Charney mentions that honest reflection and self-evaluation are not exactly hallmarks of the voluntary agency community.  “According to their own public relations pieces, it seems that the agencies always do well regardless of the grave mistakes in judgment that journalists and other independent investigators continually uncover.”  He reviews the 1978 famine in Cambodia.

Mary B. Anderson and Peter Woodrow draw on their extensive case studies of disasters in many countries for key lessons, such as how disaster victims have important capacities which are not destroyed in disaster and therefore should be built on.  They argue that outside aid to these victims must be provided in ways that recognize and support these capacities.

In his chapter, Jack Shepard summarizes his research into American assistance to Ethiopia during the 1981-1985 famine period.  He recounts hos U.S. food aid became an important part of foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s at a time of increasing American food production and increasing malnutrition around the world.  Shepherd recounts the evolution of aid policies including destabilizing Marxist regimes.  “Nowhere is the Reagan policy more clear than in its treatment of Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the official relief and development agency of the American Roman Catholic Community.  From 1982 through 1984 the administration deliberately delayed its response to emergency food aid requests for Ethiopia by CRS.”  In time, US food aid ramped up largely cross-border through Sudan into Tigray and Eritrea (fighting against the government of Ethiopia).

The most distinctive chapter was by Peter Cutler:  “Responses to Famine and Why They Are Allowed to Happen.”   Among Cutler’s observations is that rural famine victims are likely to become a political issue only if their case is taken up by influential urban elites, such as university students or the press.  He catalogs various contradictions in our aid system.

For instance, NGOs are in a contradictory position with regard to famine control.  On the one hand, their field staff are among the best informed of all actors operating in a famine zone, yet at the same time they are the least likely to challenge the system or influence governments. This is because NGOs are highly vulnerable. Cutler concludes the professional relief and development agencies will avoid the risks of challenging donors and the host governments when famine breaks out among unpopular groups of victims.

Publisher:  Kumarian Press, West Hartford Connecticut.  ISBN:  1-56549-019-3