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U.S. World Food Summit Follow-Up: No New Programs, Greater Cooperation

In order to turn its lofty pronouncements into tangible results, the 1996 World Food Summit Plan of Action calls on national governments to "adopt actions within each country's national framework to enhance food security" and to "encourage a greater role for, and alliance with, civil society organizations in addressing food security."

The United States has proceeded, by fits and starts, in this direction. Much disagreement remains on key issues, both between government and civil society, and among nongovernmental actors. But the effort has led to a wide-ranging discussion of food security, engaging diverse organizations, sectors, and individuals.

Prior to the Summit, the U.S. government held a public meeting in Washington to solicit input on a draft policy paper. This document put heavy emphasis on trade liberalization, greater reliance on markets, enhanced food production in developing countries, and the unlikelihood of an increase in development assistance resources.

Nonprofit public interest groups, especially, felt that the government allowed an airing of views, but made few changes in its approach to the Summit. A notable exception was the acknowledgment in the final government paper that food insecurity is a problem in the United States.

Following the Summit, the government decided to develop a National Action Plan for Food Security, aimed both at eradicating domestic hunger and spelling out the U.S. contribution to global food security. Officials said they wanted to achieve a broad sense of "ownership" of the Plan, and, after considerable lobbying by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), agreed to seek public input from the starting gate this time.

As one vehicle to solicit views and endorsement, the government proposed establishing an official Advisory Committee on Food Security.

NGOs were initially skeptical. Given their pre-Summit experience, they did not want to engage in a dialogue that would have no influence over the Plan, serving as a cover to let the government say it had undertaken consultations.

Nevertheless, between February and May 1997, NGOs and government officials engaged in an extensive set of discussions about the process for arriving at a National Action Plan, as well as considerable debate about its contents. Private industry representatives attended a few of these sessions.

At the behest of NGOs, the government agreed to hold a series of national consultations on the content of the plan on May 21st. Organized at 17 sites around the country, the sessions included an hour long satellite teleconference featuring speakers from government, business, NGOs, and Congress, addressing both domestic and international topics. Then, each site undertook a day-long discussion of possible elements of a National Plan. About 700 people, many representing large grassroots organizations, attended. Each site sent representatives to a synthesis meeting in Washington in early June.

A rich mosaic of proposals emerged from the consultations. Many sites called for a strong human rights framework to underlie any discussion of food security. Some criticized the overriding emphasis on trade liberalization, and many found contradictions between promoting U.S. agricultural exports on the one hand and calling on developing countries to improve their own food production on the other. Most sites stressed the need to enhance the access of poor people, especially women, to resources. There was deep concern about the environment. Some participants expressed concern that the United States was not willing to press for the same reforms at home that it wishes to see in the developing world.

Discussion of domestic food security focused both on the need to rescind the most draconian features of welfare reform (especially restrictions on food stamp eligibility) and the need for full employment at living wages. NGOs pressed for a national commitment to reduce hunger by half by the year 2000, rather than by 2015, the Summit target date. Initially, the government had agreed that following the synthesis session and the development of an outline for the National Action Plan, joint public-private teams would prepare a draft Plan.

However, in mid-June, 1997, government lawyers balked. They argued that under the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, government officials could not engage in a process of seeking consensus or joint production with non-government representatives. Any interested party could present recommendations at duly announced open meetings. But only the government could write a government plan.

This change of course led to outrage among NGOs, who had put considerable labor into the process. They wanted a truly National plan, not a government blueprint. Many wondered if it had all been a sham, and some suspected that it was the content of the consultations as much as the proposal for a joint process that had led the government to withdraw. Also, some groups noted that the Vice President's "re-engineering government" initiative calls for "stakeholder participation" in policy making, but this apparently takes back seat to an antiquated law.

Through the summer and fall, the government and NGOs worked separately on proposals based on the previously agreed upon outline. The government issued two papers, one internationally-oriented and one domestic, discussing possible issues and actions for the National Plan. NGOs offered critiques and additions. It became clear that a number of contentious issues remained, including food as a human right, trade liberalization, food safety, biotechnology, and sustainable agriculture.

The government continued to resist NGO-led initiatives to strengthen international law on food as a human right. On trade liberalization, government documents have consistently excluded references to environmental protection and labor rights, even though the President earlier indicated a willingness to incorporate such concerns into "fast track" legislation. The food safety and biotechnology issues came to the fore outside the Summit follow-up process in proposed regulations on "organic" food labeling. Initially, the government proposed including genetically engineered foods and those grown in sludge. On sustainable agriculture, while there seemed to be substantial government and NGO agreement on the domestic side, the government's international proposals stressed new agricultural technologies without appropriate concern for the environment, farmer participation in decision making, or socioeconomic effects.

In addition, NGOs were quite concerned about the government's unwillingness to press for new resources to support food security, despite the improving budget situation. The Administration's budget proposals have not included significant funding increases for international anti-hunger initiatives. On the domestic side, in contrast, the President has pressed for some restorations of earlier cuts in food stamp funding, including easing restrictions on benefits for legal immigrants.

There was broad government and NGO agreement on such issues as the need to improve data on hunger and the urgency of food insecurity in Africa.

In February, 1998, the government convened the first session of the Advisory Committee. As promised, it included a broad range of voices from industry, academia, and NGOs. In June, 1998, the government presented a draft Action Plan to the Advisory Committee for comment, scuttling an earlier plan that would have had the Committee draft papers. In addition to the issues already identified as contentious, Committee members pressed to exclude agricultural trade from sanctions, such as those imposed on Indian and Pakistan. This issue strongly united industry and NGO members of the Committee. In addition, Committee members complained that the plan lacked any clear action items (let alone resources to carry them out), and was especially weak on gender.

It remains to be seen whether this combination of an adversarial and consultative process will actually achieve a National Plan that enjoys wide public endorsement. Hunger Notes readers can make a difference by communicating their concerns to their members of Congress and the executive branch. Regardless of the outcomes, though, the process has engaged new players and raised the profile of hunger issues, both within the government and in society at large.

Marc J. Cohen represented Bread for the World, an anti-hunger NGO, in the World Food Summit and follow-up process from October, 1995 to February, 1998. He is currently Special Assistant to the Director General of the International Food Policy Research Institute.

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