[i] A possible outcome in such a general general equilibrium system, even a perfectly competitive one, is the "war of all against all." Is this Pareto optimal? If it is (as some may contend) what is the usefulness of the concept of Pareto optimality. In such "best of all possible world" type claims, one does not want to rely for the truth of the claim on there being only one possibility--that which actually is.

[ii]It is difficult to avoid a way of expression that suggests that the harmful sector acts in a unified rational way and is controlled by human actors for their benefit. Sometimes this is a reasonable description of the reality. It would be a mistake to feel that this is the only situation or even the most important way of looking at things. Essentially the process is similar to what happens in any ecological/evolutionary situation. Individual actors "do their own thing" which in economics for human actors is called pursuing their own self interest. If the result of this many actor pursuit is essentially similar to what has happened before, the situation is described as a stable equilibrium. If however, the pursuit of self interest by (in our case) the individual actors in the exploitative sector leads to a drastic change in the sector, then that form of the exploitative sector can be said not to have "survived." The forms that persist are the ones we talk about, forms where the "contradiction" between individual and sector "rationality" are not overwhelming. The sector rationality, and relative congruence with the self interest of those within the sector is in part actually achieved by this "dumb" trial and error process fundamentally identical to that of other spheres of evolution.

[iii] A way of looking at exploitation similar in one important way--the restructuring of others' alternatives--was proposed by Taylor [1977]. There do seem to be some important points of difference between the two approaches. For example, he seems to look at "contrived dependence," as he refers to it, a new type of exploitation and not, as we do, as a way of expressing what is common to various types of exploitation, both "new" and "old." Useful material relevant to the concept of exploitation can be found in Commons [1931] (e.g. pp. 59-64, 255-58, 336-48, 387, 664, 668, and 751), Lane [1958], Boulding [1973] and Andreski [1966], not only in their works cited in the references, but others as well. Many of the early economists, especially Smith, and the Marxist literature in general have many useful things to say about exploitation. For reasons of space, we will not elaborate on the terminological and substantive similarities and differences between our approach and those of the various authors.

[iv] What is the conceptual status of counter-harmful activity? In standard economics it is counted as productive. Activity against harm is certainly worthwhile and thus in some sense can be considered to be productive. But if it is considered as productive, then there are problems in incorporating it into standard theory. Some of the problems may be posed thusly. Suppose the policeman guarding my garden from others is considered to act productively. But then what if my fellow citizens, by tending their gardens in the Voltairian sense, obviate the need for the policeman? Are they then acting productively? What are they producing? What does the production function look like? What is their marginal product and are they receiving it? If not, why not? Since space does not permit an extended discussion of these points, let us simply observe that since harmful activity does not appear in the typical construction of an economic system, activity against harm must have an anomalous standing. This enables us to see one reason why standard economics has been slow to adopt institutionalist perspectives. The activity against harm approach to government is essentially institutionalist. The government establishes the rules of the game and the accompanying enforcement mechanism in such a way that harmful activity is diminished and productive activity increased. If this is in fact the case (or perceived to be), it seems like a tolerable simplification to consider the economic system as completely productive. Thus, standard economics never develops the analytical tools necessary to understand harm, or the institutions that respond to it!

[v] For other reasons, which would seem to be at least as important, see Vanderslice [1977] pp. 23-29.

[vi]Note that these two forms of exploitation, conquest and government, are by no means mutually exclusive. This will be true for the other forms we discuss as well. While this makes the classification "inelegant," it seems unavoidable in view of the nature of reality and the way we currently perceive it. Further, we believe that all the forms of harm described in this section have the characteristics of harmful activity enumerated above. To spell this out for each characteristic in each case, however, would lengthen the paper unduly.

[vii]. For an economist there is no mystery why this is so, since activity against harm is typically a government good. Ordinary goods require only a "two-body" contract between buyer and seller. To secure the blessing that counter-exploitative activity provides, a social contract is needed. Whatever paradoxes, ambiguities or analytic difficulties arise in considering "multi-body" contracts, it seems reasonable to consider such contracts the logical extension of the notion of choice to situations where simple exchange will not provide satisfactory results.

[viii] On this point see, for instance, Michels [1949] and Curry and Wade [1968], especially Ch. 4.

[ix] The examples in this paper typically refer to least developed countries (LDCs), not because we feel the developed countries' economics are non-exploitative, but because the focus of the larger work of which this paper is a part is the development of the LDCs, and because we feel that LDCs are more representative of the typical exploitative economic system than, say, the contemporary U.S. economy.

[x] The supply curve of labor is typically backward sloping, notwithstanding texts which have it upward sloping for the bottom part of its range. To see why, readers may ask themselves how long they would work if the subsistence wage required 18 hours of work, how long they would work for, for example, $5 an hour, and draw a line connecting the two points.

[xi] It should be mentioned that groups other than those referred to here may also be important, or a different division than the one indicated may be considered to be analytically more useful. What is provided here is no more than a first approximation to a very complex reality.

[xii] See Anderson [1967]. pp 87-101.

[xiii] One disadvantage of the term is that it implies a sharp demarcation between those in the harmful sector, which is not always the case. And it tends to suggest that the relevant actors are people and not corporate entities, which is not always a correct representation of reality.

[xiv]See Lenski [1966] p.225.

[xv] This is why business suits have been drab, and we speak of someone as being "impeccably dressed." It is otherwise certainly curious that the highest sartorial accolade is dressing "without sin," that is to say, in an unpunishable way.

[xvi]T.R. Bradley was an English philosopher whose reply to the view that "this  is the best of all possible worlds" was "yes, and everything in it is a necessary evil."

[xvii]Of course, we are speaking of the dichotomy in and out of the ruling class for simplicity's sake. In fact, the canons of conspicuous consumption serve as one means of ranking within classes as well as the distinction between East Egg and West Egg in The Great Gatsby, the distinction between Sands Point and Kings Point in reality, and the phrase "lace curtain Irish" serve to illustrate. The difference is that, for Veblen, people were motivated by the esteem of others, while we say that they are motivated as well by more narrowly economic self interest in undertaking conspicuous consumption and leisure.