Making Sense of Chad

Alex de Waal

(February 7, 2008) The war for Chad is not over. It is likely to become more bloody and  involve a wider humanitarian disaster before any solutions can be  grasped. The next week will be critical for the future of the country– and for the wider region, including Darfur, as well.

Last weekend’s battle in the Chadian capital N’djamena came as no  surprise. For the last two years, the Sudan government has been  trying to overthrow the Chadian president, Idriss Deby, using Chadian  rebels as proxy forces. The three armed groups involved in the latest  attack were all extensively armed by Sudanese Security, which has the  clear intent of cutting off the support that Deby is giving to  Darfurian rebels, especially the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),  which has recently been on the offensive in Darfur. The timing is no  surprise either. In the next few weeks, a European Union protection  force (EUFOR) was due to deploy to eastern Chad and north-eastern  Central African Republic. While EUFOR’s mandate (given by the UN  Security Council) is for impartial civilian protection, it is a  substantially French initiative, and seen by all in the region as a  military protection for Deby. Khartoum and the rebels wanted to  strike first.  

The Chadian civil war is often described as a “spillover” from  Darfur. That is a simplification. Darfur’s war actually began as a  spillover from Chad more than twenty years ago and the two conflicts  have been entangled ever since. Many of the Arab militia fighting in  Darfur are of Chadian origin, and many of the rebels similarly served  in the Chadian army or militia. The current Chadian war is best seen  through four different lenses.  

First, it is a continuation of the entangled conflicts of Darfur and  Chad, which includes competition for power and land.  

Second, there is an internal Chadian conflict. After a hopeful  broadening of the base of his regime in the late 1990s, accompanied  by the growth of civil politics in N’djamena, he has reverted to one-man military rule. Deby relies heavily on a very narrow circle of  close kinsmen and on using state finance as his personal property,  distributing largesse in return for loyalty. He is also ill and the  political vultures have been circling for several years. The most  feared scenario now is that Deby will eliminate the civil opposition  in Chad, forcing the international community to choose between him  and the rebels, whom he depicts as Sudanese mercenaries. Murdering  the civilian opposition in this way is not unprecedented in Chad.  

Third is Khartoum’s strategy for managing security in its  borderlands, which includes treating weak neighboring states as  extensions of its internal peripheries. Sudanese security helped  bring Deby to power in 1990 as part of a policy that also saw it  engage militarily in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Democratic Republic  of Congo and Central African Republic over the subsequent decade. In  the same way that Khartoum uses a mixture of reward and force to  control its provincial elites, in Darfur, the South and elsewhere, it  uses the same tools to influence its trans-border peripheries.  

Last is a regional competition for dominance through a vast arc of  central Africa that has rarely been governed by state authority. This  hinterland includes Chad, CAR and northern DRC, as well as the  adjoining areas of Sudan. As well as Khartoum, Tripoli, Kampala,  Kinshasa, Kigali and even Asmara are vying for influence across this  area.  

Darfur and Chad  

Deby came to power in 1990 on the basis of a simple deal with Khartoum —each would deny support to the other’s rebels. For twelve years that  deal held. When the Darfur rebels began to organize at scale in 2002  and 2003, Deby at first tried to dissociate himself from them. He  mediated the first ceasefires in the war (Abeche in September 2003  and N’djamena in April 2004), worked to split and undermine the  rebels, and even reportedly cooperated in some military actions  against them. But he was unable to control his Zaghawa kinsmen who  formed many of the fighters of both SLA and JEM, and by 2005 Chad was  sucked into the conflict as a direct supporter of the rebels. The  Sudan government responded by backing Chadian rebels, who attacked  the border town of Adre in December 2005. At this point, Deby  declared that Sudan and Chad were in a state of war. Even while the  peace talks continued in Abuja, the Chadian war intensified, reaching  its climax with a rebel attack on N’djamena in April 2006. Just weeks   before the deadline for concluding the peace talks, Khartoum tried to  alter the reality on the ground in its favor. It nearly succeeded.  JEM forces helped sway the battle for N’djamena in Deby’s favor.  

The entanglement has continued since. Deby’s favored intermediary has   been JEM, which he has rearmed with weapons captured in Chadian  battles. Meanwhile, Sudan has backed a series of Chadian rebels.  Among them are the United Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD)  of Mahamat Nouri, a Goraan and former ambassador, the Rally of Forces  for Change(RFD) of Timan Erdimi, a Bedeyat cousin of Deby and former  army chief of staff, and a breakaway group from the UFDD headed by  Abdel Wahid Aboud Mackaye, a Salamat Arab. Most of these groupings  are transient—the important things to watch are the individual  leaders, their ethnic affiliations and their backers.  

In recent months, JEM has been on the offensive in western Darfur,  broadening its own coalition to include militia from groups such as  the Gimir (a group on the Darfur-Chad border that has long valued its  autonomy, and which in recent years has been politically identified  as ‘Arab’ though it has no Arab lineage) and Missiriya Jebel (a group  from nearby Jebel Mun, which has an Arab lineage but lost the Arab  language several generations ago). Chadian forces were reportedly  engaged in these offensives too—though citizenship is largely  meaningless along this border.  

As Darfurian rebel forces—both JEM and some SLA—have rushed back to   N’djamena to join the battle for the capital, we can expect to see  the Sudan army and militia take the offensive against the rebels  remaining in West Darfur.  

Chad’s Civil War  

Idriss Deby is a strongman who gained power through military prowess  and external backing. He has stayed in power through the same  combination, his position strengthened by oil revenues and French  military cooperation. He dismantled a model World Bank program for  control of Chad’s oil revenue, which had been intended to ensure that   the funds were used for development, rather than patronage and arms  purchases. He fixed the elections. He stays in power through  intrigue, intimidation and cash.  

Since 1986, when France dispatched special forces under Operation  Epervier to Chad to support the war against Libya, French troops have  been a key factor in Chad’s civil wars. The French have assisted the   Chadian army with intelligence, logistics and medical units—the first   two turning the tide of battle in Deby’s favor several times in the  last three years.  

Under Jacques Chirac, France’s policy towards Chad was handled by the   military, whose response to the political crisis was to extend  military assistance rather than to encourage talks with the  opposition. But Deby was careful not to overstep the mark—he knew the   friendship was tactical and feared that the French could always stand  aside and allow a rival to seize power, just as it had refused to  intervene to prop up Deby’s predecessor Hissène Habré in 1990. Until  February 3, it looked as though French troops were going to do the  same—there were reports that France had offered to evacuate Deby from   his besieged presidential palace. Certainly, Deby had offended Paris  with provocative remarks on the Zoe’s Ark child abduction case, when   he alleged publicly that the children might be about to be taken to  have their organs harvested.  

But by this morning, it seems that the French government had decided  that Chad without Deby was a worse proposition than with him, and  swung back behind the beleaguered president. This is only a short- term option—Deby is literally fighting for his life and will do  anything that is necessary to stay in power. One thing he may  consider ‘necessary’ is eliminating the civil opposition. Already,   civilian opposition members and civil society leaders have been  rounded up and there are fears that they will be murdered en masse.  Habré did the same thing just before he was ousted in 1990. Deby will   then present the world with a choice—either him or Sudan’s proxies.  

While Deby’s forces have regrouped, so have the armed rebels.  Reinforcements have arrived and there may well be another battle for  N’djamena in the coming days—a fight to the death for all concerned.  

Sudan’s Management of its Borderlands  

Khartoum’s strategy for managing the security threats in Darfur is  seamless with its strategy for Chad. Sudanese security officers’  favored instrument is cash and they opportunistically buy support  among the Darfurian and Chadian elites. They buy Arab and non-Arabs  as they can. Inside Darfur, Military Intelligence is the most  powerful governmental institution. For the Chad policy, it is the  National Security and Intelligence Service.  

This is the most recent manifestation of an approach to governing the  peripheries that stretches back to the mid-19th century and earlier.  Under the Turko-Egyptian rulers of Sudan (1821-83), the territory was  divided into ‘metropolitan’ and ‘military’ provinces. Darfur and the  South were the latter, where the center established its claim to  sovereignty through making deals with local potentates. The Mahdist  rulers and the Darfur sultans used much the same practice. For all of  these, the border was not a line—it was a territory which extended  indefinitely into eastern, central and west Africa, until it met a  point at which military resistance was too great or the price of  buying influence was too high. Quasi-autonomous agents of Turko- Egyptian rule ranged across central Africa, reaching the Congo river  and Nigeria. The British reproduced a similar division of  administrative systems within the borders of Sudan—in the peripheries   they called it ‘native administration’ in the ‘closed districts’, and  differed from their predecessors principally in that they preferred  not to distribute weapons. Post-colonial Sudanese governments are  acting in exactly the older tradition of a deep and extended  borderland, seeking influence, security and profit far both within  their own remoter provinces and across their national borders.  

Competition for Regional Dominance  

Alongside Sudan, Libya sees Chad as part of its sub-Saharan  periphery. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi proclaimed the unity of Chad and  Libya in 1980 and fought a long war for control of the territory,  until defeated by a Chadian army extensively armed and supported by  France and the U.S. Recent Libyan policy has tilted towards Deby and  against his Sudan-backed adversaries. But Gaddafi was also offended  by Deby’s refusal to make political compromises during peace talks in   Libya last October. Anticipating the arrival of European soldiers who  would act as a military bulwark, Deby took a hard line and caused the  talks to fail.  

The war for Chad is also a war for Central African Republic, where  President Francois Bozize was installed by Chadian troops in 2003,  overthrowing his predecessor Ange-Felix Patassé. With Deby  endangered, the Zaghawa troops who formed the backbone of Bozize’s  army have left to defend N’djamena. This creates a potential vacuum  in which Chad’s competitors for influence may once again meddle.  Sudan will be interested in securing this outer frontier. So will  Libya, which supported Patassé. Kinshasa and Kampala will also be  looking for influence there—it was a stronghold for the Congolese  leader Jean-Pierre Bemba at the height of the war in DRC. Eritrea,  which has its fingers in every troublespot in and around the Horn of  Africa, will also be keeping its interests alive. France has a  military base in CAR and could well play the role as guardian of  stability.  

International Policy  

In the last two years, international policy towards Chad has become a  byproduct of Darfur policy, and specifically the push to bring an  international protection force to Darfur. After the election of  Nicholas Sarkozy, French policy shifted, focusing on the use of Chad  as the launchpad for humanitarian action in Darfur, including  military support for a UN protection force. A European protection  force for eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR (EUFOR) was authorized  by the UN Security Council as a neutral international civilian  protection force, distinct from the French soldiers whose mission has  always been political. But it was only a substantial French military  contingent that could bring EUFOR up to strength. For all the  political actors in the region, EUFOR is seen as a non-neutral  military protection to Deby—hence the military strike at N’djamena in  the days before it was due to be deployed.  

The limitations of an international protection-first policy are  sharply revealed by the battle for N’djamena. A humanitarian  protection mission had political implications that turned out to  contribute to an escalation in violence. The Europeans now are faced  with the dilemma of whether they send troops into the middle of  ongoing hostilities—with the Chadian rebels having declared that  EUFOR is an enemy—or whether they revert to a traditional  peacekeeping approach, and seek a negotiated settlement first. EUFOR  has no ceasefire commission and no formal means of dealing with the  rebels, a recipe for disaster. Most likely, EUFOR will simply not  deploy in Chad at all. Troop contributors will decide that they don’t   do civilian protection in wartime after all.  

The implications for the hybrid UN-African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)  are no less far-reaching. This has the mirror-image problem—it deals   with Khartoum on a day-to-day basis but there is no ceasefire  commission in which the rebels are represented, so its only contact  with them is through the mediation team working on the peace talks.  This is wholly insufficient should the war intensify—for example if  Deby regroups and decides to take the offensive by mounting attacks  deep into Darfur. UNAMID runs the risk of being a target of attack or  even an unwitting party to a conflict. In such scenarios,  international attention will become focused on the integrity and  safety of UNAMID and its members, rather than on solving Sudan’s  problems.  

What Next?  

The prospects for Chad in the immediate future are dire indeed. The  worst prospect is a massacre of the civilian opposition followed by a  battle for N’djamena which causes immense destruction, displacement  and bloodshed, and creates a new vortex of instability in Africa.  

President Deby may survive and regroup. He might be able to do this  with his domestic and Darfurian reinforcements, but France’s role  will be crucial. Most probably, Chad and France will try their  hardest to portray the war as a Sudanese invasion and bring it to the  UN Security Council on those terms. This could be a cover for Deby to  eliminate civilian opposition and counter-attack in Darfur.  

The rebels may succeed in overrunning N’djamena, leaving a ruined  city controlled by factional leaders who distrust one another and  cannot form a government, with Sudanese security playing a leading  role in brokering whatever agreement is possible. A government formed  under these conditions would certainly be an international pariah.  

A third scenario, familiar from Chad’s history, is collapse into  warlordism. The chances for a fourth—political agreement and the  construction of a civilian alternative—is fading by the hour.  

Alex De Waal is the director of Justice Africa  (www.justiceafrica.org). This article was posted at http://www.justiceafrica.org  by Alex de Waal as part of the Making Sense of  Darfur Blog http://www.ssrc.org/blog/category/darfur . This article also appeared in Pambazuka News and may be viewed at  http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/45872

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