Avoiding Overthrow

Before considering the specific topic of this section it will be useful to take up some preliminary matters.

N-person game theory would seem to be a promising framework for the consideration of exploitative economic systems. In the relevant version of the theory, the participants in the game are divided into two groups, the winning coalition, and everyone else, which is in line with our two sectors, the exploitative sector and the productive sector. While profit maximization in conventional (productive) economic activity implies individual action profit maximization in the exploitative "game" means banding together with other individuals and groups (which themselves can be considered coalitions) in order to control the rulemaking and surplus‑allocating government-‑in other words, forming a winning coalition. The redistribution from the productive sector to the exploitative sector corresponds to the "prize" in the zero sum game, which goes to the winning coalition.

One thing that this framework makes clear is that the number of possible coalitions is immense. Even under relatively stringent assumptions, it is 2n where n is the number of individuals in the system. Thus any analysis that helps to narrow and classify the number of possible coalitions can be looked on as a real improvement, even though it might be felt that the answer should somehow be more definite.

For many countries in relatively recent times, groups who have been importantly represented in the exploitative sector are landlords, capitalists, the military, foreign governments, a group that we might refer to as "educated civilians" including government functionaries and politicians, and more rarely and more debatably, organized labor. It frequently happens, of course, that an individual is a member of more than one of these groups.[xi] A feudal lord was a member of the military, a government official and a landlord. In recent times however, individuals on the average have tended to wear fewer "hats." In the past times the clergy would have been more important, but their influence has been substantially lessened with the passage of time. Members of these elite groups may be nationals or foreigners.

Why was the winning coalition that ended up in control of the state formed from members of at least some of these groups who are far from representing a majority of the population? The central part of the answer seems to be that these groups have power capabilities useful in capturing, controlling and operating the state apparatus.[xii] The military has control of the largest part of the armed force (and not infrequently intervene to keep it that way). Both landlords and capitalists have resources and organization that they can use to obtain influence. They can run for office themselves, a la Rockefeller or, in Bolivia, Arce or make sure their interests are guarded by decisive campaign contributions, as did Patino. Often their degree of control is quite striking. In Barraclough's words:

     In communities dominated by the traditional latifundias, such as may be found in the Andean highlands, in much of Brazil, and in some parts of all the study countries, practically everyone is dependent on the land-holder or patron. Public officials including the police and army are commonly at his disposal: his influence at provincial and national political levels may make his continued good will necessary for their job security. Banks and marketing institutions operate for the large landowner's convenience as he is the only one with sufficient volume of business to support them profitably. Churches and schools must obtain the landowner's patronage if they are to prosper [1973, p. 20].

Foreign governments have both organization and control over financial resources that can be used in such diverse ways as financing the election of sympathetic nationals or providing a "carrot" incentive to hard-pressed governments through foreign aid. As suppliers of modern armaments, often on generous terms, the large foreign governments also have an influence through the military, which is no less important for being derivative.

The educated civilians derive their power from a number of sources. They have the ability to run the "ship of state." As lawyers and administrators they often perform crucial functions for capitalists and landowners as well. As politicians, they have special skills in putting and keeping a coalition together, and as writers and orators they can mobilize support for their coalition. This is not to say that these roles cannot be performed by others, such as landowners or the military, just that they are often performed by these educated civilians.

Organized labor, to the extent that it is in the winning coalition, seems to derive an important part of its power from its ability to disrupt the functioning of crucial sectors of the economy and from its potential as an armed force, factors which tend to put organized labor in opposition to the military. In addition, they, like landlords and capitalists, have economic and organizational strength, and where elections are a factor, some degree of voting power as well.

The chief groups in the productive sector have been peasants, unorganized labor, and, (frequently) organized labor, which, in spite of their numerical majority, have played a subsidiary political role.

Each group that we have described does not necessarily act as a group. For example, a division in the military might occur between services, or between the upper and lower echelons. Another important complication is that not only does an individual or group want to be a member of the winning coalition, they want to be a winner within the winning coalition, (as the return to those in the winning coalition/exploitative sector varies substantially} and these objectives are typically pursued simultaneously.

Those at the top in the winning coalition/exploitative sector may be referred to as the ruling class. While this term is not without its disadvantages, it does convey the notion that some individuals and groups within the winning coalition have a disproportionate share in the rule‑making process and the benefits derived there from.[xiii]

An important feature of this type of situation is that the outcomes are unstable for reasons that appear related to the paradox (so-called) of voting. To illustrate, consider a simple example with participants A, B, and C, where the largest coalition wins and divides up the prize of, say, 30. A possible solution to this game would be a coalition of A and B, each of whom received 15. It can be seen that both A and C would benefit on the next play of the game if they formed the winning coalition, A receiving 20 and C, 10. But then on the next play B and C would find it advantageous to form a coalition, C receiving, say, 20 and B, 10. Such instability is not paradoxical, nor is it confined to problems of majority voting, but is rather a logical outcome of the typical circumstances of an n‑person game, and is if anything more serious when the winning coalition can be less than a majority. Such a "circulation of elites" is not a sign of the unimportance of exploitation, as Pareto would suggest, but rather seems to indicate the exact opposite.

Avoiding this instability is a major problem for those on top in the exploitative system. As power is distributed unequally, those with the lowest amounts of power--essentially those in the productive sector-‑tend always to be excluded from the winning coalition, and the process of coalition formation, with its shifting outcomes, is confined to the exploitative sector. What follows in the rest of this section are some of the ways those at the top of the exploitative sector try to avoid overthrow and bring some stability to the exploitative sector.

First of all, the struggle for the division of the spoils of exploitation has been considerably softened by the realization of those in the exploitative sector that too serious an internal division might make a successful uprising of the productive sector possible. For such a group, how true the words of Benjamin Franklin: "if we don't hang together, we shall all hang separately". For pre‑Allende Chile, Felix observes:

Despite the strong basis for broad policy disputation between the agricultural and industrial classes, little of this seems to have occurred. The respective trade associations cooperate as closely as do the political arms of these classes, the conservative and liberal parties,....Evidently, the solidarity has been enhanced by social tensions between the business classes and the wage and salary classes [1960, p. 123].

Secondly, trusted members of the ruling class filled positions of importance. It has been argued that the purchase of commissions in the British Army after the Restoration was designed to keep top military positions out of the hands of those who might be tempted to overthrow the regime.[xiv]

Actors in the system in general tried to get footholds in as many power centers as possible. This tends to dampen change, especially radical change, as one actor cannot advocate a new policy, for example, solely on the basis of his immediate benefit, but also has to take into account its effect on the welfare of others with whom he is associated and, to carry things to the higher remove typically encountered, the welfare of those associated with those with whom he is associated.

Moreover, those that had profited in one type of activity often established themselves in other areas as well. For example, landowners and merchants moved into industrial pursuits, and government officials often obtained land or participated in industrial undertakings. The fact that their interests were not narrowly identified with one sector helped keep cleavages from occurring.

Institutional arrangements have been fashioned in such a way that the power of the lower members of the exploitative sector was weakened as much as possible. Sufficient soldiers acting together would be enough to overturn a government for example. This possibility was made more remote by such features of the army as enforcement of rigid codes of authority and taking as foot soldiers relatively uneducated individuals. The establishment of networks of informers and secret police would be other clear ways of weakening the ability of lower members of the exploitative sector to overthrow those above them. Exile, imprisonment, torture and assassination are rarely ruled out, although usually not applied quite so readily as to members of the productive sector.

In general, an hierarchical system has some tendency to be self‑policing as the logical position for a subordinate is that of his super‑ordinate. Thus the boss can continually monitor his subordinates, and because there are a number of them, he may more easily "divide and rule."

The position of those in power has typically been strengthened by the suppression of free inquiry. A too lively spirit of inquiry might expose the essential rottenness of the foundations of society consequently demoralizing and/or dividing the ruling class. The influence of Marxism in Latin universities on predominately upper and middle class students and the turmoil frequently provoked is an important illustration of this point.

Finally, the operation of the exploitative system tended to have psychological consequences which strengthened control by those at the top. There are important reasons for conformity in an exploitative society some of which have already been noted. Let us look at other aspects. Those above are watching those below to see who is and who is not a potential threat, or, in Erving Goffman's terms, who may and who may not be "safely disattended." A mugger is an example of the latter category in our society. The problem is that if one waits for the action itself to establish who may not be safely disattended, it will be too late. Thus it is necessary to predict on the basis of characteristics that tend to be associated with being a threat. Some characteristics which increase our perception of someone as a possible mugger for instance are being male, young, black, or poorly dressed. Those on top in exploitative systems--concerned with the threat posed by these below--make similar observations of the characteristics and behavior patterns of those under them with, in general terms, the unusual or independent action being cause for alarm.

Consequently, being different is dangerous for an underling even if he has no intention of overthrowing anyone, and a rational man, at a conscious and more importantly unconscious level will try to fit in, adopting the clothing, living standards and other behavior patterns of his group so that he becomes safely disattendable.

Those in the lower stratum of the exploitative sector who are interested in modifying the existing order to their advantage will of course conform as well, so as not to imperil their plans. In order to try to counteract this tendency, the upper strata will react by increasing the required degree of conformity, requiring conformity in new areas, or taking punitive action for what would appear to be trivial breaches of conformity. Thus a society tends to be achieved where everyone dresses similarly (with allowance for status differences), behaves with deference toward those with power, expresses the same opinions, etc.-- and whose thoughts may be quite different. Such circumstances are precisely those which generate paranoia and isolation of one's being in a "labyrinth of solitude", both of which, by impeding alliance formation, work to the benefit of those at the top. Thus, pace Pavlov, to the extent that practice makes perfect, a man in inferior position will come to be a more perfect conformer, and the upper strata will have a bulwark against overthrow. In the most extreme cases, he will come to "love Big Brother" or whatever institution or individual fills that role in the society in question. This pattern of conformity is made stronger by a number of things, including his ties with others, for if he is not safely disattendable, then neither are they, and they will put pressure on him to conform. In addition, the ruling class will provide rituals that have the function of testing the obedience of those below. These ceremonies range from kissing the feet of the king to loyalty oaths and aspects of office etiquette. Moreover, people in the exploiting class will come to love their clothes, manners and so forth‑-in short, their lifestyle. For the clothes, for instance, are not just clothes, which give warmth and whose texture, color and cut may (or may not) delight the senses. They are the protective coloration that has kept the person from harm and are cherished accordingly.[xv] Consequently, it is very easy to genuinely intolerant of difference and to find truly abhorrent the dress and manner of those in the productive sector who for reasons of time, income or tradition have different ways.

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