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IMF voting shares: no plans for significant changes (high income countries run the IMF, with almost no voice for low income countries) Mark Weisbrot and Jake Johnston (May
10, 2009) The
International Monetary Fund (IMF's) governance structure is
much more reflective of the world of 1944, when it was
established, than of the world today. Since 85 percent is
needed in order to amend the IMF's charter, and for some
other important decisions, the United States' 16.7 percent
of voting shares gives it direct veto power over much
important decision-making and potential reforms. More
importantly, the United States together with other
high-income countries has a solid majority. For the past 65
years, Europe and the rest of the high-income world have
almost always voted with the United States within the Fund.
Figure 1:
Pre-Singapore (2006) IMF Voting Shares *
High Income Oil Producers Includes: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Brunei, Bahrain A number of governments have raised objections to giving more money to the IMF without a change in its governance structure to assure some significant representation to countries other than the handful that currently control the Fund. At the G-20 meeting in London on April 2, the G-20 communiqué included a statement that was interpreted as saying that the head of the IMF will no longer have to be a European. However, without a significant change in the voting structure, it is not clear that this symbolic change will give developing countries any more voice or lead to any significant reforms or accountability at the Fund. Figure 2: Post -Singapore (2006) IMF Voting Share Reforms *
High Income Oil Producers Includes: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Brunei, Bahrain Figure 3: IMF Voting Shares After Reforms Currently Under Discussion *
High Income Oil Producers Includes: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Brunei, Bahrain Figure 3 shows voting shares for IMF member countries if the second round of reforms were to be implemented. As can be seen, the changes are again very slight. The United States keeps it's voting share of 16.7 percent. The group of high-income countries maintains its majority, with 50.9 percent - down 1.8 percentage points from present. This majority is more than enough to ensure their unchallenged control, since there will always be some low- and middle-income countries that join with the high-income countries, given the enormous disparities of wealth and power both inside and outside of the institution. The BRIC countries plus Mexico pick up just 0.6 percentage points, while the 163 remaining low- and middle-income countries pick up 0.9 percentage points. Conclusion It is clear that the proposed changes in the voting shares of the IMF will not significantly alter the balance of power within the organization. This could have adverse consequences for countries that borrow from the IMF, and are subject to its conditions. The Fund first encountered serious pressure for reform after its mishandling of the last set of major financial crises, which began in Asia and spread to Russia, Brazil, Argentina, and other countries.[1] It is difficult to find evidence that Fund officials have been held accountable for any of the major mistakes that they made. Part of the reason may be that the governments who control the Fund do not have any compelling incentive to hold the Fund accountable for mistakes that negatively impact other, less well-off countries. In fact, the incentives are in the opposite direction: to do so could call attention to mismanagement of the Fund, with the risk that culpability could eventually be laid at the doorstep of the G-7 governments that are the decision-makers. Most recently, nine agreements negotiated by the Fund since September of last year contain pro-cyclical conditions, despite the severity of the current world downturn; some of these conditions would appear to be inappropriate.[2] The lack of governance reform could also have adverse consequences for the rest of the world, which might benefit from reform of the IMF. For example, the IMF publishes numerous working papers and research articles, conducts Article IV consultations with member countries, and twice annually publishes the World Economic Outlook, which includes economic forecasts and analysis of current and projected trends in the world economy. The IMF missed the two biggest asset bubbles in the history of the world - the U.S. stock market and housing bubbles -- despite the fact that these were quite obvious to economists who took the time to analyze them.[3] It has made other serious forecasting errors in specific countries and regions.[4] It is possible that the Fund's research and analysis would also show improvement if it were not controlled by such a narrow range of interests. Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director and Jake Johnston is an International Program Intern at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, DC. 1]. For a review of
these policy failures and their impact on the IMF and its
relations with borrowing countries, see Weisbrot, Mark.
(2007). "Ten
Years After: The Lasting Impact of the Asian Financial
Crisis," in Ten Years After: Revisiting the Asian
Financial Crisis. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center
for International Scholars. p 105-118, see also, Weisbrot,
Mark and Luis Sandoval. (2007). "Argentina's
Economic Recovery: Policy Choices and Implications."
Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research. 2] Weisbrot, Mark, Jose Cordero and Luis Sandoval. (2009). "Empowering the IMF: Should Reform be a Requirement for Increasing the Fund's Resources?" Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research. 3] Baker, Dean. (2002).
"The
Run-Up in Home Prices: Is It Real or Is It Another Bubble?"
Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research, and
Baker, Dean. (1997). "Saving
Social Security With Stocks: The Promises Don't Add Up."
Washington, DC: The Century Foundation. 4] See Weisbrot, Mark and David Rosnick. (2007). "Political Forecasting? The IMF's Flawed Growth Projections for Argentina and Venezuela." Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research; Baker, Dean and David Rosnick. (2003). "Too Sunny In Latin America? The IMF's Overly Optimistic Growth Projections and Their Consequences." Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research; and Rosnick, David. (2009). "Troubled Assets: The IMF's Latest Projections for Economic Growth in the Western Hemisphere." Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research. |